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SUMMARY 
 
This research examines the legal issues surrounding killing in defence of property 
in three selected jurisdictions: South Africa, Cameroon and the United States. The 
comparative analysis illustrates that although the right to protect one’s property is 
universal, this defence is interpreted differently in the various jurisdictions. Another 
issue considered in the study is the constitutional right to life in each jurisdiction 
and whether or not an unlawful attack against one’s property creates a legal 
entitlement for the attacked party to take the life of another in defence of his or her 
property. 
Private defence of property is available when a person uses force to defend an 
interest in property, for example; to prevent a would-be thief from taking his own, or 
another’s property, to prevent someone from damaging his own or another’s 
property, to prevent an intruder from entering his own or another’s property. When 
an accused pleads private defence, his claim is that his harm-causing conduct 
was, in the circumstances, lawful. The reasonable use of force (short of deadly 
force) in the private defence of property is not disputed. However, the use of 
deadly force in protection of property is controversial, especially in a constitutional 
state such as South Africa where life should be prized above property. One should 
however also consider that there is a close link between the private defence of 
defending life and of protecting property. In many cases, an assault on property 
also involves a threat on life. However, there are cases of private defence of 
property where no threat to bodily integrity exists. These situations will be 
examined in all three jurisdictions and measured against the various constitutional 
imperatives. Conclusions and recommendations are made as regards the legal 
framework on the defence of property in the criminal law of the various 
jurisdictions. 
KEY WORDS: private defence of property, self-defence, lethal force, right to life
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE DEFENCE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
“[E]very man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and 
members.”1 
In South Africa, one often hears from relatives or friends that they have been 
victims of a criminal attack on the street or at home, or how their family homes 
were invaded by criminals and family members assaulted, raped or murdered and 
valuable properties stolen. From these reports, it may appear that there is in fact 
no state security2 and that the police merely perform a symbolic role in terms of 
security as they may only reach the scene after the crime has been committed. 
In this regard, South Africans are much more fearful of crime than they were ten 
years ago.3 This growing panic has prompted a wide range of self-protective 
measures as many people prepare themselves in anticipation of a possible criminal 
encounter.4  This situation poses dangers of its own because if these persons err 
on the part of caution, they may lose their lives. If they err on the side of violence, 
they may lose their freedom.  
                                                          
1 The words of Thomas Hobbes as quoted by Kaufman Justified Killing: The Paradox of Self-
Defense (2009) 44.  
2 See eg the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC), where 
the Constitutional Court recognised the existence of a legal duty resting on the state to protect 
citizens against violent crimes. See also Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 
2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA). 
3 Burton, Du Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry & Van Vuuren National Victims of Crime Survey South 
Africa (2004) 142. 
4 Du Plessis “When Can I Fire? Use of Lethal Force to Defend Property” 2004 8 SACQ 2004 3. 
Prince & Thompson “The Inalienable Right to Stand your Ground” 2015 27 St Thomas LR 32 
state that “the common law has always recognized the inalienable right of the individual to stand 
his ground and defend his life when the civil government cannot - or will not - timely intervene”. 
The authors further assert at 46-47 that “[e]very man has a right to defend himself or his 
property, or even to defend others, where there is not time or opportunity to call in aid or the civil 
power”. 
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It is an established fact that everybody has the right to protect one’s life and that of 
others. This right may in certain circumstances even be extended to protect one’s 
property from being unlawfully appropriated by an offender. In this regard, private 
defence may be employed by individuals against an unlawful attack on a person or 
property. It is however argued that a person does not have the right to assume the 
duty of the police by protecting what he subjectively believes to be in the interest of 
justice.  
An underlying reason for the existence of private defence is that it serves to uphold 
justice in general. It is submitted that the person acting in private defence acts in 
place of the state or police, because it is impossible for the police to constantly 
protect everybody as well as their properties wherever society may find 
themselves. Therefore, at issue in all instances of private defence is the fine 
dividing line between justice and injustice.5 
As a general rule, morality does not permit the intentional killing of a person to 
defend property or even the lives of several others. Nonetheless the ground of 
justification of private defence presents a unique and unexplained exception to this 
general rule.  Although the application of private defence requires a proportionality 
test6 as regards the lawfulness of the conduct, it is still considered by many 
barbaric to inflict the death penalty on a wrongdoer merely for the unlawful 
appropriation of property.7 It is thus necessary to investigate how the law fills this 
gap; since the law does not permit persons to resort to force or violence to protect 
                                                          
5 Snyman “The Two Reasons for the Existence of Private Defence and their Effect on the Rules 
relating to the Defence in South Africa” 2004 17 SACJ 192. According to Bell “Stand Your 
Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and Misunderstood” 2015 46 U Mem LR 433: 
“Police cannot protect every single person every day. Absent their presence or some special 
undertaking, police do not have a duty to protect individuals who are threatened with harm. 
Criminals do not usually attack or assail people in front of the police, so even if police had such a 
duty, nothing would change. As a result, states seek to protect people from criminals by allowing 
them to protect themselves when it becomes necessary”. 
6 This test will be discussed in the various chapters to follow. 
7 Kaufman (n1 supra) 43. 
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their interests, expecting that they will invoke the agency of law enforcement for 
this specific purpose.8 
A point of interest here is whether a situation can ever exist where the killing of an 
offender or trespasser will be found to be proportionate to the value of the property 
sought to be protected. This position has already been evaluated by the South 
African courts and was answered in the affirmative.9 In light of the Van Wyk-case 
as well as other decided case law in selected jurisdictions, the various approaches 
followed by the courts of these countries will also be examined; by comparing and 
exploring the applicable laws from these countries to the approach followed by the 
courts in South Africa. 
In South Africa, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution10 enshrines the rights of all 
people and affirms the value of human dignity and freedom.11 This means that 
every individual has inherent rights and dignity which are protected and guaranteed 
by means of the Constitution.12 These rights are further enhanced by section 
12(1)(c) which warrants freedom and security of the person.13 This right is 
especially applicable to the issue of private defence.14 
Protecting one’s property from being stolen and harming the criminal in the process 
may lead to one’s arrest for alleged unlawful conduct. By implication, the law may 
declare certain acts to constitute criminal conduct which the public at large may 
                                                          
8 Burchell South African Criminal Law and ProcedureVolume I: General Principles of Criminal Law 
4thed (2011) 121. 
9 See eg Ex Parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A); hereinafter S v Van 
Wyk. One has to consider thought that this case was evaluated before the introduction of the SA 
Constitution in 1996. 
10 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the SA Constitution). 
11 SA Constitution (n10 supra) s 7(1). 
12 The SA Constitution (n10 supra) s 10 states that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected. 
13 According to s 12(1)(c) of the SA Constitution (n10 supra): “(1) Everyone has the right to 
freedom and security of the person, which includes the right - (c) to be free from all forms of 
violence from either public or private sources”. 
14 Another important subsidiary right in this respect is the right to privacy (s 14), which includes the 
right not to have their homes invaded and possessions seized. 
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think to be lawful.15 It thus becomes necessary to ascertain whether especially the 
South African courts are meeting the expectations of the Constitution since they 
“were given the power to declare invalid any law or conduct inconsistent with the 
Constitution”.16 
It has been stipulated that if one has to raise the defence of private defence in 
terms of property; there must be an unlawful threat or danger; a legal interest in 
property must be threatened or endangered; the threat or danger must be serious 
and a threat or danger must be present.17  It would be important to understand how 
the courts quantify or measure such counter-attack to equate the attack so as to 
free the defender. This research will focus most particularly on cases that involve 
the loss of life as a result of home invasion and robberies. It aims at comparing 
how this aspect of the law operates in other countries and the position the South 
African legal system holds, and to advance any possible recommendations in this 
regard. 
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
Despite the fact that everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, 
and freedom from deprivation of property,18 which includes the right to be free from 
all forms of violence from either public or private sources,19 there are many 
incidences where these rights are not respected by criminals.20 Consequently, the 
                                                          
15 Smith Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (1989) 4. 
16 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 2. 
17 Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers, Leslie & Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa (2013) 
82. 
18 See also s 25 of the SA Constitution (n10 supra), which enshrines the right to property, which is 
a standard international human right. 
19 See the SA Constitution (n10 supra) s 12. 
20 This is evident when one considers the atrocities committed by a single criminal gang within the 
space of one year. According to Mbangeni “Suspects Own up to Crimes, but Tormented 
Residents Left in the Dark” The Star (2013) 6, a gang committed robbery (Barbara and Jennifer 
in July), committed housebreaking and the theft of several items (Johannes’ house), the 
attempted murder of Joel in August, the attempted murder and robbery of Lelanie in August, the 
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private defence of property is still not treated with the necessary gravity as other 
cases of private defence.  
There are many factors that need to be considered when a defender is responding 
to protecting property in terms of the attack as well as the defence. It has been 
specified that the use of force must be necessary; the force used must be 
reasonable; and the force must be directed against the attacker or would-be 
attackers.21 What ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’ force entails remains an issue to 
take into consideration in this research.  
Another problem is what requirements, considered in the interest of justice, equity 
and morality, as well as criminal liability, really exist in cases of killing in defence of 
property that would exonerate the defender. Moreover, the courts use an objective 
test to determine the limits of private defence, and a subjective test in determining 
the defender’s intention. The issue here is whether judicial weight is based on 
either the objective or subjective test; taking into consideration the exigencies of 
the situation and the practicalities involved, when considering possible prosecution. 
Killing in defence of property is a legal issue as well as a practical problem. As the 
general public do not fully grasp the law of private defence, they are likely to have 
impromptu responses in situations where they are unlawfully attacked and their 
possessions unlawfully appropriated. It is contended that a cross-section of South 
African citizens are still unaware or in doubt as to whether killing in defence of 
property is legitimate and to which degree this ground of justification may be 
applied.  
In a case concerning the killing of a person in defence of property, it is submitted 
that the constitutional right to life is likely to be given more precedence over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
assault and robbery of Sibusiso and his family in August, the theft of horse blankets from Lilian 
in August, the murder and robbery of Andre in September, further murders, attempted murders 
and robberies, and so the list continues. In each of these incidents, the men surprised their 
victims while they were already at home or on their arrival at home.  
21 Kemp et al (n17 supra) 83. 
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right to defend property.22  However, an issue which should be deliberated in this 
regard is also whether the item stolen or about to be stolen is a life-serving item for 
the owner. This study will give due consideration to what the law reasonably 
expects from a person in such circumstances. 
The main conundrum of this research will be to ascertain the position of the 
criminal law in South African and the selected jurisdictions, and the role of the 
courts as adjudicators as regards the private defence of property. In South Africa, 
for example, neither the Constitution nor the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA)23 
contains any specific provision with regards to the private defence of property. The 
Constitution only provides for freedom and security of the person which may 
include the defence of property but does not exactly explain what one may infer 
under these terms.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses and research questions 
 
The study examines the adequacy and effectiveness of the legal framework 
dealing with the private defence of property in South Africa by means of a 
comparative approach.  To achieve this objective, the following research questions 
are asked:  
• What does the concept ‘private defence of property’ mean in South Africa as 
well as the jurisdictions of the United States and Cameroon? 
• Do the various histories of private defence laws in the selected jurisdictions 
contribute to the current perceptions of the concept? 
• Do South Africa and the selected jurisdictions have appropriate and effective 
legislation in place for addressing private defence of property?  
                                                          
22 Du Plessis (n4 supra) 1.The balancing of rights in the South African Bill of Rights will be 
explained in Chapter 4. 
23 The South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA). 
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• Why do the legislations on private defence of property differ in the various 
selected jurisdictions? 
• Do these laws comply with the various constitutional directives? 
• Should more comprehensive laws be implemented in order to address the 
possible escalation of private defence of property incidences? 
 
The hypotheses underlying the research are the following:  
• Crime is a growing problem in especially South Africa. Citizens need to 
protect themselves and their property in cases where law-enforcement 
interception is minimal. 
• Although all theories of private defence originate from common geneses, 
these concepts have developed in each jurisdiction according to specific 
needs and circumstances. 
• The selected jurisdictions need to adopt more comprehensive and 
instructive private defence legislation. 
• Killing in defence of property may be against constitutional prerequisites. 
 
1.4 Aim of study 
 
• Adequacy and efficacy of current legal framework on private defence 
 
As pointed out above, the purpose of this study is to examine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the legal framework dealing with the private defence of property in 
South Africa and the other selected jurisdictions. In order to achieve this objective, 
an overview of the legal framework concerning private defence in three selected 
jurisdictions will be provided. The comparative analyses will constitute the 
applicable legal framework of two foreign jurisdictions and that of South Africa. 
Where applicable, mention will be made to international instruments. 
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• Promotion of a universal legal framework on private defence 
 
Considering the fact that most countries have ratified international instruments 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),24 it is peculiar that 
South Africa as well as other countries still have divergent considerations as to the 
killing in defence of property.25 Moreover, the fact that the right of private defence 
is a natural right, founded not in the law of society, but in the law of nature,26 and 
the fact that the extent of the right of private defence is undefined by the law of 
nature, necessitates the importance in exploring and comparing the applicable 
laws from the selected jurisdictions of the United States and Cameroon to that of 
South Africa; and evaluating whether justice is effectively administered by these 
jurisdictions in this regard. From the decided case law of the various countries, it 
will be investigated whether judges ground their decisions regarding the private 
defence of property on ideological considerations; by means of logical, 
comprehensive contemplations; or rely strictly on the criminal law of the particular 
jurisdiction. In other words, it will be determined what the test for the killing in 
defence of property is in the selected jurisdictions, with a particular focus on the 
situation in South Africa. A universally-acceptable definition of the private defence 
of property is furthermore crucial so as to encourage a clear understanding of this 
ground of justification. 
 
• Illumination of concept 
Confusion as to what exactly private defence constitutes still exists, especially 
amongst the lay person. The boundaries of private defence, particularly as regards 
the private defence of property, are even more confusing. This misapprehension 
                                                          
24 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) (hereinafter UDHR). 
25 The Sudanese Penal Code 2003 under s 62(a) & (b) permits killing where the threat involves 
harm to both property and to the person. While other countries like Nigeria permits the right to 
kill in defence of property, this is in regard to certain types of property only (see s 282 of the 
Southern Nigerian Criminal Code).  
26 Livingstone “The Right to Shoot a Burglar” 1894-1895 (1)2 University Law Review 26. 
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can lead to persons being prosecuted in situations where they thought their acts 
were lawful. A lack of an explicit definition can also lead to poor prosecution. For 
example, the common law allows a person to use “reasonable force” to defend 
himself, another or his property. The question here is whether it would be 
reasonable to use deadly force for the protection of property, assuming that no 
means short of killing could have prevented the commission of the crime. In this 
regard, one has to consider a scenario where the only way X could prevent Y from 
stealing his life-saving item was to kill Y. One is left to contemplate whether such 
force was reasonable or what degree of force would be regarded as “reasonable” 
in the eyes of the law to vindicate such a defender (X) from criminal liability? In 
other words, when would or is a person justified for killing a robber or home 
invader? There are no definitional prescriptions in cases such as these.  
 
• Compilation of more detailed private defence legislation 
A further aim of this study is to produce an updated, contemporary and 
comparative compilation of the law that relates to private defence in South Africa 
and selected foreign jurisdictions. Although the study does not purport to provide a 
solution to the predicament of the private defence of property, the research will 
endeavour to provide a critical perspective on current efforts to prosecute such 
cases. 
 
• Outcome of research 
Although many offences such as house-breaking with the intent to steal and 
domestic robbery do not involve the killing of the perpetrator, it is quite possible 
that in our violent society with ever-increasing crime statistics the courts may 
encounter an influx of such cases of private defence. It is thus of the utmost 
importance that research be undertaken to guide both the general public as well as 
the courts in contending with such cases. The intended outcome of the research is 
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to make recommendations regarding the adoption of appropriate legislation and 
the implementation of other strategies to effectively deal with cases where house 
robberies lead to the death of the offender. After the applicable laws on private 
defence in other countries have been considered, and this information applied to 
the position of the South African law on the killing in defence of property, possible 
recommendations will be advanced as practical guidelines for the courts and the 
public at large. 
 
1.5 Scope and limitations of study 
This study provides a critical and comprehensive account of the private defence of 
property and the prosecution thereof. The research will focus on private defence 
legislation in South Africa and in the legal systems of the United States of America 
and Cameroon. Comparative research will be conducted regarding the difference 
in approach followed with regard to the prosecution of private defence 
transgressions in these jurisdictions.  
The comparative research is conducted in the context of the different jurisdictions’ 
historical, legal and cultural environments. In all three legal systems, there are 
strong resemblances regarding the supremacy of a constitution. All three 
constitutions also exhibit particular influences. The Bill of Rights (Amendments 1-
10) in the Constitution of the United States was inspired by the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.27 The Cameroonian Constitution and Bill of Rights are also partially 
based on the English common law.28 The South African constitutional system has 
                                                          
27 Schwartz The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights (2002) 1-2. 
28 The legal system also includes French civil law. See Bringer “The Abiding Influence of English 
and French Criminal Law in One African Country: Some Remarks regarding the Machinery of 
Criminal Justice in Cameroon” 1981 25 J Afr L3. 
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drawn inspiration from many sources, which includes Roman-Dutch, English, and 
German law.29 
The legal system of the United States is selected for research purposes since it is 
represents many different approaches when dealing with cases relating to self-
defence of property in the various states. It will be interesting to research the 
reasons why there are so much diversion in this jurisdiction when dealing with this 
ground of justification. The jurisdiction of Cameroon is selected as a typical product 
from the Colonial era. It is also the country where the researcher hails from. 
Cameroon is unique in the sense that it has a bi-jural legal system where both 
English common law and French civil law coexists in a single jurisdiction. 
Customary law also still plays a very active role in Cameroon. From the evidence 
collected in the Cameroonian chapter it will be seen that there is a great shortage 
of published academic contribution in this area of the law in the country. The 
current situation in Cameroon as regards the legislation and prosecution of private 
defence is researched in the hope that the findings and recommendations of this 
study will contribute to improving the lack of publications as well as the legislation 
on private defence in the jurisdiction. South Africa, as another African country, is 
chosen as the courts have dealt extensively with the ground of justification already 
and could be illustrative of the manner in which other African countries may 
contend with the principle of private defence, especially in defence of property. 
Although not a ground of justification, putative private defence is briefly touched on 
in the discussion of private defence in the various jurisdictions to illustrate cases 
where an accused pleads private defence as he genuinely and reasonably 
believed that he was unlawfully being attacked, but an ex post facto examination of 
the facts indicates that he was not. This defence is however not discussed in the 
third chapter as there are no known cases on putative private defence in 
Cameroon. 
                                                          
29 Sarkin “The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights 
and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions” 1998 1(2) Journal of Constitutional Law 180-181. 
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There have been some difficulties in accessing case law from the various selected 
jurisdictions. Whilst laws enacted by the Cameroonian Parliament and some 
subsidiary legislations are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Cameroon, which is printed by the National Printing Press, there is no regular and 
efficient system of law reporting in Cameroon. At present, cases from the 
Anglophone30 courts are only reported in the Cameroon Common Law Report, 
which is essentially a private initiative of a private law firm. In the Francophone 
region, cases are reported in Juridise Periodique: Revue de Droit et Science 
Politique, which is also a private initiative. On the whole, the reporting of judgments 
in Cameroon is erratic and very poor. Even access to judgments is sometimes a 
challenge because they are hand-written and the records in the archives are poorly 
kept. There is no public law library in any of the English-speaking provinces in 
Cameroon. Moreover, Cameroon is sheltered with no, or a very poor law reporting 
system which made access to information virtually impossible. Despite these 
challenges, every effort has been made to retrieve all possible material for this 
research.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
Since the research is intended to compare the applicable law on killing in defence 
of property in South African criminal law with those of other countries, the research 
design will be comparative and exploratory in nature. A logical-analytical and 
comparative literature review of the relevant domestic and international law will be 
conducted.  
A qualitative research method will be applied in this study. This will include an 
analysis of the South African and other selected jurisdictions’ constitutions, 
statutory legislation, case law, common law, and international treaties and 
                                                          
30 That is the English-speaking provinces in Cameroon. 
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instruments ratified. Further secondary resources such as textbooks, articles, 
reports, internet sources, research papers and theses, as well as periodicals and 
programmes are further consulted. These sources are utilised to support the 
hypotheses made in this research. 
 
1.7 Definition of terms 
Certain terminology utilised in the study need further elaboration at this stage. This 
will be consequently effected. 
 
1.7.1 Criminal liability 
For criminal liability to result, the state (prosecution) must prove, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the accused has committed voluntary conduct which is 
unlawful (actus reus) and that this conduct was accompanied by criminal capacity, 
and fault or culpability (mens rea). An overriding principle of South African criminal 
law is that an act is not unlawful unless there is a guilty mind - expressed in the 
maxim actus non facitreum nisi mens sit rea. The general rule is that culpability is 
required for criminal liability and the culpability element may take the form of 
intention or negligence. 
1.7.2 Unlawful act 
Conduct constitutes doing something (a positive act) or not doing something (an 
omission).31 It includes not only an act that is punishable as a crime for example 
murder and culpable homicide, but also other conduct such as trespassing.32 
                                                          
31 Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3rded (2006) 139. 
32 LaFave Criminal Law 3rd ed (2010) 844. 
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“Unlawful” means contrary to the community’s perception of justice or equity (“boni 
mores”) or the legal convictions of the community.33 
Private defence can be resorted to only in respect of an attack that is unlawful.34 
An attack presupposes a voluntary human act which need not be committed 
culpably; it need not be directed at the defender; and it need not consist of a 
positive act of commission.35 
Unlawful conduct (actus reus) must exist contemporaneously with the guilty 
condition (culpability or mens rea) before criminal liability can result,36 thus, an 
unlawful attack is a positive act. The conduct of the accused must be unlawful in 
order to lead to criminal liability. This means that there must be no defence 
excluding unlawfulness available to the accused. The general defence excluding 
the unlawfulness of conduct is private (self) defence.37 
1.7.3 Killing 
Killing can constitute either murder or culpable homicide. At common law, murder 
is defined as the intentional causing of the death of another person. In American 
criminal law, murder is defined as a homicide committed with malice aforethought. 
Murder is unlawful unless there is some ground of justification which validates the 
unlawful act - it is then regarded as a justifiable homicide or an excusable 
category.38 Since the harming and killing of a person is always prima facie 
unlawful, the accused must lay a proper evidential foundation if he wishes to rely 
on the defence of private defence. Once the state has proved that the accused 
caused the death of another person, or once the accused has admitted this, he 
attracts an evidential burden, that is, he must place some evidence before the 
                                                          
33 Snyman Criminal Law 6th ed (2014) 97-98. 
34 Therefore, one may not defend oneself against lawful arrest. 
35 Singh Self-defence as a Ground of Justification in Cases of Battered Women who Kill their 
Abusive Partners (2009) 89. 
36 Burchell (n8 supra) 117. 
37 Others include necessity, impossibility, public authority or consent. 
38 As aptly termed in the criminal law of the United States. See Pollock Criminal Law (2013) 161. 
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court39 to explain and justify his conduct.40 If the plea of private defence is 
successful, the accused may be set free or be found guilty of a lesser charge such 
as culpable homicide,41 depending on the particular circumstances of the case. 
1.7.4 Private defence 
One of the recognised defences that exclude unlawfulness is self-defence or 
private defence.42 Generally, private defence is defined as the lawful use of force 
to deter an unlawful attack. There are certain conditions attached to both the attack 
and the defensive action. The attack must have already begun, and endanger the 
defender’s or another's life, bodily integrity, or other legitimate interest, inter alia, 
property.43  The defensive act must be levelled at the attacker, essential to protect 
the threatened interest and no more injurious than is required to deflect the attack. 
When an accused pleads private defence, his claim is that the harm-causing 
conduct was, in the circumstances, lawful or permissible.44 
1.7.5 Defence of property 
The right of a man to protect his person or property from injury is known as the 
right of private or self-defence.45 This right to protect one’s self, one’s family, and 
                                                          
39 Kemp et al (n17 supra) 86. 
40 This does not mean that the accused acquires the onus of proof (which in criminal cases is 
always on the state to prove the elements of criminal liability, including unlawful conduct, beyond 
reasonable doubt). 
41 Culpable homicide is defined as the unlawful, negligent causing of the death of a human being. 
42 Private defence is commonly referred to as self-defence. According to some scholars the phrase 
‘private defence’ captures a broader scope of legally-recognised interests. It should be noted 
that these phrases (‘self-defence’ and ‘private defence’) will be used interchangeably in this 
research since they include not only defence of person but also defence of property. Thus, killing 
in defence of property is an aspect of private or self-defence. In the US, the term self-defence is 
employed. 
43 Le Roux “Private Defence: Strict Conditions to be Satisfied Govender v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2009 2 SACR 87 (N)” 2010 (73) THRHR 328. 
44 Mousourakis “Excessive Self-defence and Criminal Liability” 1999 12 SACJ 143. 
45 Livingstone (n26 supra) 26. 
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one’s “castle” is a time-honoured right that existed before the common law and was 
recognised by it.46 
The property interests that are traditionally protected by private defence are 
possession of movable property (theft, robbery) and intrusion upon immovable 
property, which may take the form of either a simple trespass or an unlawful 
invasion of a habitation (housebreaking, damage) or destruction of movable or 
immovable property.  The defence of property may involve the following types of 
defensive action: use of force to prevent a thief from making off with movable 
goods, or for the purpose of recovering stolen property; the infliction of physical 
harm in order to prevent damage of property, or placing protective devices to inflict 
physical harm to prevent anticipated intrusion onto property or premises. 
The existence of this ground of justification highlights the fact that citizens have 
been unable to rely upon the agencies of the state to protect their legal interests.47 
Therefore, it is argued that one is justified in using reasonable force to protect his 
property from theft, when he reasonably believes that his property is in imminent 
danger of such an unlawful interference and that the use of such force is necessary 
to avoid that danger.48 It may be suggested that killing in defence of property may 
no longer pass the test of constitutionality, because there is greater opinion to the 
view that the value of property can never outweigh the value of a human life. As 
such, it may no longer be justifiable to kill in defence of property.49 
1.7.6 Deadly force 
Deadly force is the force utilised that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or 
in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious 
bodily injury.50 Intentionally firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a 
                                                          
46 Pollock (n38 supra) 101. 
47 Burchell (n8 supra) 121. 
48 Lafave (n32 supra) 491. 
49 Kemp et al (n17 supra) 84. 
50 See s 9.01 of Texas Penal Code 1973. 
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vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force.51 In 
other words, deadly force means force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or 
death and includes, but is not limited to shooting at a suspect with a firearm.52 
1.7.7 Security of the person 
Human beings, by their very nature, are concerned with protecting certain basic 
interests such as life, physical integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, property and 
personal freedom. In many legal systems, these interests are considered to be so 
important that they are elevated to the status of human rights.53 The right to 
security of person is guaranteed in article 354 of the UDHR (1948), as well as in the 
constitutions of many countries. In South Africa, the guarantee to security of 
person is found in section 12 of the Bill of Rights: 
12(1)  Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes 
the right  
(a)  not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b)  not to be detained without trial; 
(c)  to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d)  not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e)  not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
 
Security of person is generally understood to be persons’ lawful and continuous 
enjoyment of their lives, bodily integrity, health, reputation and other fundamental 
rights. 
 
                                                          
51 Johnson Criminal Law Cases, Materials and Text 3rd ed (1985) 446. 
52 See eg Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 9 of 2012 s 49(1)(c). In this Act, deadly force may 
be employed under the following circumstances: the suspect poses a threat of serious violence 
to the arrestor or any other person and they need to be protected from imminent or future death 
or grievous bodily harm caused by the suspect if the arrest is delayed, and the offence for which 
the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of 
life-threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm. Although 
the purpose of this Act differs from the common-law defence, it is believed that the phrase 
‘deadly force’ may be similarly interpreted in the ground of justification. 
53 Kemp et al (n17 supra) 8. 
54 Art 3 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” 
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1.8 Chapter outline 
In Chapter 1, the general background to the subject is introduced and the aim, 
method and scope of the dissertation are set out. The reasons for selecting the 
topic of the private defence of property in South Africa; the rationale for the study, 
as well as the statement of the research problem and hypotheses are presented. 
The ambit of the study is outlined and the chapter layout of the study is given. The 
rationale for the selection of the legal systems of three countries for comparative 
purposes is explained.   
Chapter 2 of this study focuses on the manner in which the American legal system 
deals with private defence, especially when lethal force is used to defend property. 
This chapter not only discusses the United States Model Penal Code, but also 
gives a comparative analysis of the way the various American states handles the 
topic.  
The third chapter deals with killing in defence of property in Cameroonian criminal 
law. In Cameroon, the ground of justification known as private defence is regulated 
in the jurisdiction by the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Cameroon, and the Penal Code of Cameroon. Private defence 
cases are tried by criminal as well as customary courts. In Cameroonian criminal 
law, there exist no distinction between private defence of the person and that of 
property. Both cases are considered as lawful defences under section 84 of the 
Penal Code. 
In Chapter 4 killing in defence of property in South African criminal law is 
specifically focused on. After an explanation of the requirements of private defence 
in this jurisdiction, killing in defence of property is elaborated on. It will be seen that 
case law has contributed much to the development of this defence, and that killing 
in defence of property may be a valid defence in this jurisdiction (subject to certain 
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regulations). As a private defence, defence of others and of property, the common 
law endures but only to the extent that it is not incompatible with the South African 
Constitution. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study whereby, taking into consideration the position of 
the law in regards to killing in defence of property in the various jurisdictions 
considered, the main conclusions of the research are summarised, discussed and 
interpreted. Finally, recommendations are made for law reform and practice. The 
findings of the research are that there is scope for improvement in content and 
application of private defence of property in South Africa, the United States and 
especially in Cameroon. 
 
1.9 Summary 
Whether the law should ever justify killing in defence of property is a question 
which cannot be easily answered. This is demonstrated by the existence of several 
diverging approaches to this question. Some countries hold the view that no one 
has the right whatsoever to kill in defence of property, while others would allow a 
right to kill in defence of only certain types of properties. There are furthermore 
other jurisdictions that allow a right to kill only where the threat is to both property 
and person.  
It can generally be accepted that in all circumstances of killing in defence of 
property, there is always a combination of threat to property and person. However, 
it seems as if the law focuses attention mainly on the response of the defenders of 
the property (to their detriment), and thus fails to consider the original intention of 
the trespassers - who are determined to achieve the criminal act but not ready to 
die in the course of their illegal conduct. This means that in every instance where 
the defender is actually defending property, by implication, his life also is at stake.  
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In all instances, a defender may never have any intention to kill; as he is only 
reacting against an offender who manifestly intends by violence or surprise to 
commit a known crime. If this encounter results in the death of the intruder, it 
becomes interesting to explore whether the law would incriminate the defender for 
not sacrificing his life or possessions.   
Whichever approach might be supported by the various jurisdictions, it is generally 
accepted that the right to kill in defence of property, if given, must be carefully 
circumscribed. This is because such a right comprises an exception to the basic 
principle that human life is more valuable than property.55 It will be of great interest 
to explore this particular area of the law so as to understand whether killing in 
defence of property could be viewed as a ‘personal excuse’56 rather than a general 
ground for justification to avoid contradicting the South African Constitution.
                                                          
55 Yeo “African Approaches to Killing in Defence of Property” 2008 41CILSA 352. 
56 This means that in such situations, each case ought to be judged based on those particular 
circumstances. This is so because when a crime has been committed in a manner that 
somehow implicates an inability to control one’s actions, the criminal ought to receive no or a 
lesser punishment since that person did not freely choose to kill (not implying the reasonable 
man’s test in cases of negligence). 
21 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
PRIVATE DEFENCE OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 
  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the United States criminal law regarding killing in defence of 
property, and justification as a ground for self-defence. In order to illustrate these 
critical principles, a brief background to the concept of private defence in the 
United States criminal law will be provided. The requirements for self-defence 
according to United States law will also be discussed in this chapter, taking into 
consideration applicable legislation and case law. Legislation on private defence in 
other common-law jurisdictions will be compared to the United States law in order 
to provide possible recommendations. 
While the United States applies a federal system of government, various states still 
have Penal Codes and other laws which are applicable only in that particular 
state.1 Much ink has been spilled in a bid to pinpoint a specific approach when 
dealing with cases relating to self-defence in the various states. The various 
approaches will be illustrated in this chapter. 
An important issue that will also be taken into consideration in this chapter is the 
fact that it is not whether the accused’s beliefs were truthful but whether they were 
reasonable such that the conduct of the accused may be justified or excused. 
When a defendant raises the defence of private defence in the United States, it 
does not necessarily mean that no crime has been committed - such a defence 
merely represents the fact that the defendant may go unpunished due to public 
                                                          
1 The Constitution of United States established a system of government called a federal system 
which allows for power-sharing between the national and state government.  The judiciary has 
both federal and state courts. Each court tries particular cases but is not independent from one 
another. For more information, see United States Courts Administrative Office “Why Two 
Courts Systems?” http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/federal-court-
basics/ why-two-courts-systems.aspx (accessed 30/04/2015). 
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policy. This means that the conditions to be taken into consideration are evaluated 
based on the standard of reasonableness. To weigh up these requirements of 
reasonableness, various courts2 in the United States have developed a mixed 
standard of both objective and subjective tests, taking into consideration the 
particular circumstances of the accused when the unlawful act was committed.   
Some of the courts in this jurisdiction have held that the application of fatal force is 
not necessary in cases involving a simple intrusion into a dwelling home. Other 
courts have decided that the application of lethal force is permitted in cases where 
the defender reasonably thought that the trespasser was going to harm him or any 
other family member.3 This will be elaborated later in this chapter.  
Another issue to be considered of this jurisdiction is the right to life as enumerated 
in the United States Constitution, that is, whether one has a legal right in the case 
of an unlawful attack to kill another in the course of defending his property or 
whether such an act would be regarded as unconstitutional. In the subsequent 
paragraphs, the ground of justification of private defence will be elucidated; 
principles and requirements of private defence will be clarified where after putative 
private defence and killing in defence of property in the United States will be 
discussed. 
 
2.2 The concept of private defence in United States criminal law 
One of the important rationales behind the United States criminal law is to clearly 
outline behaviours that are regarded as unacceptable by society, and to deter such 
                                                          
2 Courts at federal, state and local levels. 
3 The United States’ courts had earlier held this view which was based on the English position 
that the defence of a dwelling house was to be regarded as if the defender was defending life. 
In this regard, the householder is permitted to exert fatal or deadly force in situations where it is 
necessary, and reasonable in order to avoid possible entry. However, a warning is required for 
the intruder not to continue with his unlawful act. Some legal experts had criticized this rule as 
being too broad. See LaFave Criminal Law 3rd ed (2010) 505. 
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conduct by means of punishment.4 It should be noted that the criminal law in the 
United States is an amalgam of both common law and statutes. However, this does 
not encompass all the laws in the United States as some of the prohibited offences 
can only be found as precedents in court decisions.5 
The United States jurisprudence has acknowledged the permissibility of self-
defence in particular cases. Nevertheless, in comparison with other jurisdictions, 
different reasons allowing the application of lethal force are predetermined. This at 
times exposes possible differences in the scope and the strengths of the defence.6 
The United States criminal law explicitly holds that a person is allowed to apply 
deadly force when there is a sound belief that an impending and unjust aggression 
exists.7 This explains why in justification defences it is admitted that the defender is 
liable for his act; nevertheless it is also proclaimed that the act of the defender was 
not wrongful.8 Thus, for the defender’s act to be regarded as a justification there 
must exists a set of factors which correspond with the defender’s conviction for the 
need to defend, thereby making lawful what could have been regarded as 
unlawful.9 Kahan and Braman explain the defence as such: 
The conventional formulation of private defence effectively permits the use of deadly 
force only to protect one’s life. However, in many other situations this doctrine may 
authorize the use of deadly force when necessary to protect a myriad other interests 
- property, equality and the like. This explains why the United States recognises a 
person’s moral agency to demand respect not just for his bodily integrity but for his 
                                                          
4 Fontaine “A Symposium on Self-Defence: An Attack on Self-Defence” 2010 47 Am Crim LR 63. 
5 Smith Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (1989) 1. 
6 Uniacke “Self-Defense and Natural Law” 1991 36(1) Am J Juris 73.  
7 Uniacke (n6 supra) 100. This is so because "[w]hen seconds count, the police are only minutes 
or hours away, if they come at all” Prince & Thompson “The Inalienable Right to Stand your 
Ground” 2015 27 St Thomas LR 32. They assert that “English and American common law 
historically allowed an individual to use reciprocal force to fend off an imminent attack”. Ibid.  
8 Fontaine (n4 supra) 62. Prince & Thompson (n7 supra) 43 state: “If one who is assaulted, 
being himself without fault in bringing on the difficulty, reasonably apprehends death or great 
bodily harm to himself unless he kills the assailant, the killing is justifiable”. 
9 Singh Self-Defence as a Ground of Justification in Cases of Battered Women Who Kill their 
Abusive Partners (Unpublished LLD thesis UNISA Pretoria 2009) 121. 
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dominion over property, his entitlement to social deference, his enjoyment of 
individual liberty, and so on, this would still be a doctrine of self-defence.10 
In this regard, it is assumed just and fair that if there is no prospect for an attacked 
person to depend on a law enforcement agency for assistance, he has the right to 
take all steps that are reasonably necessary to defend himself or his property. The 
intentional application of lethal force on the aggressor is said to be justified in these 
circumstances. Thus, the defender is not culpable of any unlawful conduct.11 
There are two important concerns under the United States law of self-defence 
which need to be understood: the first is that “self-defence may be a defence of 
either justification or excuse; and secondly, in dealing with the conditions of self-
defence, the courts agree that the significant question is that of the reasonableness 
of the conduct and beliefs of the accused”12 existing at the time of his act. On this 
note, one could assert that self-defence seems to overlap with both justification 
and excuse. This suggests a situation where an unlawful act would either be 
justified or excused.13 
Whatever the case, when balancing the parties’ interests, it should be presumed 
that one of the parties acted unlawfully while the other acted lawfully. This means 
that although there is a right to life, this right is not absolute since some properties 
may be considered as life-sustaining to the owner.14 
                                                          
10 Kahan & Braman “The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense” 2008 45(1) Am Crim LR 18. 
11 LaFave (n3 supra) 491. 
12 Singh (n9 supra)172. Ingram “Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-defense” 
2011-2012 39 Am J Crim L 429 further explains that “New York courts have interpreted 
reasonableness in terms of the beliefs of the reasonable person. As such, a reasonable belief 
is defined by what a reasonable person could have believed in the circumstances of the 
defendant”. Jackson “Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances” 2013 50 San Diego 
LR 706 confirms that: “[T]he reasonable person's circumstances must include the physical 
facts known to the defendant, for example, the physical layout of the nearby space and the 
shape and size of nearby objects, and the defendant's mental characteristics associated with 
perception…”. 
13 Smith (n5 supra) 1. These positions will be illuminated later.  
14 Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers, Leslie & Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa 
(2013) 84; LaFave (n3 supra) 504. 
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In the hereto following sections, the concepts of justification and excuse, the right 
to retreat and the “castle” doctrine will be taken into consideration to determine 
whether killing another so as to protect property is legal in the United States 
criminal law.  
 
2.2.1 Self-defence as justification 
In the United States, self-defence is regarded as a ground of justification in the 
jurisdiction,15 if it is not considered an excuse. Traditionally there have been many 
debates16 in Anglo-American criminal law whether certain positive acts of defence 
are in nature regarded as an excuse or a justification. One of the reasons behind 
this continuous debate lies in the different degrees of the positive act of defence in 
question. Self-defence has been found difficult to classify by American theorists, 
especially in cases where it was based on the mistaken belief of the facts by the 
defender. The terms - justification and excuse - are useful17 to differentiate 
between behaviour that is acceptable and lawful on the one hand, and an 
unacceptable and unlawful act on the other.18 Excuse will be further discussed 
infra as imperfect private defence in this chapter. 
By its nature, justification is applicable to the principle of penal proportionality in 
order to administer punishment that is not more or less than is necessary.19 
Justified action is not prohibited, and is therefore regarded as correct behaviour. It 
                                                          
15 Fontaine (n4 supra) 61. 
16 It has been recognized that “[i]n the field of Anglo-American criminal-law theory perhaps no 
subject has been more invoked the past twenty odd years than the distinction between 
justification and excuse”. See Fontaine (n4 supra) 57. 
17 Wright “Self-defence and the Classification of Defences” 1992 7 Auckland Univ LR 127.  
18 See Fontaine (n4 supra) 66; Slater “Making Sense of Self-Defence” 1996 5 Nottingham LJ 
154. 
19 Fontaine (n4 supra) 62. Responsibility is absent as the attack was not initiated by him, and his 
defensive act is a direct response of the unlawful attack. It should be noted that justified 
actions are intentional, although done with a motive that negatives criminal liability. 
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is therefore is not only tolerated but in many cases, it is positively evaluated and 
encouraged as a good behaviour.20 
It is submitted that the doctrine of self-defence is in fact a full-justification 
defence,21 for example; where a choice has to be made between the aggressor’s 
life and the life of the defender, the law would prefer the latter.22 As such, killing in 
self-defence is considered justified homicide in some states in the United States 
when the killer reasonably thought that the aggressor poses an impending risk of 
death or bodily impairment.23 The victim is not required to resist, and other persons 
acquire a right to assist24 the defender. Accordingly:  
…[c]onduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be 
avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged25… 
From the above excerpt it can be deduced that justification concerns itself more 
with the criminality of the act rather than the actor. Thus, where the application of 
force is concerned, the extent of justified force is guided by force that is 
indispensable and proportionate in the circumstances. This means that the 
subjective opinion of the defender is not necessary in the eyes of the law. Here, the 
act is analysed by considering the nature of the defender’s act. If the court 
concludes that the defender’s act is justified in the sense that it was necessary and 
proportionate, then it is needless to find an excuse for it.26 
                                                          
20 Fontaine (n4 supra) 62. 
21 Fontaine (n4 supra) 59. Bell “Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and 
Misunderstood” 2015 46 U Mem LR 384 states: “Man, animals and all organisms seek to 
survive. When confronted with danger, the fight or fight instinct compels man and animals to do 
what is necessary to preserve his or its life.” 
22 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 7. 
23 Fontaine (n4 supra) 60-61. 
24 Wright (n17 supra) 140. 
25 United States Model Penal Code 1962 Title 2: General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, 
Chapter 9: Justification excluding criminal responsibility s 3.02(1) (hereinafter US Penal Code). 
26 Slater (n18 supra) 148.    
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Justification has two distinct approaches. The first is that it may be regarded as an 
exception to an offence (that is the “implicit elements” approach), or it may be seen 
as a privilege to commit a certain offence in a given circumstance (that is the 
“licence” approach). The license approach to justification holds the view that a non-
aggressor has the liberty or “licence” to respond in some specific way, even if it is 
deemed as unlawful, if certain triggering conditions exist. According to the licence 
approach such reactive act is longer unlawful conduct, although such conduct is 
generally condemned.27 It is only tolerated in circumstances where, by causing 
such harm, a greater civil harm is avoided. 
The implicit elements approach holds that a defender with a valid justification has 
committed no crime.28 Once an offence is justified, it is no longer regarded as a 
crime.29  
 
2.2.2 The duty to flee 
There is a strong policy in the United States against the unnecessarily taking of a 
human life; although private defence grants the actor the right to defend his life. An 
issue that needs to be clarified in this regard is whether the defender, instead of 
standing his ground and utilising force, is obliged to run away as an alternative. As 
previously mentioned, it has been noted that the self-defender has no duty to flee 
from his home or workplace. Although the law does not require a person to run 
away, it does require that he requests the aggressor to desist, except where such a 
request would be a waste of time or risky to himself and his property. It may be 
argued that a person is not required to retreat when he is being attacked in his 
home.  
                                                          
27 Wright (n17 supra) 130. 
28 Wright (n17 supra) 129. 
29 Fontaine (n4 supra) 63.  
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In most jurisdictions in the United States, however, a person may use lethal force 
in order to ward off a deadly attack around his home despite the possibility of 
escaping.30 This implies that a person need not flee from his home or business 
place if threatened with lethal force; even if there is the possibility to do so.31 In a 
decided case, the court, relying on the state’s constitutional right to defend property 
declared that the agent of a shopkeeper has “no duty to comply with a robber's 
unlawful demand for the surrender of property,”32 even in situations where the 
robbers are threatening the shopkeeper’s life.  
State courts33 have disagreed on the obligation to attempt to retreat. This explains 
why it was held by a South Carolina court34 that any person who is attacked within 
his premises without fault is not required by law to flee. However, a Louisiana 
court, in discussing the duty to retreat, noted that although there is no duty for the 
attacker to retreat,35 the likelihood of escaping is a recognised factor to take into 
consideration when determining whether the defender reasonably believed that 
lethal force was required to ward off the danger, to sustain his claim of self-defence 
on a homicide charge.   
According to Pollock: 
In other states, the so-called “stand your ground”-laws have expanded the legal right 
to use lethal force. Even in states that recognise a duty to retreat, the “castle 
exception” indicates that one is not obligated to retreat if the threat occurs within the 
parameters of one’s own home. Thus, an intruder who poses an imminent threat of 
                                                          
30 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 9-10. . In this vein, Bell (n21 supra) 387 notes that the law does 
“not require a person to retreat if the ‘fierceness of the assault’ was so fierce that retreating 
would increase a defender's danger of death or great bodily harm”. 
31 LaFave (n3 supra) 491. It has been stated that “a man is not obliged to retreat and, in fact, may 
even pursue the initial assailant until the danger has passed”. See Prince & Thompson (n7 
supra) 42. 
32 Kentucky Fried Chicken of California v Superior Court 927 P 2d 1260, 1269-70 (Cal 1997).  
33 A state court is the final arbitrator regarding the state’s laws and Constitution. A state court 
hears, eg, most criminal, probate, contracts, tort, and family law cases.  
34 S v Long 480 SE 2d 62 (SC 1997) 63. 
35 S v Barnes 729 So 2d 44 (La 1999). 
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bodily harm may be met with force without having to retreat from the home or within 
the home to a different room.36 
Although it could be said that a person is expected to run away in a case where 
force, especially deadly force, could be avoided, this will not be the case where 
moderate force can be applied in self-defence. It can thus be concluded here that 
under the duty to flee the right to use deadly force would apply only when the 
attacker cannot safely flee, or is in his premise or workplace.37 
 
2.2.3 The “castle” doctrine 
The doctrine is not a new concept. Two more doctrines had been developed in this 
regard under the common law. The first is that the “castle” doctrine excludes 
persons who are being attacked in their homes from the duty to retreat; and the 
second permits the application of deadly defensive force to defend the home.38 It 
has been accepted as far back as the nineteenth century that a dwelling house is a 
person’s place of shelter and thus worthy of protection.39 This is so because for 
most people the home represents the most important source of personal protection 
from a criminal attack; hence the oft-quoted remark “the house of everyone is to 
him as his castle and fortress”. The United States Penal Code further expands the 
“castle” doctrine to include the defender’s workplace.40 The “castle” doctrine 
                                                          
36 Pollock Criminal Law 10th ed (2013) 105. 
37 Volokh “State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defence and Defence of Property” 2006-2007 
Texas Review of Law and Politics 399-418, 412. 
38 A case in support of this doctrine is the 1924 English case of R v Hussey (1924) 18 Cr App 
Rep 160, where the reason a tenant shot and killed his landlady was because she was trying 
to evict him.The notice of eviction that was given to the tenant by the landlady was an invalid 
one. She had mistakenly believed that she had the right to do so.The court; in holding the 
shooting justified noted that, “it would be lawful for a man to kill one who would unlawfully 
dispossess him of his home, even though there was no suggestion that the defendant was 
threaded with serious injury”.  
39 See, eg, Fustel de Coulanges La Cité Antique (The Ancient City) (1864) 50, where in a history 
of the Roman Republic it is stated that “to enter this house with any malevolent intention was a 
sacrilege. The domicile was inviolable.”  
40 US Penal Code (n25 supra) s 3.05(2)(b)(ii). Stand-Your-Ground laws “expand the ‘Castle 
Doctrine’ - a common-law doctrine by which deadly force may be used in self-defense or to 
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therefore affirms that a defender is entitled to stand his ground if attacked in his 
home.  
It is important to mention here that the “castle” doctrine will not apply to every 
situation. In S v Page,41 the appellant’s assertion was that his neighbour attacked 
him along a common walkway in front of their apartments. The “castle” doctrine 
was however not applied by the court in this case on the ground that the appellant 
had retreated into his apartment. The court regarded this approach necessary for 
an accurate implementation of the criminal law. The court observed that: “to rule 
otherwise would, in effect, allow shoot-outs between persons with equal rights to 
be in common area.”42 A question here is whether the “castle” doctrine also applies 
to the co-occupant? In Cooper v US,43 the appellant, who was living with his 
brother in their home shot his brother in the living room in reaction to a supposed 
home invasion. The court in this case held that the “castle” doctrine was applicable 
to co-occupants.44 
In general, the United States’ courts have been comfortable to also afford 
occupants of a dwelling the civil liberties of the “castle” doctrine in cases where the 
occupants are not the house holder. A number of courts have even gone beyond 
the “castle” doctrine by stating that it eliminates any responsibility upon house 
guests to move away when attacked in their host’s home by intruders. The court 
has also recognised the use of deadly force to defend dwelling houses from 
intrusion even in circumstances where the defender may not sustain grievous 
bodily harm.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
prevent a forcible felony when one is in the safety of one’s home - to include public places 
outside the home”. See Abuznaid, Bettinger-Lopez, Cassel & Jagannath “‘Stand Your Ground’ 
Laws: International Human Rights Law Implications” 2013-2014 68 U Miami L Rev 1130. 
41 S v Page 418 So 2d 254 (1982). 
42 S v Page (n41 supra) para 4 as per opinion of McDonald J. 
43 Cooper v US 512 A 2d 1002 (1986) (Dis Col CA). 
44 Co-occupants, “even those unrelated by blood or marriage, have a heightened obligation to 
treat each other with the degree of tolerance and respect. That obligation does not evaporate 
when one co-occupant disregards it and attacks another” Cooper v US (n43 supra) para 1006. 
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In S v Mitcheson,45 the court held that a guest who was attending his sister’s party 
did not owe any duty to retreat before using fatal defensive force against the 
attacker. Similarly, the court in Beard v US46 had noted that the defendant, who 
was attacked in his field which was some 50-60 yards,47 was not under any 
obligation to retreat from his house. Whilst such a distance was in fact close 
enough to the defender’s dwelling house to fall within the definition of a 
“cartilage”,48 it would seem that 200-300 yards49 was too far. This was the situation 
in Danford v State50 where, faced with a comparable set of facts as in Beard v 
US,51 the Florida Supreme Court, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was 
working in his field which was some 200-300 yards from his dwelling house, held 
that the appellant was under the obligation to run away. 
It can therefore be concluded here that even though the “castle” doctrine is 
recognised and applicable in the United States, the doctrine will not apply to every 
single case of attack in or around a dwelling house. This will, however, depend on 
how a court interprets the circumstances in each particular case.  
 
2.3 Requirements for private defence 
The traditional self-defence or private defence doctrine in the United States as well 
as most Anglo-American criminal law has some basic requirements which are 
virtually universally recognised.52 The first requirement is that the application of 
deadly force is prohibited in the defence except where there is no reasonable 
                                                          
45 S v Mitcheson 560 P2d 1120 SCU (1977). 
46 Beard v US (1895) 158 US 550 (United States Supreme Court). 
47 A distance estimated to be about 45-55 metres. 
48 The concept of “cartilage” applies to rural properties. 
49 An estimate of about 182-274 metres. 
50 Danford v State 53 FLA 4 (1977). 
51 Beard v US (n46 supra). 
52 Fontaine (n4 supra) 60. Ward also states these requirements for the use of deadly force. Ward. 
“‘Stand Your Ground’ and Self-Defense” 2014-2015 42 Am J Crim L 103. 
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alternative to avoid the threat. This means that any force may be “undertaken to 
avoid an imminent and impending danger to property or bodily harm”.53 
It is taken for granted that in relation to private defence, a triggering condition alone 
would be sufficient to provide a good reason for the defender to react. However, it 
has to be certain that the defenders reaction was in fact necessary to defend the 
interests at risk, and also reasonable in relation to the harm threatened.54 
Accordingly, a “person who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using 
a reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably believes 
that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary, and that 
the use of such force is necessary to avoid the danger”.55 
To raise the defence of necessity, further requirements necessitate that the 
defender must satisfy the court that his property and life was under immediate 
threat and that the only means for him under the circumstances was to go against 
the law. This means that the defender must be under a situation where he is left 
with no legal alternative.56 
In a case which was held in 1997,57 a court in South Carolina interpreted these 
requirements by stating that a defender has to establish that he is not blameworthy 
for the harm caused; that he was actually under an impending threat of losing his 
life and property; that any reasonable person would have acted the way he did; 
and finally that there was no other means to avoid the danger.58 These 
requirements will consequently be discussed in more detail. 
 
 
                                                          
53 Wright (n17 supra) 137. 
54 Wright (n17 supra) 125. 
55 Singh (n9 supra) 173. 
56 See People v Galambos 128 Cal Rptr 844 (2002). 
57 S v Long (n35 supra) 64.  
58 Pollock (n36 supra) 104-105.  
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2.3.1 The attack must be imminent 
The law in the United States requires the defender to have a reasonable belief that 
the unlawful aggression was impending or that imminent and unjust aggression 
occurred.59 A cross-section of the modern criminal codes of the states in the 
jurisdiction necessitates that the defender reasonably recognise an imminent use 
of force.60 In all these circumstances, “imminent” means set or prepared to take 
place; in other words it means threatening or menacingly near (whereas the term 
“immediate” means “occurring, acting, or accomplish without loss of time). The 
concept of imminence therefore allows a defender to defend himself and his 
property despite any delay of the harm threatened.  
Under United States statute and case law, anyone claiming the defence of self-
defence has to prove to the court that at the time of the attack “he reasonably 
perceived an imminent” danger.61 The United States Penal Code also restricts the 
use of defensive force to occasions when it is immediately necessary.62 In 
principle, any person facing an unlawful attack does not necessarily need to wait 
for the assistance of a third party;63 even though it follows that a person is 
expected to request assistance from state organs or any other actor if such 
assistance will not increase the risk threatened.  
                                                          
59 Uniacke (n6 supra) 100. 
60 LaFave (n3 supra) 495.  
61 Pollock (n36 supra) 104. 
62 See US Penal Code (n25 supra) s 3 06 (defence of property). In contrast, self-defence under 
German and Israeli law is permissible only against unlawful attacks. “It has for a long time 
been controversial whether unlawfulness refers to the harm caused by the attack or to the 
wrongfulness of the aggressor’s conduct. The primary restriction of the German right to self-
defence requires that the act be necessary to ward off the assault. That means that the 
defender may use optimum defence. Here, it is not clear if the person may kill the aggressor in 
defence of property. In German law as well as in the Israeli penal law proposal, an attack must 
be imminent. Imminence exists from the beginning of the attack until its end”. See Bernsmann 
“Private Self-Defence and Necessity in German Penal Law and in the Penal Law Proposal: 
Some Remarks” 1996 30 Israel LR 175. 
63 In practice, this is the case in Cameroon, although it is regarded as unlawful. See chapter three 
(infra). 
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Although the defender must have a reasonable belief that he was under an 
impending threat of damage to property or grievous bodily harm or death,64 it 
appears from United States case law that it is enough for the defender to have 
acted with the belief that the danger was imminent even if that belief was 
unreasonable.65 This principle was illustrated in People v Goetz,66 a famous self-
defence case where the defender (Goetz) shot and wounded four African-
American teenagers in a sub-way car in New York. The defender acted in fear that 
the teenagers were about to rob him. The discussion that transpired between him 
and the teenagers before his action was when they asked him for money. The 
defender supposed the request as a forerunner towards robbing him. The 
teenagers testified that they never had any intention to rob any person, even 
though two of the teenagers had screwdrivers in their possession, which they 
admitted that they used to break into coin boxes. The defender was indicted. On 
appeal, the New York Court of Appeal upheld the indictment, but a jury acquitted 
him of aggravated assault and attempted murder. However, the defender was also 
convicted for the illegal possession of a weapon. In 1996 a civil claim was instituted 
against the defender by one of the teenagers who were paralyzed as a result of the 
shooting, which Goetz lost. Based on the circumstances of the case, this was a 
suitable decision since there were no signs of imminent danger and moreover, the 
force used was not necessary in this particular case.  
 
2.3.2 The use of force must be necessary 
A general facet of the natural law justification of self-defence is the requirement 
that the use of force in the circumstance must be necessary.67  It should be noted 
                                                          
64 Fontaine (n4 supra) 60. 
65 See Parsons & Andoh “Private Defence and Public Defence in the Criminal Law and in the 
Law of Tort - A Comparison” 2012 76 Journal of Criminal Law 21-28, 23. 
66 People v Goetz 497 NE2d 41 NY (1986). 
67 Uniacke (n6 supra) 99. All the states in the United States require the necessity component. 
See, eg, Bell (n21 supra) 393.   
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at this juncture that the requirement of necessity is distinguishable from the 
proportionality requirement (which will be discussed below) in that the amount of 
force used must not surpass what would be regarded as necessary in that situation 
to avoid the harm. Nevertheless, with the necessity requirement it is possible that a 
defender may use force that is not proportionate, but which is, of course, 
necessary. Consider for example a situation where an aggressor, who intends to 
assault the defender on the roof of a tall building, who, in self-defence, may push 
the aggressor from the building.68 
In the state of Indiana, the court in Dozier v State69 proclaimed that for a defender 
to succeed under a claim of necessity he must show that the unlawful conduct was 
performed in order to prevent a major harm; there must have been no appropriate 
alternative to avoid that conduct; the injury caused as a result of the conduct was 
proportionate to the damage or loss sought to avoid; and the defender must 
believe in good faith that this conduct was necessary to avert a greater harm. 
These elements will now be discussed below. 
The self-defence prerequisite of necessity presupposes the existence of a danger 
to a legal interest. However, according to the prevailing view, “the issue of whether 
an interest is in danger is determined ex ante of a well-informed objective observer 
and not from the defender’s individual, subjective point of view”.70 A person cannot 
rely on private defence if it appears from the facts that he was not, in fact, exposed 
to danger, although he thought that he was. Thus, the defender must have 
honestly and reasonably believed that it was necessary to kill the aggressor in 
order to avoid the threat from being realized.71 The Appeal Court in Virginia72 held 
that “the essential element of the common-law defence includes a reasonable 
belief that the action was necessary to avoid imminent threatened harm”.73  This is 
                                                          
68 Uniacke (n6 supra) 74. 
69 Dozier v State 709 N E 2d 27 Ind (1999). 
70 Bernsmann (n52 supra) 181. This is according to the objective reasonable man-test. 
71 See Fontaine (n4 supra) 60. 
72 Long v Commonwealth 478 SE2d 424 Va Ct App (1996). 
73 Fontaine (n4 supra) 98. 
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also expressly stated under the Texas Penal Code.74 The said reasonable belief 
must occur before the defender commences his defensive act. In this regard, it can 
be emphasised that the attacker surrenders his personal interest since he 
instigated the unlawful attack.  
Nonetheless it can be stated here that the common legal and moral condition of 
acceptable self-defence requires that the concept of necessary force need not be 
interpreted in the extreme; it should (depending on the context of each situation) 
include an assessment of relative costs and also the reasonableness of another 
cause of action.75 
This issue is suitably illustrated in People v Ceballos.76 The facts in this case are 
as follows: Some tools were stolen from Ceballos’ home in March 1970. Two 
months later (12 May) he also realised that one of his garage doors was interfered 
with and the lock on the other door was twisted. The damage to the door was 
caused by two boys aged fifteen and sixteen (Robert and Stephen). On 15 May in 
the afternoon; the two boys returned to Ceballos’ house in his absence carrying 
neither a knife nor a gun. Ceballos had on that day, loaded and set between the 
garage doors a .22-calibre pistol in the garage. He connected the pistol by a wire 
and linked it to one of the garage doors such that it would discharge if someone 
opens the door just a few inches. After peeping through the window and realising 
that there was no one in the house, Stephen, using a crowbar, broke the lock of 
one of the garage doors. In a bid to pull the door outward, a bullet from the 
mounted pistol hit him in the face. The police interrogated Ceballos shortly after the 
incident as to why he had mounted the gun. He stated that he had noticed that his 
garage doors were tampered with and that he did not have much and he wanted to 
protect what he did have.  
                                                          
74 Texas Penal Code s 9.22. Conduct would be justified if “the actor reasonably believes the force 
is immediately necessary to avoid the immediate harm”. 
75 See Uniacke (n6 supra) 95 where Aquinas is cited.  
76 People v Ceballos 12 Cal 3rd 470 166 Cal Rptr 233 256 P 2d 241 (1974) (hereinafter the 
Ceballos-case). 
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Ceballos was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon, which he 
appealed. Some of his contentions were that he had acted lawfully since the victim 
was committing burglary before he was hit by the mounted gun; “that had he been 
present he would have been justified in shooting the victim”;77 that the court misled 
the jury and that “under cases such as US v Gilliam,78 a defendant had the right to 
do indirectly what he could have done directly”.79 Thus, according to Ceballos, the 
act performed by him which produced injury upon Stephen was lawful. However, 
the court disputed that the rule as applied in Gilliam was not sound; that the 
situation was not in fact such as to permit Ceballos to employ the use of lethal 
force as a matter of fact;80 and that a trap gun constitutes excessive force. The 
judgment was affirmed by the appeal court.  
One is tempted to ponder whether the decision would have been different if 
Stephen was killed by the mounted gun. It can be argued that the asserted 
burglary in Caballos-case... 
...did not threaten death or serious bodily harm to any one, since only the two boys 
were on the premises. The defendant did not, and could not properly contend that 
the intrusion was in fact such that, were he present, he would be justified under Civil 
Code section 50 in using deadly force. This section provides that any necessary 
force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself. It 
is necessary that this section should also be read in the light of the common law.81 
Thus the court concluded that Ceballos was not justified under Penal Code section 
197, subdivisions 1 or 2, in shooting the boy to prevent him from committing 
                                                          
77 See Ceballos-case (n76 supra) para 1 (as per Burke J). See also US Penal Code (n25 supra) 
s 459. 
78 US v Gilliam 25 Fed Cas 1319 15 205a (1882). 
79 See Ceballos-case (n76 supra) para 1 (as per Burke J). 
80 See Ceballos-case (n76 supra) para 2 (as per Burke J). See Johnson (n25 supra) 448. 
81 “At common law an exception to the foregoing principle that deadly force could not be used 
solely for the protection of property was recognized where the property was a dwelling house 
in some circumstances. Further, deadly force was privileged if it was or reasonably seemed 
necessary to protect the dwelling against a burglar”. See Johnson (n25 supra) 451. 
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burglary.82 This was not a case involving the destruction or dispossession of a 
dwelling. Setting upon one’s premises a deadly mechanical device in order to kill or 
injure another was not permissible in this particular case. It was furthermore held in 
S v Plumlee83 that the taking of any human life (or the infliction of grievous bodily 
harm) using means of that nature is regarded as malicious. It was argued that to 
allow persons, at their own risk, to make use of lethal devices put the lives of 
children, firemen and police officers acting within the scope of their duties and 
others in danger. There is the possibility that a person who is present at the time 
an unlawful act is about to be committed will realise whether the use of lethal force 
is necessary or not. This is because lethal devices have no compassion on 
humans. They cause death or fatal injury to both the innocent and the unlawful 
aggressor without caution.84 
Taking the facts of Ceballos-case into consideration, it can therefore be stated that 
killing or the use of deadly force is only allowed in situations where it is absolutely 
necessary. This is supported by international law which states that the “deprivation 
of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in 
defence of any person from unlawful violence”.85 
There have been instances though, where an exception to the rule of liability for 
injuries inflicted by a deadly mechanical device were applied. In these cases, the 
legal rule followed was that if the person would have been present when the 
                                                          
82 See Johnson (n25 supra) 446. S 197 states that: “Homicide is also justifiable when committed 
by any person in any of the following cases: 
1.  When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some 
great bodily injury upon any person; or, 
2.  When committed in defence of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly 
intends or endeavours, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who 
manifestly intends and endeavours, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the 
habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein”. 
83 S v Plumlee 177 La 687 149 So 425 (hereinafter Plumlee). In this case, the defendant set a 
trap or spring gun in his barn, which killed the deceased. 
84 Johnson (n25 supra) 451. 
85 Art 2(2) of the United Nations Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (hereinafter the Convention on Human Rights). 
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invasion took place, he would have been justified in taking the life or inflicting the 
bodily harm with his own hands.86 The principle set forth here is that a person may 
do indirectly what he is permitted to do directly. 
One could also submit that the decisions in the case of Plumlee as well as 
Ceballos-case are not rational if one has to consider the installation of deadly 
devices like electric fences to protect houses and businesses; the exception should 
be cases where the installation of such devices is statutorily protected. It can 
therefore be concluded here that the application of deadly force will however be 
wholly illegal if it is against a non-deadly aggression.87 The same requirement of 
necessity also applies in the state of California. Accordingly, the Californian law 
states that any “necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the 
person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, 
or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest”.88 However the 
code does not mention whether deadly force is necessary force.89 
A legal condition against which findings can be made about the necessary force 
used is the consideration that each and every person has interests and values 
which they are sometimes forced to defend.90 Although the distinguishable 
conditions of acceptable self-defence are the requirements that the force used 
must be necessary and proportional, (which imply that any other means would 
engage intolerable risk), considerations of proportionality and the fact that the force 
used must be reasonable have to be part of the legal conditions for necessity to be 
judged.  
 
                                                          
86 See eg, US v Gilliam (n78 supra). 1319, 1320-1321; Scheuermann v Scharfenberg [12 Cal3d 
477] 163 Ala 337; Katko v Briney (Iowa) 183 NW2d 657 660 [47 ALR3d 624]; Gray v Combs 
(Ky) 23 Am Dec 431; S v Beckham 306 Mo 566 [267 SW 817 819 37 ALR 1094]; S v Childers 
133 Ohio St 508 [11 Ohio Ops 191 14 NE2d 767 769]; Marquis v Benfer (TexCiv App) 298 
SW2d 601 603. See also Johnson (n25 supra) 451. 
87 LaFave (n3 supra) 497.  
88 See s 50 of California Civil Code 1872. 
89 Deadly force is described as necessary force.  
90 Uniacke (n6 supra) 96. 
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2.3.3 The use of force must be reasonable 
The United States Penal Code91 requires that anyone who is under attack should 
first ask the attacker to cease his attack before using reasonable force, unless 
such a request would be a waste of time or dangerous to the attacked person. A 
person may justifiably use lethal force in private defence only if he plausibly thinks 
that an aggressor is about to cause serious damage to property or bodily injury, 
and that person believes that the application of lethal force is in fact reasonable to 
prevent the harm.92 Whether it was in fact reasonable to use force will be 
determined ex post facto by the court taking into account the specific 
circumstances of each case on its own merits. As seen in the Plumlee-case,93 a 
trap gun constitutes excessive and not reasonable force.  
The notion of the reasonableness of using lethal force was considered extensively 
in the case of Garner v Memphis Police Department.94 Although this case revolved 
around section 40 of the Tennessee’s Criminal Act95 which authorises police 
officers to use deadly force in order to capture suspects, similar principles 
applicable to private defence were considered. In this case, a fifteen-year-old boy 
broke into and entered a vacant home in suburban Memphis on a night in October 
1974, intending to steal money and goods. A neighbour who noticed the burglary 
alerted the police. The two police officers who arrived at the scene attempted to 
obstruct the boy who was running towards a six-foot cyclone fence behind the 
house. One of the policemen flashed his torch on the boy who was crouching by 
the fence; the police officer identified himself and shouted “Halt”. He noticed that 
the burglar was an unarmed boy who, at that moment was attempting to jump over 
the fence. The officer fired his .38-calibre pistol (loaded with hollow-point bullets) at 
the upper part of the boy’s body, killing the boy instantly. The boy was carrying 
                                                          
91 US Penal Code (n25 supra) s 3.06(3)(a). 
92 Pollock (n36 supra) 104. 
93  See n99 supra. 
94 Garner v Memphis Police Department USCA 6th Circuit 710 F 2d 240 (1983). 
95 The Tennessee Criminal Act s 40-808 (1975), under the 4th, 8th and 14th Amendments. 
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merely ten dollars’ worth of money and jewellery which he had stolen from the 
residence. The court had to decide on the reasonableness of the accused’s act, 
that is:  
… to create a jury question on the issue of the reasonableness and the necessity of 
using deadly force. But the reasonableness and necessity of the officer’s action must 
be judged solely on the basis of whether the officer could have arrested the suspect 
without shooting him.96 
In a bid to pursue the common-law rule regarding the use of lethal force on 
suspected felons who cannot be arrested,97 the court in this case found the police 
officer’s action to be reasonable.98 It is submitted that in the case of private 
defence, such deadly force will not be seen as reasonable as the force used was 
harsh and unnecessarily excessive. The aggressor in this case posed no imminent 
danger to life or property, and there was no fear of harm being done by the 
aggressor. Still, as seen in the Goetz-case,99 the use of deadly force may be 
considered reasonable even if no real harm exists, as long as the defender 
subjectively (and reasonably) believes that he is to suffer imminent injury. 
 
2.3.4 The force used must be proportionate 
The proportionality test requires that the amount of force used by the defender 
must not exceed the degree of force posed by the threat.100 Within this requirement 
there is the need to make certain that the amount of force used was proportionate 
                                                          
96 Garner v Memphis Police Department (n94 supra) para 14. 
97 At common law it is permissible to kill an offender who resists arrest regardless of the type of 
the crime. This is so because it is obvious that the offender would be executed or hanged since 
he is regarded as an outlaw who is a threat to the security and safety of others. 
98 Garner v Memphis Police Department (n94 supra) para 14. 
99 People v Goetz (n56 supra). 
100 See Fontaine (n4 supra) 60. This is based on the view that “somebody who uses more 
violence than is necessary to defend himself would be doing something wrong”. See Uniacke 
(n6 supra) 95. 
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in relation to the kind of danger threatened.101 At common law, the iniquity a 
person is attempting to shun has to be greater than that which the law defining the 
crime is attempting to prevent.102 
If a person, in the course of defending his property exerts more violence than is 
proportionately necessary, he will be committing an offence. This is so because 
there is a condition for proportionality; which requires that an act of defence, 
though for a good cause, may attract liability if the defensive force applied is not 
proportionate to the end anticipated.103 This can therefore be considered as the 
principle of proportionality. 
The requirement of proportionality leaves open the question as to whether a 
person may kill someone to prevent a particular harm.104 In the United States, it is 
typically required that a defender who has invoked private defence must 
demonstrate that, amongst other criteria, he reasonably believed his life to be in 
danger. These circumstances must be such that a reasonable person would 
interpret it to be so serious and severe in nature that it would cause him to 
experience significant fear for life and limb. In this regard, it is obvious that the 
force used may not be proportionate to the harm the defender seeks to avoid. In 
such a case, there is the possibility for excusing the defender for applying 
excessive force. However, it is obvious that in such a case, there is the possibility 
that the defensive force could be disproportionate such that it is regarded as being 
unreasonable.105 
 
                                                          
101 A defender may apply force that is reasonable, in order to prevent a crime, or of persons 
unlawfully at large.  See also s 3(1) of the English Criminal Law Act 1967. 
102 See Pollock (n36 supra) 98. Bell (n21 supra) 391-392 confirms that: “The most fundamental 
component required for using deadly force in self-defense is proportionality. A person must be 
confronted with deadly force before using deadly force. All fifty states require proportionality 
before defending with deadly force. This includes the states that do not require a person to 
retreat before resorting to deadly force - the so-called ‘stand-your-ground’ states”. 
103 Uniacke (n6 supra) 95. 
104 Uniacke (n6 supra) 75. 
105 Slater (n18 supra) 166. 
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2.4 Is it permissible to use lethal force to protect property in the US? 
From early ages and in most modern societies, robbery is considered as a serious 
offence punishable by death.106 As mentioned earlier, the United States courts and 
the legislature had for quite a long time considered a dwelling to be worthy of 
safety, especially at night where peace and security is considered most required. In 
order to deliberate on whether it is permitted to kill to protect property in the United 
States, it is important to reflect on some of the constitutions of the various states; 
considering the fact that the preamble of the United States Constitution guarantees 
“domestic tranquillity”.  
The Constitution of the state of Florida regards the right to protect property as 
follows: 
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have 
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to 
pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect 
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real 
property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No 
person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or 
physical disability.107 
Similarly, the Constitution of New Jersey views this right as:  
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and 
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
                                                          
106 See S v Brooks 277 SC 111 283 SE 2d 830 (1981), and also S v Allison 169 NC 375 85 SE 
129 (1915). Ward (n52 supra) 90 comments: “Someone is threatening you with imminent and 
deadly force. You could safely retreat from the threat but you choose, instead, to stand your 
ground and meet force with force. In doing so, you kill the aggressor. Are you guilty of murder? 
In most of the United States, the answer is no. By statute, court rulings, or a combination of 
both, more than thirty states have adopted a ‘Stand Your Ground’ (No Retreat) rule which bars 
the prosecution of people who use deadly force against a deadly aggressor without first 
attempting to retreat, or offers such persons a valid self-defense claim against a charge of 
criminal homicide”. 
107 Florida Constitution 1968 art I s. 2. 
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of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining 
safety and happiness.108 
Considering the various states’ constitutions mentioned above, it is evident that 
they all guarantee the right to defend property. Even though everyone has the right 
to own and protect property, it is not certain whether a person is permitted to kill 
another in order to protect his property.  
One has to further examine the United States jurisprudence to establish whether 
killing is allowed if necessary to protect property. In essence, all the jurisdictions 
hold that anyone who is not the assailant has the right to use lethal force against 
the attacker (and therefore, is excluded from having committed an unlawful act) 
when he truly believed that it was necessary to use such force to avoid an 
impending danger of death or severe bodily injury to himself, or in certain cases, 
even his property. This is confirmed by the United States Penal Code section 197 
which provides that: 
...homicide is justifiable when resisting any attempt to murder any person or to 
commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or when 
committed in defence of habitation, property, or person, against one whom 
manifestly intends or endeavours by violence or surprise to commit a felony. 
                                                          
108 New Jersey Constitution 1947 art I s. 1. The Pennsylvania Constitution 1776 art I s 1 is almost 
a replica of this provision as it states: “All men are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and 
of pursuing their own happiness”. Similarly, the Constitution of California 1849 Art 1 s 1: “All 
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy”. See also the Arkansas Constitution 
1874 Art II s 2, which guarantees that: “All men are created equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent and inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and reputation; and 
of pursuing their own happiness. To secure these rights governments are instituted among 
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. 
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However, when the risk does not involve death or grievous bodily injury, or when 
the loss or damage to property is insignificant, non-lethal force may be applied to 
defend the criminal act.109 
Although it is acknowledged that life and possessions are two distinct entities, the 
defence of property is “compensated by a preference to be given to the innocent 
and the condemnation incurred by the robber”.110 Despite this view, it is not 
permissible to kill a thief to defend or prevent property; except in circumstances 
where life is serious danger to life.111 
Accepting that deadly force is permissible in order to deter certain crimes such as 
robbery, for example, may be defended on the basis that the possible offences 
present a high risk of bodily injury or death. This assertion could give reason for a 
presupposition in all the circumstances that lethal force was necessary to resist the 
aggression.112 However, it is not required that the act of defence be more injurious 
than was necessary to defend the property. For example, in R v Martin,113 two 
burglars attacked the appellant, a farmer living in his farm homestead in a remote 
rural area, at night. In the course of the confrontation, he shot and killed one of the 
burglars and injured another. Nevertheless, the appellant did not succeed in his 
claim of self-defence for the reason that, according to the court his use of lethal 
force was “excessive”.114 This decision in the Martin-case could be regarded as 
irrational if one has to take the following facts into consideration: the appellant lived 
                                                          
109 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 6-7. 
110 Uniacke (n6 supra) 86. 
111 Uniacke (n6 supra) 98. 
112 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 10. According to Bell (n21 supra) 384, the “law of nature is so 
basic that every state recognizes the right to use force, including deadly force and self-
defense. The scope of the right to use deadly force to defend oneself has come under 
particular scrutiny in the past decade due to highly publicized and debated cases, such as 
State of Florida v Zimmerman 114 So 3d 446, 447 (Fla Dist Ct App 2013) , combined with the 
fact that many states changed and expanded their self-defense laws to provide greater 
protections for law-abiding citizens unlawfully confronted with deadly force”. 
113 R v Martin 1 CR App Rep 27 (2002) (hereinafter the Martin-case). 
114 As can be perceived from this case, to determine the amount of force that could be rated as 
excessive force may, at times, become problematic.  
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in a remote rural area; the appellant was attacked at night; and the fact that there 
were two burglars who could easily overpower the appellant. 
The United States Penal Code115 recommends a narrower approach where the 
defender is allowed to apply deadly force to stop the aggressor from dispossessing 
the defender of his home. According to the United States Penal Code,116 the 
application of lethal force will not be regarded as justifiable except where the 
defender believes that:  
(i) the person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of 
his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or  
(ii) the person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or 
consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other felonious theft or property 
destruction and either:  
(1) has employed or threatened deadly force against or in the presence of the 
actor; or  
(2) the use of force other than deadly force to prevent the commission or the 
consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his 
presence to substantial danger of serious bodily harm.  
It was held in McKellar v Mason117 that the United States Constitution and that of 
Louisiana (as well as about 44 constitutions of the various United States’ states - 
dating from 1776) secure “the right to keep and bear arms”. Understandably, this 
implies that keeping or bearing arms gives the individual a right of usage. This 
means the right to use the arms to defend himself, family, property and for other 
purposes. Moreover, 22 states bear provisions like “every citizen has a right to 
bear arms in defence of himself and the state”. Followers of the individual’s right to 
keep arms also consider such right to be targeted at self-defence.118 The right to 
                                                          
115 US Penal Code (n25 supra) s 3.06(1). 
116 US Penal Code (n25 supra) s 3.06(3)(d). 
117 McKellar v Mason 159 So 2d 700 702 La Ct App (1964). 
118 Volokh (n37 supra) 414. Ward (n52 supra) 90 states that: “Since 2005, 26 states have adopted 
statutory No Retreat rules, and an additional seven states have adopted some form of Stand-
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keep and use arms assumes, at least, a right to defend oneself by using these 
arms. This right was acknowledged in People v McNeese119 in which the court held 
that the law which permits the application of lethal force by dweller against any 
unlawful aggression to the home owners was undoubtedly anticipated to protect 
the home owners who use their constitutional right to keep or bear such arms to 
defend themselves properties or other members of the family.120 
However, as earlier stated, no matter the situation, it is generally not acceptable to 
apply fatal force to defend personal property in the United States. Opponents of 
this view contend that this approach is uncompromising and undeservedly strict on 
innocent defenders. This disparagement does not take into consideration the 
aggressor’s right to life. It is therefore important that the law considers each 
particular case and prohibit the application of deadly force in some situations.  
Nonetheless, it can still be argued that the defence of a dwelling house may fulfil a 
lesser-evils standard if one assumes that any intrusion will possibly threaten death 
or will cause serious bodily harm.121 Consider the Texas Penal Code which 
provides that: 
A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, 
movable property:  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
your-Ground approach through a combination of court rulings, statutory provisions, and jury 
instructions”. 
119 People v McNeese 892 P 2d 304 317 Colo (1995). 
120 Volokh (n37 supra) 415. This is also witnessed in the case of S v Buckner 377 S E 2d 139 144 
W Va (1988), where it was held that a West Virginia law prohibiting the carrying of deadly 
weapons for self-defence or for defence of family home without a license impermissibly infringe 
upon constitutionally-protected right to bear arms.  
121 The argument in support of the use of fatal force to defend a dwelling is regarded as 
persuasive by many other jurisdictions. In any circumstance, if the conduct cannot be justified 
as protecting the person, it might however be justifiable on other reasons such as the 
recognition of the home as important to the defender’s dignity and privacy. It has recently been 
stated that “the majority of states recognized a person's right to use deadly force to defend 
against deadly force without first retreating”. See Bell (n21 supra) 389. 
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(1)  if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.41;122 
and  
(2)  when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is 
immediately necessary:  
(A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, 
aggravated robbery, theft during the night-time, or criminal mischief during 
the night-time; or  
(B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, 
robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the night-time from escaping 
with the property; and  
(3)  he reasonably believes that:  
(A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; 
or  
(B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or 
property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury.123 
Furthermore, where a person’s life or something on which the person depends on 
for his livelihood is threatened, the mere fact that the danger is focused in the 
direction of the defender as undue violence is generally considered as adequate 
for acceptable self-defensive homicide.124 This assumption follows undoubtedly 
from the provision regarding the right to bear arms.  
It can thus be concluded that in certain states a person is allowed to use fatal force 
to defend his property if he deems it necessary. However, in ordinary civil society, 
the application of lethal force in order to defend property is not generally allowed. It 
may be allowed in circumstances where it is impossible for the thief to be 
arrested.125 Apart from life and property, one remains tempted to also consider 
other important rights worthy of protection like honour, equality and autonomy if 
                                                          
122 S 9.41 of the Texas Penal Code (n74 supra) provides further explanations on the protection of 
one’s property. 
123 The Texas Penal Code (n74 supra) s 9 42. 
124 Uniacke (n6 supra) 100. 
125 Uniacke (n6 supra) 99.  
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necessary, at the expense of the live of the aggressor who threaten these 
interests.126 
 
2.5 Imperfect self-defence in the US 
In the United States, putative private defence (or imperfect self-defence) is a 
common-law defence raised by a self-defender who acted “on a reasonable false 
belief” that deadly force was necessary to repel an attack.127 Examples of 
“excusing conditions” include some instances of necessity, insanity and mistake. 
Each connotes some degree of involuntariness. The element that triggers a 
putative self-defender is the belief, as he thought them to be at that moment in time 
that excites the uncontrollable defensive act. In this regard, “such a belief, though a 
mistaken one, is calculated to induce the same emotions as would be felt were the 
wrongful act of the aggressor in fact committed”.128 The actor’s belief that he is 
being attacked must be reasonable, since an excused actor lacks culpability.129 
The actor’s blameworthiness and punishment are thus mitigated or partially 
excused.130 
                                                          
126 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 11. 
127 See S v Jones 8 P 3d 1282 1287 (Kan Ct App 2000); Uniacke (n6 supra) 100. 
128 See Fontaine (n4 supra) 65. A mistake cannot justify homicide. This is certainly true if the basis 
of self-defence is objective necessity. In South Africa, such imperfect self-defence is also 
regarded as a mistake as the defender was mistaken about the unlawfulness of his action and 
therefore lacked intention. As pronounced in S v Faulkner 483 A2d 759 769 (Md 1984), in such 
cases the element of malice is lacking. 
129 Wright (n17 supra) 133. This does not mean that the actor will not suffer any consequences; 
he may still be found guilty of manslaughter (culpable homicide) if the reasonable person 
would have acted differently in the circumstances. It must be noted that not every reaction in a 
“moment of unexpected anguish can be held to be fully justifiable”. See Kaye “Excessive Force 
in Self-defence after R v Clegg” 1997 61 Journal of Criminal Law 454. 
130 Fontaine (n4 supra) 62. Accordingly, “whether the killing in self-defense be justifiable or 
excusable, there must be an entire acquittal, for the reason that there is no forfeiture of goods 
in case of excusable homicide". See Ward (n52 supra) 100. 
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In the case of excuse, it is always the perpetrators who are excused and not the 
act. Excuses provide that although the act was wrong, liability is inappropriate 
because some characteristics of the actor negate society’s desire to punish him:131 
The successful excuse defence accepts the prosecution’s prima facie case that the 
defendant has committed a crime, but adequately demonstrates that the defendant 
acted in a non-culpable and therefore non-punishable manner by providing evidence 
of extenuating circumstances that show that he committed the act without the 
requisite degree of guilty mind.132 
Thus, had the facts been as he believed them to be, the actor’s conduct would 
have been justified rather than excused.133 
Imperfect self-defence may thus be considered in two different ways, though the 
fact that the act is one of excuse is not negated:134 
The first, which reflects a subjective theory of self-defence, treats a killing that is 
reasonably believed by the actor to be necessary in order to prevent another from 
taking his property or his life as justified. It is the reasonable belief that the killing is 
necessary that is itself sufficient to meet the standard of justification. The second, 
which reflects an objective theory of self-defence, treats the killing as unjustified.135 
In imperfect self-defence cases, the putative self-defender acting on a reasonable 
false belief becomes an unjust aggressor. However, the concept of unjust 
aggression is nowhere fully clarified in order to judge whether or not such types of 
self-defenders are unjust aggressors. From the perspective of a putative self-
defender, the force used is justified in the circumstance, even though it is not the 
case. In this regard, one is compelled to consider cases which constitute both acts 
of self-defence and putative private defence. These cases are problematic as they 
                                                          
131 Kahan & Braman (n10 supra) 7. 
132 Fontaine (n4 supra) 63. 
133 Singh (n9 supra) 122. 
134 A mistaken belief as to the reality of a justificatory claim may be an excusing condition in its 
own right. 
135 Fontaine (n4 supra) 71. 
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“will yield awkward results if the putative self-defender is permissibly killed in self-
defence: that one and the same act can be permissible (putative) self-defence and 
also at the same time an act of unjust”136 violence. 
Even if the actor’s honest belief that the attack is imminent is a justified belief in 
that particular instance, and where the “justified belief is thought sufficient to 
establish a positive right of self-defence”,137 the victim’s right to life is still 
violated.138 The force used by a putative private defender is unfair violence in the 
sense that, though it is not wicked, it has been used against an unoffending 
person. This is so because the intended recipient did not provoke the situation and 
thus did not deserve it; although from the reasonable perspective of the putative 
private defender the use of such force was reasonable in the circumstances. The 
question which now follows is - does an honest belief equate with absolutely 
necessity? It has been argued that it does not;139 which is also the position in the 
United States’ law of tort (law of delict). A triggering circumstance alone will not be 
a sufficient defence to justify the response of a putative private defender. It must 
also be shown that the response from the defender was necessary to defend the 
interest or interests that were threatened and also reasonable140 with regards to 
the damage that was threatened.  
It has been suggested that the doctrine of private defence in the United States 
should be reframed in such a way that cases where there is in fact no actual 
defence (such as in cases of a reasonable but mistaken belief of a deadly threat) 
be excluded and dealt with under a separate “excuse-based doctrine” of putative 
private defence. In this regard, self-defence may be precisely limited to homicides 
                                                          
136 Ibid. An unreasonable actor is therefore not blameless. Each case is decided on its own merits 
as to whether the force used by defender was justified. 
137 Uniacke (n6 supra) 100. 
138 The Convention on Human Rights (n85 supra) art 2. 
139 See the Convention on Human Rights (n85 supra) art 2(2). To comply with art 2 of the 
Convention on Human Rights, the defendant acting in private defence is required to have a 
reasonable belief in the need for fatal force. 
140 Courts have to consider cases which centre on the application of a single norm by taking into 
consideration all the requirements that must be present before taking a judgment; that is - the 
use of reasonableness. See Singh (n9 supra) 126-127. 
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that are in fact justifiable so that a separate excuse-based defence is then 
considered whereby the essence of the role of “reasonable mistake” may be 
handled correctly in cases of reactive killing.141 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the private defence of life and especially property as applied in the 
United States was examined. In private-defence cases, the self-defender may be 
exonerated from all culpability by way of justification. Justification of self-defence 
requires the presence of a subjective element in addition to the presence of an 
objective element. An actor must know that he is acting in a situation giving rise to 
a right to self-defence; he must, for example, be aware of an imminent attack. In 
determining whether there is a valid justification, it is implicit in the “licence” 
approach that the decisions made examine the situation in which the actor actually 
found himself or herself. The emphasis here is on the act which must be positively 
justified. This is so because one cannot explain how imminent the danger must be 
if one does not find himself in the actor’s position.  
The self-defender may also be exculpated from blameworthiness and the resultant 
punishment by means of an excuse. An excuse therefore implies the denial of any 
moral culpability of the self-defender for inflicting the harm. Consequently, a self-
defender who, even though he has admitted having committed a criminal act, did 
so in a way that he cannot truthfully be blamed for such action, will not be guilty of 
the unlawful act but may be found guilty of a lesser offence. It is imperative to 
make a distinction between acts that are justified (that is, legally-acceptable 
conduct) from those that are only excusable (legally unacceptable but committed 
non-culpable) as one of the objectives of the criminal law is to clearly and 
consistently define and also forbid certain behaviours which society has regarded 
as harmful and unacceptable.  
                                                          
141 Fontaine (n4 supra) 61. 
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For a private defence action to protect any legal interest to be permitted, certain 
requirements need to be fulfilled. First of all, there must be a present and imminent 
danger to a recognised lawful interest which may include life and property, 
amongst others. The self-defence must be necessary and reasonable. It can be 
accepted that the application of lethal force will not be considered to be reasonable 
but for circumstances where the unlawful threat to property also include a danger 
to life or grievous bodily harm. In this regard, it is acceptable to use lethal force 
when the aggressor intends to commit an offence therein or to cause severe bodily 
injuries to the occupants of the dwelling. However, the reasonableness rule has 
been criticised by many for lacking precision and has become so indefinite that it is 
not much regarded as a rule at all.  
It has been concluded by courts in the United States that one may be held 
criminally responsible under the law prohibiting homicide, or civilly responsible, if 
he set deadly devices on his premises in order to protect his property, and such 
devices kill or injure someone. Nevertheless, there is an exception to this rule that 
a defender may be liable if such devices cause death or injuries to another. This 
may be acknowledged in cases where the attack is, in fact, such that if the person 
happened to be present at that time, he would be justified in killing or causing 
bodily injury with his own hands. 
It can be concluded that the United States law on private defence provides in 
certain instances for the use of lethal force to defend property. According to the 
majority view, deadly force might be employed if necessary to avert an attack on 
property. The minority view deems it impermissible to kill a potential thief, even if 
one takes into consideration the objective basis for the right to self-defence that is 
protection of the legal order. However, as was confirmed, most state constitutions 
affirm the right not only to acquire properties, but also to defend the properties.  
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The following chapter examines killing in defence of property in Cameroon. It will 
be investigated whether the law allows for the use of lethal force in defence of 
property and if so, the circumstances under which this would be applicable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIVATE DEFENCE OF PROPERTY IN CAMEROON CRIMINAL 
LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the approach in Cameroonian criminal law when dealing with 
homicide cases involving private defence, especially in defence of property. 
Certain jurisdictions recognise such a right so long as it is immediately necessary 
to kill in the specific circumstances.1 Other jurisdictions unequivocally oppose such 
acts by issuing a blanket rejection of a right to kill in defence of property. Several 
jurisdictions however adopt a more circumscribed approach by recognising the use 
of fatal force in defence of certain limited types of property, in particular, a human 
dwelling. A number of jurisdictions recognise and further extend this right provided 
that the danger sought to be defended against constituted a combination of a 
threat to property and to the person.  
It will be seen from this chapter that according to the Penal Code in Cameroon no 
criminal liability for killing in defence of property exists in circumstances where it is 
immediately necessary for the defender to act in self-defence. Case law supporting 
this particular defence is however very sparse. A paucity of reported cases may be 
ascribed to “a complete absence of systematic law reporting in this country”2 and 
also “an almost complete absence of published academic contribution in this area 
of the law in this country”.3 It further does not seem that any prosecution has been 
initiated in respect of killing in defence of property in Cameroon. Possible reasons 
for this anomaly will be provided in this chapter. 
                                                          
1 Eg, in the United States. See previous chapter. 
2 Anyangwe Criminal Law in Cameroon: Specific Offences (2011) xi. Judgments are furthermore 
cyclostyled and not freely available online. 
3 Anyangwe (n2 supra) xii. 
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Whether killing is regarded as reasonable in particular circumstances may vary 
from one society to the next, given that it invariably involves a value judgment. It is 
thus necessary to provide a brief legal history of Cameroon in order to understand 
why its legal system is bi-jural before considering the lawful defences from a 
selected region of the country. This chapter will also explore the requirements for 
private defence, and whether there is the right to kill in defence of property in this 
jurisdiction. 
 
3.2 Background to the Cameroonian legal system 
The legal system in Cameroon,4 like most in Africa, is a relic of the Colonial era.5 
The Cameroonian legal system has been described as “a hotchpotch of diverse 
legal systems”, “a jumble of pieces, much like a jigsaw or a mosaic”.6 The reason 
for Cameroon’s legal mélange can be found in its history. After the end of World 
War II, two colonial powers (Britain and France) were given the authority to 
administer Cameroon in accordance with their laws and as an integral part of their 
territory,7 subject to such modification as may be required by the local conditions. 
                                                          
4 The name Cameroon comes from the Portuguese word camero’es (prawns); named in 1472 by 
explorer Fernando Poo who dubbed the Wouri River Rio dos Camero’es (river of prawns). The 
Spanish who occupied the Island of Fernando Poo in 1494 referred to camer’oes as 
Camerones. This gave rise to the Anglicised name “Cameroon”, the German spelling 
“Kamerun” and the French spelling “Cameroun”. See Fanso Cameroon History for Secondary 
Schools and Colleges (1989) 90. 
5 The Germans annexed Cameroon in 1884. During the First World War, a combined British and 
French force defeated the Germans in Cameroon and proceeded to divide the territory into two 
territories. The French took the larger portion of the French-speaking part of Cameroon, whilst 
the British took control of two disconnected portions, which they labelled Northern and 
Southern Cameroon respectively. The research for this dissertation is carried out in Northern 
and Southern Cameroon.  
6 Enonchong “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The Exclusion of Customary Law in Cameroon” 
1993 5 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 503. 
7 The British and French legal system was introduced in 1945. The British administered their 
portion of Cameroon as part of their neighbouring colony of Nigeria. The Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act 1890 was the enabling statute for the introduction and observance of English law in 
Southern Cameroon. As a consequence, a number of English statutes as well as Nigerian laws 
and ordinances were made applicable to Southern Cameroon. Currently, s 11 of the Southern 
Cameroon High Court Law 1958 provides for the application of English common law, the 
doctrine of equity and the statute of general application as in force in England on 1 Jan 1900. 
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On 1 September 1961, Southern Cameroon and the newly-independent French 
Cameroon were formally reunited as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The 
confederacy was based on a two-state federation8 consisting of West Cameroon 
(the former Southern Cameroon), and East Cameroon (former French Cameroon) 
until 1972 when the country became the United Republic of Cameroon.9 
Cameroonian law is thus unique in that the two distinct and often conflicting legal 
systems of English common law and French civil law operate in some sort of 
tenuous coexistence.10 The English common law is applicable in the Anglophone 
provinces while the French civil law is applied to the Francophone provinces of the 
country. However, some uniform legislation does exist in certain areas of these 
laws, such as criminal law. In addition to the Western legal systems found in the 
jurisdiction, indigenous or customary law also plays a role. Cameroonian 
customary laws have existed in pre-colonial Cameroonian society already. These 
diverse and unwritten traditional laws applied in varying degrees by the different 
ethnic groups, have remained, in certain instances, intact. For example, in 
Anglophone Cameroon, the British colonial policy of indirect rule largely left these 
traditional laws integral.11 Despite structural and substance differences, there were, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
See Ngwafor “Cameroon: The Law across the Bridge: Twenty Years (1972-1992) of 
Confusion” 1995 26 Revue Générale de Droit 70.The French section of Cameroon formed part 
of their colony of French Equatorial Africa into which the civil law system was introduced. 
French civil law as applicable in the Francophone regions does not form part of this research. 
8 Northern Cameroon voted in favour of remaining as part of Nigeria. See Fombad “Researching 
Cameroonian Law” http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/cameroon.htm (accessed 24/10/ 
2015). 
9 Since 1972, Cameroon has had a strong centralised system of government dominated by the 
President as Head of State. This was reinforced in the 1996 amendment to the Constitution of 
the United Republic of Cameroon of 1972.  
10 When Cameroon, like most African countries, achieved their independence; the European 
legal systems had already obtained a firm footing. After independence, practically, they had to 
maintain the legal system imposed by the colonial masters. Since then, further laws were 
developed in a similar manner. See Bringer “The Abiding Influence of English and French 
Criminal Law in One African Country: Some Remarks regarding the Machinery of Criminal 
Justice in Cameroon” 1981 25 J Afr L 3. Cameroon is consequently one of the few countries 
with a dual legal system in the world. 
11 This can nowadays still be observed in West Cameroon where the customary courts play a 
major role in the legal proceedings in the area. See Bringer (n10 supra) 1. 
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and still are many similarities between the varied customary laws of the region.12 It 
is important to note that in certain legal matters, customary law has jurisdiction and 
is applicable parallel to the received English or French law, as the case may be.13 
The rules in the different legal systems in Cameroon are harmonised through the 
use of the doctrine of “public policy”.14 In this regard, a court will not enforce a 
customary law rule if it is opposing to public policy,15 in other words, repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience or incompatible with any existing 
laws.16 The Cameroonian legal system can thus be described as bi-jural as it has 
two systems of laws (as well as customary) which also reflects the dual system of 
courts.17 The sources of Cameroonian law include the Constitution,18 common 
law,19 judicial precedents,20 legislation and customary law.  
 
                                                          
12 Fombad (n8 supra).The application of customary law in customary courts is based upon the 
custom and tradition of that particular clan or ethnic group. As such, there are most likely as 
many different customary laws as there are ethnic bands in Cameroon which may be over 250 
groups. See Enonchong (n6 supra) 503. 
13 Enonchong (n6 supra) 503. 
14 Known as “ordre public” in Francophone provinces. 
15 Enonchong (n6 supra) 503. Eg, s 2(1) of the 1979 Law on Customary and Akali Courts in 
Anglophone Cameroon determines that “Customary and Akali courts shall apply the custom of 
the parties provided they are not contrary to the law and to public policy”. The Alkali courts 
(from the Bamenda Grassland Kingdoms in North-west Cameroon) are highly-organised legal 
institutions introduced by the Islamic faith, where accused persons are tried in conformity with 
Sharia Law. 
16 Fombad (n8 supra). Eg, in the case of Anya v Anya (1988) CASWP/cc/9/88 (unreported), the 
Buea Court of Appeal invoked s 2(1) of Law no 79-4 of 1979 to exclude a rule of customary law 
because it was “against public policy, that is, ‘natural justice, equity and good conscience’ as 
spelled out in s 27 of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law, 1955”. This section provides: 
“The High Court shall observe, and enforce the observance of every native law and custom 
which is neither repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible 
with any law for the time being in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the 
benefit of any such native law or custom”. See Enonchong (n6 supra) 504; Ngwafor (n7 supra) 
75. 
17 Coldham “Criminal Justice Policies in Commonwealth Africa: Trends and Prospects” 2000 
44(2) J Afr L 220. 
18 Constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon 1972, instituted by a parliament of the two 
(Southern Cameroon and East Cameroon) federated states.  
19 See n7 above.   
20 Court judgments from the English-speaking regions are not binding to the French-speaking 
regions of Cameroon. 
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3.3 Private defence in Cameroon criminal law 
The ground of justification known as private defence is regulated in the jurisdiction 
by the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon,21 the Criminal Procedure Code of 
Cameroon,22 and the Penal Code of Cameroon.23 In Cameroonian criminal law, 
there exist no distinction between private defence of the person and that of 
property. Both cases are considered as lawful defences under section 84 of the 
Penal Code. 
 
3.3.1 Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 
Similar to most constitutions in the world, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cameroon guarantees certain rights to its citizens. These rights are especially 
important for both the perpetrator as well as the victim in cases of homicide in 
defence of property. However, the Cameroonian Constitution does not contain a 
separate Bill of Rights, but is attached to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in 
the UDHR,24 the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter)25 and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter),26 as well as all duly-
                                                          
21 Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon Law No 96 of 18 January 1996 (hereinafter the 
Constitution). 
22 The Criminal Procedure Code of Cameroon Law No 2005/007 of 27 July 2005 (hereinafter the 
Criminal Procedure Code). 
23 The Penal Code of Cameroon decree 66/DF/237 of 12 May 1966 (hereinafter the Penal Code). 
24 UDHR, adopted on 10 December 1948, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Session, UN Doc 
A/RES/3/217A (1948). Cameroon became party to this instrument as a British mandate in 
1945. 
25 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153; 
entered into force on 24 October 1945. Cameroon became party to this instrument as a British 
mandate in 1945. 
26 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, established at the 18th 
Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
entered into force on 21 October 1986 (hereinafter the African Charter). Cameroon is a 
signatory to the African Charter by virtue of Decree No 87-1910 of 29 December 1987, 
authorised by Law No 87-29 of 17 December 1987. As a Member State of the OAU, Cameroon 
is obligated to “recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall 
undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them”, according to art 1 of 
the African Charter. 
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ratified international conventions relating the any fundamental rights and 
obligations. This is affirmed in its Preamble.  
The Preamble in the Constitution provides for specific human-rights principles such 
that all persons shall have equal rights and obligations (this right is further 
confirmed in Part 1, Art 1(2)) of the Constitution). These rights are also upheld in 
the UDHR (articles 1, 7); the UN Charter (articles 1, 2), and the African Charter 
(articles 3, 19). In the Constitution, a core principle appears soon after this specific 
right: it is stated that the home is inviolate. This is very important in terms of 
protecting one’s property against possible intruders. It is only article 12 of the 
UDHR that supports this constitutional provision. This article states that “no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, or to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
Furthermore, ownership is guaranteed in the Constitution - the right of every 
person by law to use, enjoy and dispose of property. The pledge is made that no 
person shall be deprived of any ownership. However, a restriction is imposed in 
that the right of ownership may not be exercised in violation of the public interest or 
in such a way as to be prejudicial to the security, freedom, existence or property of 
other persons.27 
Killing in defence of property may certainly infringe on the existence or freedom of 
the home intruder. Still, the home houses the family - the Constitution pledges that 
the nation shall protect and promote the family which is the natural foundation of 
human society. This sentiment is echoed in article 16(3) of the UDHR: “The family 
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State”. Similarly in the African Charter, article 18(1), (2) regards the 
family as the natural unit and basis of society, which must be protected by the state 
                                                          
27 A similar right and restriction is provided for in the African Charter, art 14. The UDHR 
determines in art 17 that everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property, without furnishing any 
constraint to the right. 
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in terms of its physical health and morals. The family is regarded as the custodian 
of morals and traditional values recognised by the community, and it is here where 
the state must assist the family. Article 27(1) of the African Charter further extends 
this right to every individual who has a duty towards his family and society, the 
state and other legally-recognised communities and the international community. 
Killing a robber in defence of the family seems acceptable in this regard, especially 
since every person has a right to life, to physical and moral integrity and to humane 
treatment in all circumstances.28 These principles may, of course, also apply to the 
intruder. 
In addition, it is pronounced that no person shall, under any circumstances, be 
subjected to torture, to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.29 Article 5 of the 
African Charter determines that all forms of exploitation and degradation, such as 
torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment and treatment are prohibited. 
Similarly, article 5 of the UDHR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. According to the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Torture Convention);30 states are obligated to institute preventive 
measures against torture. Accordingly, each state “shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction”.31 It is also emphasised that there is no exceptional 
circumstances whatever the situation or order which may be invoked as reason for 
                                                          
28 See the Preamble of the Constitution. Also provided for in the UDHR, art 3: “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person”; and the African Charter, art 4: “Human beings are 
inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his 
person”; art 5: “Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being and to the recognition of his legal status”; art 6: “Every individual shall have the 
right to liberty and to the security of his person”. 
29 See the Preamble of the Constitution.  
30 The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Torture Convention); adopted by the GA Res 39/46 of 10 December in 1984; 
entered into force on 26 June 1987. Cameroon acceded to the instrument on 19 December 
1986, and signed its Optional Protocol on 15 December 2009.  
31 Art 2(2) of the Torture Convention. 
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torture.32 In contradistinction to these provisions, it is submitted that Cameroon still 
utilises torture33 in its widest possible sense. Even though there is an anti-torture 
law34 in Cameroon, this law is only applicable to government officials and not 
civilians and provides for severe punishment for the use of torture by government 
officials.35 Torture is applicable in the Cameroonian sense of justice, a notion which 
will be explained in detail further in the chapter. Cases of home robbery often result 
in mob justice, where the intruder is captured by the community, manhandled and 
frequently killed for the crime committed.  Such activities are not penalised by the 
state. As such, it seems as if torture is excused and a regard for life and a fair trial 
discounted by the Cameroonian legal system in this respect. 
Further general but important rights which may affect all participants in 
housebreaking homicides include the guarantee of freedom and security to each 
individual, subject to respect for the rights of others and the higher interests of the 
state; as well as the right of every accused person to be presumed innocent until 
found guilty during a hearing conducted in strict compliance with the rights of 
defence. There is also no retrospective application of the law - no person may be 
judged and punished except by virtue of a law enacted and published before the 
offence committed. In this regard, the Charter states that “[n]o penalty may be 
inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was 
committed”,36 and that every individual has “the right to be presumed innocent until 
                                                          
32 See art 2(2)-(3) of the Torture Convention. 
33 See United States Dept of State “2010 Human Rights Report: Cameroon” 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154335.htm (accessed 28/04/2015). “Torture” is 
defined as “any acute pain or suffering whether physical, mental or psychological inflicted on a 
person by any civil servant or anyone acting on their behalf in order to obtain information or a 
confession”. See Murray & Onyema (eds) “New Anti-Torture Law in Cameroon” 1998 42(1) J 
Afr L 138. Also see s 132(a)(5) of the Penal Code, which is identical to the definition of torture 
in art 1(1) of the Torture Convention.  
34 Law No 97/9 of 10 January 1997 affords harsh punishment for the use of torture by 
government officials: “If the torture results in unintentional death, the punishment is 
imprisonment for life”. See Murray & Onyema (n33 supra) 137. 
35 See Murray & Onyema (n33 supra) 137. 
36 Art 7(2) of the Charter. 
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proved guilty37 by a competent court or tribunal”.38 The Cameroonian society 
seems to be ignorant about this article if one considers the manner in which 
alleged criminals are being treated. 
Violations of these rights in the Constitution may be challenged in the Supreme 
Court. If this is not achieved, affected persons may solicit a regional body such as 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission)39 to 
ensure that their rights are promoted and validated.40 However, as the African 
Commission has no jurisdiction to make binding decisions against any member 
state that has violated a provision in the African Charter,41 the body has not been 
able to discharge its duties satisfactorily. The inability to successfully attain its main 
objective of protecting human rights can be mainly attributed to some difficulties in 
identifying the limits of the rights and, where there has been an infringement 
thereof, finding an effective and practical remedy.42 As a consequence, victims of 
human-rights abuse have for the most part looked no further than their national 
courts for a remedy. Yet national judges have largely been asymmetrical to the 
challenge of providing a remedy where the alleged violation is by a mob.  
The Preamble to the Constitution declares the Cameroonian people’s commitment 
to universal human-rights values and principles, such as the right to life, to physical 
and moral integrity and to humane treatment, etcetera. In stark contrast, the Penal 
                                                          
37 Even art 11(1) of the UDHR states that: "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right 
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has 
had all the guarantees necessary for his defence”.  
38 Art 7(1)(b) of the Charter. 
39 As established by Part II of the African Charter. 
40 Art 30 of the Charter. 
41 Enonchong (n6 supra) 197. 
42 Enonchong (n6 supra) 199, 208, 213. Eg, in cases where the right to the presumption of 
innocence has been infringed, it is difficult to determine what a just and appropriate remedy 
should be where it has been found that a violation has occurred before any criminal trial. If, 
after a trial, the accused has not been convicted, the only practical remedy will be monetary 
compensation by way of damages; which is not be practicable in Cameroon criminal law. A 
breach of the right to the presumption of innocence under the Charter will thus always involve 
a breach of the right to a fair trial. 
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Code prescribes the death penalty for serious crimes.43 Crimes punishable by 
death include aggravated murder,44 premeditated murder, theft committed with 
violence and leading to death, as well as robbery not resulting in death,45 amongst 
others. A robber who has caused grievous bodily harm may be subjected to the 
death penalty, if applicable. It seems as if a home owner, who kills in defence of 
property, will not receive the death penalty if the act is not aggravated or 
premeditated. Also, the Penal Code does not impose any criminal liability in a case 
where the defence was immediately necessary.46 
As the Constitution is the supreme law of the jurisdiction, it is curious that domestic 
laws which are inconsistent with it are not regarded as invalid. The many approved 
or ratified human-rights treaties and conventions acknowledged in the 
Constitution47 are also disregarded. This constitutional imperative is explicitly 
integrated into criminal law, as article 2(1) of the Penal Code provides that “the 
rules of international law and of duly ratified and published treaties are applicable 
to the present code and to any criminal provision.” In order to shed more light on 
this dilemma, it is necessary to examine the particular domestic laws applicable. 
This will be achieved in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
                                                          
43 See Penal Code s 320. Execution takes place by means of hanging or shooting by firing squad 
as stated in the Penal Code s 23(1): “Execution of the death sentence shall be by shooting or 
by hanging as may be ordered by the judgment, and shall be public unless otherwise ordered 
in the decision not to commute”. 
44 Murder committed by poisoning or in order to further an offence, murder of a child of fifteen 
years old or younger, and murder of ascendants. 
45 Theft committed with violence, causing grievous bodily harm. 
46 S 84 of the Penal Code considers lawful defences. 
47 The Constitution states in art 45: “duly approved or ratified treaties and international 
agreements shall, following their publication, override national laws, provided the other party 
implements the said treaty or agreement”. It has been noted that in practice, Cameroonian 
courts primarily apply domestic law without any reference to international norms. See 
Atangana Amougou “Les Tribunaux Militaires et Juridictions d’exception au Cameroun” in 
Lambert Abdelgawad Juridictions Militaires et Tribunaux d’Exception en Mutation: Perspectives 
Comparées et Internationales (2007) 96. 
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3.3.2 Cameroon Criminal Procedure Code 
The Cameroon Criminal Procedure Code48 of 2005 is the long-awaited result of a 
draft uniform code of criminal procedure presented by the Federal Commission for 
Penal Legislation in 1978 already.49 The Criminal Procedure Code stipulates the 
rules which deal with the investigation of offences; the search and identification of 
offenders; the method of adducing evidence; the powers of those charged with 
prosecution; the organisation, composition and jurisdiction of courts in criminal 
matters; verdict; sentencing; the setting aside of judgments in default and appeals; 
the rights of the parties; and the methods of executing sentences. These are all 
procedures which may pertain to cases of killing in defence of property, and will be 
briefly discussed in order to highlight certain aspects of private defence. 
The institution of any criminal proceeding is aimed at procuring a sentence or a 
preventive measure against the lawbreaker.50 Thus, any person who contravenes 
the law must be arrested. According to the Criminal Procedure Code,51 an arrest 
shall consist of capturing a person with the intention of bringing that person as 
soon as possible before the authority as prescribed by law: 
A judicial police officer, agent of judicial police or any officer of the forces of law and 
order effecting an arrest shall order the person to be arrested to follow him and, in 
the event of refusal, he shall use reasonable force necessary to arrest the person. 
                                                          
48 The Criminal Procedure Code consists of six books. Book I concerns general provisions 
starting at ss 1 to 58, Book II considers the investigation and prosecution of offences (s 59 to s 
287); Book III regards the trial courts (s 288 to s 426); Book IV involves the setting aside of 
judgments in default, appeals and reviews (s 427 to s 544); Book V (s 545 to s 583) relates to 
the execution of judgments; and lastly, Book VI (s 584 to s 747) pertains to special procedures. 
49 The draft appeared in 1978, and was the result of the work of the Federal Commission for 
Penal Legislation which includes lawyers from both parts of Cameroon. The explicit goal of the 
draft is to bring about a synthesis between the accusatorial and non-accusatorial procedural 
systems, of the English and French types respectively. It took the Commission more than ten 
years to elaborate the draft. However, the draft was passed by the Parliament without major 
modifications. See Bringer (n10 supra) 11. See also Abeng, Bah, Bamlango, Udobong, Barad 
& Feroli “International Legal Developments in Review: 2006” 2007 41(2) The Intl Lawyer 692. 
50 See s 59(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Book II Part I). 
51 Criminal Procedure Code s 30(1). 
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Any individual may in case of a felony misdemeanour committed in flagrante delicto 
as defined in section 103 arrest the author of such an offence. 
No bodily or psychological harm shall be caused to the person arrested.52 
It is specified that any accused, if he so wishes, may be a witness in the course of 
the proceedings.53 The examining magistrate shall also not be bound by any 
statement relating to the offence which the police have given in relation to the facts 
of the case.54 This is not the case in practice when it comes to defence of property 
in the jurisdiction. It is submitted that the main purpose is not that the police arrest 
a thief in order to bring him before judicial authority, but for a crowd of people to 
take the law into their own hands and punish an alleged criminal on the spot.55 This 
usually results in serious injury or more often, death. Such punishment is totally 
against prescribed Cameroonian procedural law but is deliberately ignored or 
completely disregarded in the society. 
 
3.3.3 Cameroon customary law  
Cameroon customary law is ancient and binding, its origins lost in the mist of 
antiquity.56 These laws derive from various disparate and distant lands which were 
                                                          
52 See s 30(2)(3)(4). 
53 Criminal Procedure Code s 323(1). 
54 See s 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
55 This particular act of punishment (called mob- or jungle justice) has been in existence from 
time immemorial in Cameroon. It is not yet certain whether any stringent law against mob 
justice would ameliorate such practice. A traditional principle that must be settled here is that in 
cases of misconduct, eg, theft, when it comes to the attention of the society, “justice” is 
immediately delivered. In such cases, there is no presumption of innocence. Similar incidences 
occur in South Africa. In Tickyline Village near Tzaneen, a suspected housebreaker was killed 
by a mob. Reacting to the victim's loud screams, community members came in large numbers; 
caught the suspect and assaulted him. He died on the scene. See News24 Correspondent 
“Limpopo Mob Kills Suspected Housebreaker” News24.com http://www.news24.com 
/SouthAfrica/News/limpopo-mob-kills-suspected-housebreaker-20160209 (accessed 10/02/ 
2016). 
56 Fisiy “Colonial and Religious Influences on Customary Law: The Cameroonian Experiences” 
1988 43(2) Africa: Rivista Trimestrale di Studi e Documentazione dell’ Instituto Italiano per 
l’Africa e l’Oriente 263. 
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inspired by different moral, religious, social and economic backgrounds.57 Some of 
these principles state general rules of morality and public policy which make up the 
ideological framework through which justice is administered.58 As previously 
mentioned; customary law still feature prominently in certain regions of the 
jurisdiction. For example, due to the influence of English law in West Cameroon the 
customary courts still play a major role in the legal proceedings in the area.59 It 
must be noted that although customary criminal laws were recognised by the 
British colonial authorities,60 two distinct systems of courts co-existed in the 
Cameroon territories administered by them - the Native or customary courts for the 
natives and the European or modern courts for the whites.61 
Cameroon currently still has strong customary laws and traditional courts systems 
in place.62 Any violation of a local norm or custom could easily bring about the 
imposition of either a moral, ritual or legal sanction or any combination thereof.63 In 
some customs, certain crimes are punishable by stoning the criminal to death or by 
hanging, regarded as repugnant and contrary to public policy by the colonial 
authorities.64 Although civil and criminal cases are heard using either customary or 
state courts, criminal cases are generally tried in state courts. After sentencing in 
state courts, customary courts are allowed to promote reconciliation between the 
parties, and to order restitution to be made as a remedy either by assigning the 
whole or part of the fine to compensate the victim.65 Still, as will be illustrated, 
                                                          
57 Enonchong (n6 supra) 503.  
58 Fisiy (n56 supra) 263. 
59 See Ngwafor (n7 supra) 71. 
60 Coldham (n17 supra) 219.  
61 See Fisiy (n56 supra) 267. 
62 Traditionally, customary justice was administered by different bodies ranging from the family 
head, quarter head, chief, and the chief’s council. The more serious the offence, the higher up 
in hierarchy it had to be heard. See Fombad (n8 supra). 
63 Fisiy (n56 supra) 262. 
64 Eg, penalties meted out by Alkali courts in the Bamenda Grassland Kingdoms (see n15 supra) 
“range from public flogging, penal servitude to bodily mutilations and even execution”. See 
Fisiy (n56 supra) 273-274. 
65 Coldham (n17 supra) 221. The objective of any judicial proceeding under customary law is 
reconciliation, which is encouraged through an informal arbitration process. It is purported that 
this quest for the truth lead to some psychological satisfaction for both trial parties - litigants 
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Cameroonian people prefer to bring criminal cases before the customary courts 
although they have no jurisdiction in such cases. Cases of theft - even aggravated 
theft – are tried in customary courts which, on a guilty-finding, results in 
compensation being paid by the accused to the aggrieved person. It is alleged that 
“[n]either the plaintiff, or - very understandably - the defendant had an interest in 
getting the official courts and police involved”.66 The main reasoning behind 
avoiding official courts are that they “are too severe in their eyes and do not satisfy 
the victim's primary interest in recovering the stolen item or receiving an adequate 
compensation”.67 
It is reasonable to conclude that, considering the particular context of each case, 
killing in defence of property will be vindicated by customary courts and appropriate 
compensation will be paid to the aggrieved person, if applicable. However, theft 
may also transpire using supernatural powers. Although cases relating to witchcraft 
should automatically be transferred to the court of first instance (a statutory 
court),68 Cameroonian people accede to customary courts to hear these types of 
cases.  
The following case illustrates this point well. In Bafia,69Mr Christopher Tabi70 was 
amongst the six largest cocoa producers in Bafia with a number of workers working 
for him. As it was harvest season, he had to dry some of the already-fermented 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
may confess publicly and receive public vindication rather than damages. See Fisiy (n56 
supra) 267. 
66 Bringer (n10 supra) 12. 
67 Bringer (n10 supra) 12. 
68 Witchcraft Ordinances create a number of offences to carry severe penalties, aimed at 
eradicating both the belief in and the practice of witchcraft. See Coldham (n17 supra) 219. S 
251 of the Penal Code states: ““Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination 
liable to disturb public order or tranquillity or to harm another in his person, property or 
substance, whether by the taking of a reward or otherwise, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for from two to 10 years, and with fine from 5000 Francs to 100,000 Francs.” 
(Cameroon Central African Franc or CFA 100, 000 is equivalent to ZAR 2040.00.) 
69 Bafia is a rural area in the south-west province of Cameroon, an area in which 96% of the 
activities consists of cocoa farming. 
70 This case was reported to the researcher by the niece of the victim. Please note that 
customary courts do not keep any records of their proceedings. As such, no court numbers 
exist and enquiries had to be made orally. 
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cocoa beans in the oven71 on one of his cocoa farms. He had instructed those in 
charge of drying the cocoa not to start the process (setting fire to the wood) until he 
arrived. After waiting for Mr Tabi for some time, the workers decided to set fire to 
the wood as drying the cocoa is a time-consuming process and it was already very 
late. All of a sudden, a commotion was heard in the oven. A large snake appeared 
which they, after a struggle, managed to kill. Suddenly, Mr Tabi came running 
towards them with sweat all over his body, angrily questioning the workers why 
they disobeyed his instructions. He died a week later. His sudden death was 
attributed to his involvement in witchcraft. It was believed that Mr Tabi had, through 
mystical means, transformed himself into a snake and visited a rival cocoa 
producer’s farm the previous night to steal his produce. However, this man had, 
through protective charms, safeguarded his cocoa beans. It was alleged that Mr 
Tabi died because he went to appropriate another’s property through mystical 
means. According to the community and the court “na-yifindnam”72- his death was 
justified. 
It is apparent that if such a case should appear before an official court of law, it will 
be very difficult for the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Not only will the prosecution have problems with establishing 
that the actual crime of theft (by Mr Tabi in the form of a snake) took place - the 
actus reus - but it will be very arduous to prove intent – the mens rea. Testimonies 
of witnesses scarcely meet the requisite evidentiary standards. It will also be 
difficult to prove that Mr Tabi’s death was witchcraft-related. Normally an official 
post-mortem autopsy will have to be conducted in order to determine the cause of 
death. However, the rate for medico-legal autopsies in Cameroon is very low,73 but 
                                                          
71 An oven is an approximate eight square metres by one-and-a-half metres construction built 
with sun-dried mud bricks used to facilitate the quick-drying process of cocoa. Hot charcoal is 
used to dry the cocoa on an iron net at the top.  
72 Pidgin English translated as “he looked for it” ie ‘just deserts’. 
73 See Enow-Orock; Assob Ngu et al “Contribution of Autopsy to Medical Practice in Cameroon: 
A 10 Year Review” 2009 6(1) Clinics in Mother and Child Health 1019. The authors aver that 
“[o]f 12.000 bodies received at the mortuary … 126 were autopsied … from 1997 to 2007, 
giving a rate of 1 autopsy in 100 deaths” (or one autopsy per month). 
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“traditional autopsies” are routinely performed by “specialists” in divinations.74 
Courts can only establish culpability in such cases if the perpetrator actually 
confesses to committing the crime, within the meaning and intent of section 74(2) 
of the Penal Code.75 In the absence of any confessional statements, no intent of 
witchcraft can be proven, and consequently no killing in defence of property 
established. 
 
3.3.4 Cameroon Penal Code 
As previously clarified, the Cameroon Penal Code76 derives its origin from French-
and English law.77 As such, the substantive-law crimes and their punishments 
                                                          
74 Eg, a “specialist” performed a “traditional autopsy” on a two-year-old baby girl, even though the 
child drowned in a well in the capital, Yaounde, while playing with a neighbour's son. The 
procedure consisted of slicing the child’s abdomen open with a dagger a few minutes before 
the burial, in front of all funeral attendees. The viscera are then pulled out, examined, some 
incantations are pronounced, and the organs shoved back. The verdict in this particular case 
was: “The child had already died seven times. The spell had long been there, hidden under the 
spleen. She was possessed by evil spirits and will be reincarnated through an animal”. While 
traditional autopsy is systematically carried out on the dead in order to “track [assassins] 
through the bodies of their victims”, official post-mortem autopsies are elective. See Panapress 
“Cameroonian Witch Doctors Dabble in Post-Mortems” 12 December 2002 
http://www.panapress.com/Cameroonian-witch-doctors-dabble-in-post-mortems--12-469959-
20-lang2-index.html (accessed 01/06/2015).  
75 Penal Code s 74(2) provides: “Criminal responsibility shall lie on him who intentionally commits 
each of the ingredient acts or omissions of an offence with the intention of causing the result 
which completes it”. Also see Ndukong “Sorcery and the Law” Cameroon Tribune (28 April 
2015) https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 893 
10sorcery-and-the-law&catid=4:societe&Itemid=3#contenu (accessed 28/04/2015). 
76 The Penal Code comprises of two books. Book 1 (Law no 65/LF/24 of 12 November 1965) 
introduces the general principles of criminal law, some of which apply equally to procedure, eg, 
ss 1 and 2. Book 1 consists of four parts: Part I starts from s 1 to s 16 and introduces the 
application of criminal law; Part II concerns punishment and prevention starting from s 17 to s 
73; Part III entails criminal responsibility starting from s 74 to s 100; and Part IV - s 101 to s 
226 - encompasses state laws. Book 2 (Law No 67/LF/1 of 12 June 1967) also consist of two 
parts: Part I (s 227 to s 274) concerns specific crimes and Part II (s 275 to s 361) relates to 
felonies and misdemeanours against private interest. This Law (introduced by decree no 
67/DF/322 of 20 July 1967) has been amended by subsequent laws and ordinances. The 
Penal Code has been described as “the first opus of law unification in Cameroon”. See Ajanoh 
“The Administration of Criminal Justice in Cameroon: Realities of the Application of the Uniform 
Penal Code” 1998 10 Afr J Int'l & Comp L 292. 
77 Much English law was incorporated into the Nigerian Penal Code, one of Britain’s territories. 
As such, the Penal Code followed both the Nigerian and French Penal Codes, which were 
previously in force in the English and French-speaking regions, respectively.  
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specified are an amalgam of the two jurisdictions’ rules of criminal law. Although 
different sections exist in the Code which deals with the person78 and property,79 
both concepts are considered under Part II of Book 1 in the Penal Code as 
“felonies and misdemeanours against private interest”.80 Criminal responsibility for 
crimes committed which involve either persons or property is considered in section 
84, which is of general application.81 This section negates any criminal 
responsibility in the course of protecting “any right”82 or “all other rights”.83 
Similar to the Constitution, the importance of protecting property is given primary 
attention in the Penal Code. Many offences in the Code punish interference with 
another’s property, as illustrated in the scheme below:84 
                                                          
78 See Part II, Chap 1 of the Penal Code. Eg, according to s 275, any person who “causes 
another’s death shall be punished with imprisonment for life”. 
79 See Part II, Chap 4; s 316 of the Penal Code. 
80 Offences in the Penal Code are divided into three types: felonies, misdemeanours, and simple 
offences. A felony is the most serious offence and is delineated in s 21 of the Penal Code as 
“an offence punishable with death or loss of liberty for a maximum of more than ten years”. 
Misdemeanours are less serious offences and are punishable by a minimum of ten days and 
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of at least CFA 25, 000. Simple offences 
are the least serious offences and are punished by a maximum of ten days’ imprisonment 
and/or a fine of maximum CFA 25, 000. Simple offences are grouped separately from felonies 
and misdemeanours as general crimes committed irrespective of the victim or interest harmed. 
Felonies and misdemeanours, on the other hand, do regard the specific victim and interests 
injured in each case; and are grouped into three categories: crimes against the state, against 
general interest and against private interest. See Anyangwe (n2 supra) ix. 
81 See s 84 (n117 infra). 
82 See s 84(1) (n117 infra). 
83 See s C84 (n124 infra). 
84 See Anyangwe (n2 supra) 410. Burglary (or breaking and entering with the intention to steal) 
and robbery (as highlighted) are crimes implicated for use of the ground of justification (self-
defence) in this study. In the Penal Code, both these crimes are conflated as aggravated theft; 
and no distinction is made between these two crimes as in other jurisdictions.  
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Not only is the thieving of property punished, but any deed which may harm any 
type of property of the other is punishable. If a robber, in an attempt to unlawfully 
enter a house, breaks down the door, the crime of destruction of or damage to 
property will be committed. Under section 316(1) of the Penal Code, a person who 
intentionally “destroys the whole or any part of any property belonging to, or 
charged in favour of, another” is guilty of an offence.85 Furthermore, setting fire to 
another’s property amounts to a crime in terms of the Penal Code section 227(1); 
punishable by imprisonment from 3 to 10 years and a fine. Destruction of property 
need not only to take the form of arson,86 but damages of any kind to a residence 
is further penalised in section 227(2) of the Code.  
                                                          
85 According to the Penal Code s 316(2), the penalty for property destruction is imprisonment 
from fifteen days to ten years, and/or a fine from CFA 5000 to CFA 500 000, depending on the 
type of property and gravity of destruction. The property most often destroyed in Cameroonian 
case law is others’ crops or yields. Eg, in The People & Attia Daniel v Nche Daniel (2008) 
Appeal No BCA/MS/8c/2006 (unreported), a pear tree, yams and sweet potatoes were 
destroyed, while in Nji Jato & 5 Others v The People (2006) Appeal No BCA/MS/5c/2005 
(unreported), hundreds of eucalyptus trees were destroyed. See Anyangwe (n2 supra) 251-
452. 
86 Eg, in the case of Thomas Sama v The People (1974) Appeal No BCA/15c/73 (unreported), 
the complainant saw the appellant set his hay on fire. After yelling loudly that the appellant 
wanted to kill him, the appellant allegedly ran away. The appellant was convicted under s 
227(10), and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.  
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Theft is considered a serious crime in Cameroon. Unlike simple theft,87 a burglar or 
robber who has appropriated another person’s property will be charged with 
aggravated theft. The difference between simple and aggravated theft lies in the 
manner in which the crime is committed.88 Aggravated theft has been defined in 
section 320(1) of the amended Penal Code89 as a crime of theft committed either 
by day or by night, with the use of force;90 or bearing weapons;91 or by breaking in, 
by climbing in, or by the use of a false key;92 or with a motor vehicle.93 The use of 
force in aggravated theft may include either actual violence or threats of violence.94 
The proviso regarding the bearing of weapons require that any type of weapon 
may be used, but must be visibly carried. It is also not necessary that such a 
weapon should actually be used during the theft. Theft by any type of unauthorised 
entry is also considered aggravated.  
The inclusion of these crimes into the discussion is important as the death penalty 
is prescribed for their contravention. While the original draft of the Penal Code 
restricted the death penalty only to very serious crimes like treason and 
premeditated murder,95 instances where the death sentence may be instituted 
                                                          
87 Simple theft is defined in s 318(1)(a) of the Penal Code as intentionally causing loss to another 
by removing his property.  
88 Mbi “Death Penalty Crimes in Cameroon” 2007 1 Cameroon J on Democracy & HR 30. 
89 Law 90/61 of December 1990, s 320 ‘Aggravated theft’. 
90 S 320(1)(a) of the Penal Code. 
91 S 320(1)(b) of the Penal Code. 
92 S 320(1)(c) of the Penal Code. See, eg, the case of Zebaze Pierre v The People (1986) Suit 
No HCB/186c/86 (unreported), where the appellant was convicted of aggravated theft for 
forcing open a window and stealing some money inside the house. 
93 S 320(1)(d) of the Penal Code. The motor vehicle must be used for committing the crime, eg, 
in Bimela Francis v The People (1988) Appeal No BCA/12c/88 (unreported), the appellant was 
convicted of aggravated theft after stealing fourteen bags of coffee and transporting it in his 
car. 
94 Or, according to Anyangwe (n2 supra) 423; “physical or psychic force”. See, eg, Adamu Buba, 
Hamidu Adamu & YerimaIssa v The People & Nebane Shadrack Shy (2008) Appeal No 
BCA/7c/2007, where the appellants were convicted of aggravated theft for stealing cattle from 
the respondent. 
95 Capital murder as defined under s 276 of the Penal Code is committed: “a) after premeditation; 
or b) by poising; or c) in the preparation, facilitation, or commission of a felony or 
misdemeanour, or to enable the escape or procure the impunity of the offender or an 
accessory to such felony or misdemeanour”. Premeditated murder is committed when 
intentional and planned, notwithstanding the identity of the victim or that the enterprise 
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have been extended to theft where aggravating circumstances were present in 
committing the act.96 Accordingly, if theft has been committed causing the death of 
another or grievous harm,97 the person may be punished with death.98 These 
penalties differ, depending on the specific circumstances of each case, including 
whether it had been committed during the day or night.99 Thus, different types of 
theft of varying degrees of severity may be differentiated. The death penalty can 
also be commuted to a maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment if the court finds 
mitigating circumstances, except when the acceptance of mitigating circumstances 
is expressly excluded by law.100 Notwithstanding the above, no public execution 
has taken place for the past decade though the Courts continue to sentence 
persons to death as per the provisions of the Code.101 
The severity of the penalty prescribed for aggravated theft is a direct result of the 
increasing rate of armed robbery in Cameroon:102 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
depends on the fulfilment of a condition (penal Code s 276(1)(a)). Also see Capstick “Capital 
Theft and the Cameroon Penal Code Amendment Ordinance 1972” 1973 13(3) Bri J Crim 294. 
96 If committed without causing grievous bodily harm, the penalty is a maximum of twenty years 
and a fine. Aggravated robbery (usually, but not necessarily, involving the use of a firearm or 
other offensive weapon) has also been made a capital offence in Zambia, Uganda, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Malawi and Kenya. See Coldham (n17 supra) 230. 
97 This is provided under s 277 and s 279 of the Penal Code. 
98 S 320(2) of the Penal Code. Previously, the Penal Code (old section dealing with aggravated 
theft) provided that aggravated theft existed where loss to another had been caused: (a) with 
force; or (b) bearing weapons; or (c) by breaking in, by climbing in, or by the use of a false key; 
or (d) with a motor vehicle; or (e) by three or more offenders". This section has been repealed. 
99 See Capstick (n95 supra) 284. 
100 See ss 90 and 91 of the Penal Code.Before the Code was amended in 1972, judges also had 
extensive sentencing discretion. See Bringer (n10 supra) 11. 
101 Mbi (n88 supra) 30. 
102 This concern is mirrored by an increase of death sentence penalties for the growing trend of 
robbery under arms elsewhere in Africa: Uganda introduced the death sentence for aggravated 
robbery with its enactment of the Penal (Amendment) Act 1966. The Kenyan Penal Code (cap 
63), as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act No 25/71, provides the death penalty for 
armed robbery and attempted armed robbery in the course of which “grievous harm is inflicted 
upon any person other than a participant in such offence”. In Sierra Leone the death penalty 
has replaced life imprisonment for persons convicted of armed robbery, or armed attempted 
robbery, or any robbery in which personal violence was an ingredient - by virtue of the Imperial 
Statutes (Criminal Law) Amendment Act No 16/71. Nigeria also has introduced public 
execution by firing squad for people convicted of armed robbery. See Capstick (n95 supra) 
285.  
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The government was apparently shocked by some incidents of particularly brutal 
armed robbery in the early seventies which might well have been the decisive 
impulse for the Penal Code amendment ordinance of 1972. Whether draconian 
punishment has really been a successful instrument to control crime, particularly 
theft, is a controversial issue among Cameroon lawyers and police officials.103 
It is submitted that, in the light of the seriousness of the crime of aggravated theft 
and its accompanying punishment of death, a person who uses necessary, even 
deadly force against an assailant for the purpose of protecting his or another’s 
body and property when immediate aid from the law enforcement is not readily 
available, will be justified in doing so. On a charge of murder,104 such a person 
may claim private defence. According to the Penal Code, private defence is 
permissible and thus lawful, if the infringement is unlawful105 and the defender’s 
reaction was what one might expect from a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances. In the case of a lawful defence, the unlawful infringement need not 
necessary be to the detriment of the accused himself. It is important to mention 
here that “lawful defence” as a defence of general application under the Penal 
Code is broader in scope than the law of “self-defence” in some jurisdictions.106 In 
the following sections, the requirements for private defence to be considered lawful 
will be focussed on in detail. 
 
3.4 Requirements for private defence 
Everyone has the right to defend his person and all other rights including the rights 
of others,107 provided that in every case the following conditions are fulfilled: the 
                                                          
103 Bringer (n10 supra) 12. 
104 Murder (or homicide in Cameroonian law) is defined as the killing of one human being by 
another. Murder simpliciter (or murder in the second degree in some jurisdictions) is the 
intentional causing of another’s death (Penal Code s 275). 
105 An unlawful infringement is any act which would expose its author either to criminal 
punishment or to damages. See s C84(a). 
106 See Anyangwe (n2 supra) 331. 
107 The Penal Code s C84. 
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infringement was unlawful; the defence must be dictated by an immediate 
necessity, and there must be a reasonable proportion between the defence and the 
infringement.108 
 
3.4.1 The attack or infringement must be unlawful 
An unlawful infringement means any act which would expose the person 
responsible either to criminal punishment or to damages. This means that one 
cannot defend oneself against lawful arrest by the police or against an adversary 
who is himself acting in lawful defence. The right of defence however exist even if 
the immediate aggressor may have a complete defence (or irresponsibility) and 
even more so if his defence is only partial (threat, obedience to lawful order, 
insanity or infancy), since the infringement in itself remains unlawful. Thus, a 
person would be acting in lawful defence “if he beats another who is wrongfully 
endeavouring, with violence, to dispossess him of his land or goods, or the land or 
goods of another person”.109 
 
3.4.2 The use of force must be reasonably necessary 
The defence must be dictated by an immediate necessity.110 The Penal Code 
further provides that if there is time to apply to the forces of law and order for 
assistance without any adverse consequence occurring from the delay; that any 
defence implemented in such situations would be regarded as unlawful. This 
seems impracticable since the defender cannot wait for the police to arrive in a 
case of emergency. In a case where a defender defends himself and his property, 
the issue foremost is whether the force used by the defender was reasonable and 
necessary in the circumstances. 
                                                          
108 The Penal Code s C84(a), (b), (c). 
109 See Anyangwe (n2 supra) 331. 
110 See the Penal Code s C84(b). 
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According to the Penal Code: 
No criminal responsibility shall arise from an infringement of a right of property, not 
justified as lawful defence under section 84111 but inflicted in order to protect the 
person acting or any other person, or his or another’s property, from a grave and 
imminent danger not otherwise avoidable: Provided that the means of protection is 
proportionate to the harm threatened.112 
This section of the Code negates any criminal responsibility if the purpose of doing 
so was to protect an interest. It seems that most of Cameroonian society 
disregards the proviso of this section – that is, the means of protection should be 
proportionate to the harm threatened. Consider the facts of the following case:113 at 
about four o’clock in the morning on the 17th of December 2013, a gang of thieves 
invaded a dwelling house to steal chickens in Ntamulung.114 Having succeeded in 
their mission, Raymond (a member of the gang of thieves) detached from the gang 
for a separate operation alone in another dwelling house. He succeeded to pull 
three healthy chickens from the chickens’ cage. As he was about to leave the 
building, the daughter of the owner peeped through the window and informed her 
mother who immediately ran out and alerted the neighbours.115 Raymond started 
running. Upon realising that a mob was after him he abandoned the chickens as he 
tried to escape. He was eventually caught by the mob around the Ntamulung 
Presbyterian Church; some 2000m away from the crime scene, where he was 
bitten and burnt to death with tyres. The chickens were taken to the police station 
by the police who arrived quite some time thereafter; where after the owner of the 
                                                          
111 It should be noted here that s 84 regards lawful defence. 
112 Penal Code s 86. 
113 Unreported case reported on Chi Mac “Tori Time” Radio Hot Cocoa 4-5pm (17/12/2013), 
hereinafter the Raymond-case.  
114 Ntamulung is a small town in Bamenda in the North-West Province of Cameroon. 
115 In Cameroon any person who is being overpowered by a thief just need to scream as loudly as 
he can for assistance. The most popular screaming voice which is in Pidgin English is - “wuana 
come o, thiefman o”, directly translated as - “come everyone o, there is a thief o”.  Any person 
who hears such screaming will be turning his attention towards that direction either to 
participate in catching the thief, to beat or to watch as the thief dies in pain. This is called 
“jungle justice”. 
78 
 
chickens went to the police station to identify and reclaim her chickens. In this 
case, the force used by the mob against Raymond was not reasonably necessary 
and excessive. No criminal case ensued as a result of this episode, probably 
because Cameroonian society holds such acts as just and necessary in 
accordance with “na-yifindnam”.116 
What is worth noting in the above incident is that the killing was in defence of 
personal property only. There was no threat to bodily injury or loss of another’s life. 
The force used was also excessive. Although it is generally considered that 
property is not worth a human life, dealing with a thief in this manner is, according 
to public opinion, necessary. Unfortunately, once a mob is chasing an alleged thief 
the motive or what he has stolen or done, or whether he is actually the 
transgressor or not, is of no essence. This may explain the reason why such cases 
never reach the courts; either because there is no one to summon a case or 
because either the family of the victim or the law enforcement officers have no one 
to be hold accountable. As “no prosecution may commence without the complaint 
of the injured party”,117 no case will follow as the alleged perpetrator is deceased.  
It is important to consider the following case which did not only involve a threat to 
property but also a threat to life. In S v AbubakaBenyo and Another,118 two 
herdsmen, Abubaka and Mbonghing, were taking care of their employer’s herd of 
cattle in one of the grass fields around Ndop in the North West Province of 
Cameroon. On the night of the 3rd of March 2008, when one of the herdsmen 
(Abubaka) went to the other end of the field to ensure that the cattle do not break 
out of the boundaries, two thieves caught, assaulted and tied up the other 
herdsman (Mbonghing). On his way back to meet Mbonghing at their resting place, 
                                                          
116 See n72 supra. 
117 See the Penal Code s 299(3). According to the Criminal Procedure Code s 62(1)(a), criminal 
proceedings shall be discontinued in the case of “the death of the suspect, the defendant or 
the accused”. This means that if the person suspected of having committed the crime is dead; 
there will be no criminal proceeding. The same principle applies to the accused. 
118 S v Abubaka Benyo and Another Suit No HCMD/P1/21/08 (unreported) (hereinafter Abubaka-
case). 
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Abukaka realised that Mbonghing had been beaten and tied up. Abubaka then shot 
and killed one of the thieves and the other ran away.  
What is important to note is that the case was dismissed at its preliminary 
inquiry.119 It is necessary to question why Abubaka was never tried in court. The 
answer to this question is clear if the court was to rely on Penal Code section 92(1) 
which states that “[u]pon a finding of mitigating circumstances after conviction ... 
the court may reduce to five days any sentence of loss of liberty, and any sentence 
of fine to one franc,120 and may pass sentence of one such penalty only”. 
Objectively, if one finds himself in Abubaka’s position, it becomes certain that he 
had to do just what he did;121 despite the fact that a person is punished with death 
if he commits murder.122 
Taking into consideration all the facts of the case, a “no-case”123 ruling is deemed 
a just decision in the Abubaka-case. According to the Penal Code, “[c]ontrary to 
defences124 which are set forth in the Code and which are of right, mitigating 
circumstances are not catalogued and are in discretion of the court.”125 The court 
must have taken into consideration the circumstances of the particular offence, in 
that Abubaka considered his life, and that of his fellow herdsman, in imminent 
danger. He was furthermore protecting the property of his employer. Considering 
that the two thieves had already assaulted and tied up the other herdsman, and 
Abubaka did not know whether they had any weapons at their disposal, it can be 
concluded that the use of deadly force was reasonably necessary. Accordingly: 
                                                          
119 See the Penal Code s 265: “Where a no-case ruling in favour of the defendant has become 
final, no further proceedings shall be brought against him on the same facts, even under a 
different statement of offence.” 
120 One franc CFA is about three South African cents. 
121 Many other jurisdictions consider that a person is justified in using deadly force against another 
to protect land or tangible, movable property, if he reasonably believes that deadly force is 
immediately necessary. See, eg, the Texas Penal Code s 9 42. 
122 Only if committed with premeditation and capital murder. See Penal Code s 276(1)(a). 
123 See n18 supra. 
124 That is lawful defence under s 84 of the Penal Code. 
125 Penal Code s C 90. 
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No criminal responsibility shall arise from submission to threats, not otherwise 
avoidable, of immediate death or of grievous harm as defined by this Code: 
Provided that where the act committed is defined as an offence punishable with 
death or has resulted in death or of grievous harm, the responsibility of the person 
committing the act shall be merely diminished.126 
If it had been found that the force used by Abubaka was excessive, his 
responsibility would be diminished, allowing the judge sentencing discretion. In 
almost all cases, this entails a reduction of sentence. Another consideration why 
the court passed a no-case ruling is envisaged under the Penal Code127 which 
states that the “infliction of harm and the use of force shall constitute no offence 
where proved to be justified by the immediate necessity of avoiding greater harm to 
the victim”. In the Abubaka-case, the warden could not be expected to retreat 
seeing that his companion and the cattle were under serious threat. Moreover, his 
conduct tallies with section 84 of the Penal Code,128 especially as it involves the 
defence of one’s person and property. One is left to ponder whether the court 
would arrive at a different decision if Mbonghing was not assaulted and tied up by 
the thieves.   
Taking the above cases into consideration, it seems that in Cameroon the right to 
private defence is recognised, but not restricted to force that is reasonably 
necessary. The right to private defence must not extend to the inflicting of more 
harm than is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. 
 
3.4.3 Reasonable proportion between the defence and the infringement 
For a defence to be regarded as a lawful defence there must be a reasonable 
proportion between the defence and the infringement. In this regard, “intentional 
                                                          
126 Penal Code s 81(1). 
127 Penal Code s 287. 
128 See the Penal Code s 84(1) for the contents of this section (n117 supra). 
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killing is proportionate to an attack causing a reasonable apprehension of death, or 
grievous harm as defined by this Code”.129 This subsection specifies the instances 
in which one may go as far as to kill an aggressor, taking into consideration the 
specific circumstances of each particular case. The question of what reasonable 
proportionality constitutes in various situations is in nearly every case an arduous 
problem.130 The relevant court, who must decide on reasonable proportionality in a 
case of self-defence, must do so with reference to the guidance provided in the 
Code: that the confrontation caused a reasonable apprehension with the defender 
of death, or of grievous harm, or of rape or sodomy.131 
If violence of an aggressor is returned with violence by a defender, the 
requirements of proportionality must be satisfied. This is well-illustrated in the case 
of Kari Tazi Joel v The People,132 where the appellant was assaulted in his house 
by an intruder (the deceased). While the deceased used a belt to beat the 
appellant, the appellant could only reach for a knife to defend himself, and which 
caused the intruder’s death. In this case, the court accepted self-defence as a 
ground of justification for the act committed.133 
As explained earlier, the legal requirement of proportionality is seldom adhered to 
in Cameroon.134 The force used is never reasonably proportionate but excessive, 
and “such cases do not reach the court for prosecution”135 since the thief mostly do 
not survive mob justice. In this regard, killing in defence of property would 
                                                          
129 See s 84(2) of the Penal Code. Also see Anyangwe (n2 supra) 331. 
130 Eg, the court in S v Dimmere [1993] BLR 478 (HC) held, per Gyeke-Dako J, that a person 
unlawfully attacked at night could not be expected, in his state of anguish, to weigh the force of 
his blows in defence of himself in golden scales of a jeweller and to adjudicate with great nicety 
as to the exact amount of force which would be justified. A similar view was expressed by Kirby 
J in S v Tatedi [2007] 2 BLR 55 to the effect that the actions of a person trying to effect the 
arrest of a dangerous criminal should not be examined under “... the judgmental microscope of 
the armchair critic”. He went on to hold that “allowances must be made for the fears, dangers 
and tensions that are present when engaging with a dangerous criminal”. 
131 See the Penal Code s 84(2). 
132 Kari Tazi Joel v The People Appeal No BCA/18c/82 (unreported). 
133 See Anyangwe (n2 supra) 332. 
134 See s 86 of the Penal Code for the content of this section. 
135 A comment made personally to the researcher by the Chief Registrar of the Fako High Court in 
the course of the researcher’s search for case law. 
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assumedly also be regarded as reasonable.136 It has been alleged that even a thief 
who has stolen an empty wallet would be killed if caught by a mob. This is because 
of the belief that the aggressor would not have found himself in this position had he 
not provoked the situation. As such, it seems as if there is a direct link between 
provocation and private defence in Cameroon. Both defences require a reasonable 
proportion between the provocation or attack and the subsequent reaction. Still, 
while defence of self or of property is regarded as a lawful defence which may 
absolve all culpability on behalf of the defender, a plea of provocation merely 
diminishes responsibility for the unlawful act.  
Considering the manner in which persons alleged of having committed theft are 
treated in Cameroon, it is worth noting that if the act of defence is not proportional 
to the attack, the harm caused may be regarded as grievous harm,137 homicide or 
even torture. Torture is considered as cruel and unusual punishment which causes 
severe physical, mental and psychological pain or suffering. It is punishable with 
life imprisonment when it is intentionally inflicted and results in death, maiming or 
illness.138 The difference between the crimes of grievous harm and torture is that 
torture may be “inflicted on a person by any civil servant or anyone acting on their 
behalf in order to obtain information or a confession,”139 while grievous harm may 
be perpetrated on a victim by any person. It is thus an offence for any person when 
attempting to procure a confession from an alleged robber for his crime to apply 
any type of force under any circumstances. This offence must be read with an 
                                                          
136 This seems to be the case not only in Cameroon, but most African countries in the region.  
137 The Penal Code s 277 describes grievous harm as “permanently depriving another of the use 
of the whole or of any part of any member, organ or sense”.  
138 The Penal Code s 132(a)(5) defines torture to: “mean any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public 
official or with the express or tacit consent on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or putting pressure on him 
or a third person, or for any other motive based on any form of discrimination whatsoever. 
Torture shall not include pain or suffering arising from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful 
sanctions”. See also Anyangwe (n2 supra) 74. 
139 See Murray & Onyema (n33 supra) 138. Also see s 132(1) of the (New) Penal Code. Such an 
offence is punishable with imprisonment of from six months to five years, where no penalty is 
provided for such offence. 
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exception that certain category of public officers, like police officers may under 
certain circumstances, which must be legally defined, legitimately use force against 
any person. Police officers may use physical force to wrench a confession from a 
thief or even assault or kill a thief when caught in flagrante delicto (“in the pursuit of 
public clamour”). The officer thus acts on behalf of the home owner or resident to 
protect his property, and any death caused by such action may be considered 
lawful. Nonetheless, the proportionality element must still be adhered to and any 
use of impermissible and excessive physical force, compulsion or coercion is 
proscribed by law. 
 
3.5 Is there a right to kill in defence of property? 
Cameroonian law140 states that ownership entails the right guaranteed to every 
person by law to use, enjoy and dispose of property; and that no person must be 
deprived of such a right. However, this does not guarantee one the right to kill 
anyone who attempts to deprive others of such rights. The law permits only a 
judicial police officer, agent of judicial police or any officer of the forces of law and 
order effecting an arrest to use “reasonable force necessary”141 to arrest the 
person. Although any individual may in case of a felony or misdemeanour 
committed in flagrante delicto arrest the author of such an offence, it is unlawful to 
cause any bodily harm to the person arrested.142 
Yet one finds that killing in defence of property in Cameroon, as previous examples 
provided have illustrated, is a reality. Most instances involving killing in defence of 
property do not involve the home owner or house resident, but the neighbourhood 
communities who demand justice for the alleged crime committed. One must view 
Cameroonian society’s reaction to these types of crimes against the background of 
the jurisdiction. Governmental failure to guarantee civil order, social, political, and 
                                                          
140 Preamble of the Constitution of Cameroon. 
141 S 30(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (n55 supra). 
142 See s 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code (n54 supra).  
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economic stability143 with a consequent high rate of unemployment has provided 
the ideal climate for an increase in crime, especially robberies and burglaries. For 
example, the financial loss suffered in Cameroon due to burglaries in the first 
quarter of 1993 alone was equivalent to CFA 6250000.144 Inaction by law and 
order structures has led society to enforce the law themselves. 
Killing in defence of property is not prohibited in the Penal Code. As enunciated by 
section 84(1), the use of force, even deadly force, is lawful for the necessary 
defence of any right of oneself or of another. This includes the right to property. A 
person thus acts lawful if force is used against “another who is wrongfully 
endeavouring, with violence, to dispossess him of his land or goods, or the lands or 
goods of another person”.145 If a self-defender had acted in good faith and without 
intending to do more harm than is necessary for such defence; his attack is lawful 
and he incurs no liability for the death caused. If, however, one of the limitations of 
the justification is exceeded, the law may excuse him for the killing. It does so 
through section 249(2) of the Penal Code by convicting the defendant of the lesser 
form of culpable homicide. Although this provision makes no specific reference to 
the use of fatal force in defence of a dwelling house; it may also be interpreted as 
such. 
It is thus obvious that lawful defence of self or of property may become unlawful if 
the conditions of immediacy, proportionality, and necessity are transgressed. 
According to the Penal Code,146 only threats of death or grievous harm give rise to 
the defence of lawful force. It may be submitted that a crowd, chasing a suspected 
robber down a street, have not been subjected to any threat of death or harm, and 
the immediacy of the attack would have already ended. Even if a crowd acts on 
behalf of the threatened home owner or house resident; “if the apprehension of 
                                                          
143 Cosmas & Schmidt-Ehry “Human Rights and Health in Developing Countries: Barriers to 
Community Participation in Health in Cameroon” 1995 1(3) H & H R 251. 
144 This amount is equivalent to ZAR 130, 000 00. No more recent information was obtainable. 
145 Anyangwe (n2 supra) 331. 
146 S C81(1) of the Penal Code. 
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danger has ceased, killing them will be murder”.147 In this regard, one must 
consider the definition of a felony or a misdemeanour committed in flagrante 
delicto, which includes the proviso that it is committed when, after the commission 
of the offence, the suspect is pursued by public clamour.148 It seems that this 
provision satisfy the immediacy requisite for such circumstances. In any case, if the 
result of submission is the commission of any act punishable with death, or is itself 
the infliction of death or of grievous harm, responsibility will be diminished.  
Despite the fact that the law prohibits any bodily harm to a robber, as already 
mentioned earlier, in Cameroon a person can be killed for stealing an insignificant 
item; however this is not specifically following statute law which specifies the 
means of protection to be proportionate to the harm threatened. Taking the 
Raymond-case as well as the Abubaka-case149 into consideration, it becomes 
apparent that this is a trend which is followed in Cameroon as well as other in 
African countries. Persons have been killed in Cameroon for merely defacing the 
property of another. A recent incident involved the killing of 33-year-old Lucine 
Njonga by home owner Hugeu Mouaha, for urinating on his house’s wall. Luckily 
for the home owner, police intervened quite quickly, and he “narrowly escaped 
jungle justice”.150 Even though it may be said that Mouaha was defending his 
property, there was no immediate threat from Njonga and the force Mouaha used 
was not only excessive but brutal. This case again confirms the communities’ 
involvement in apprehending offenders. Always on alert in case of a scream for 
assistance, the neighbours heard the scuffle and intervened by seizing Mouaha’s 
machete. When Mouaha tried to escape, they chased after him. In this instance, it 
                                                          
147 Anyangwe (n2 supra) 377. 
148 S103 (2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Cameroon does not have a common-purpose 
doctrine, so identifying and prosecuting the guilty parties will be difficult. 
149 See n130 & n135 supra. 
150 Munteh “Murdered for Urinating on Neighbour’s Wall”Cameroon Tribune 10 February 2015 
https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87838: 
cite-sic-bassa-murdered-for-urinating-on-neighbours-wall&catid=4:societe&Itemid=3 (accessed 
28/04/2015). Njonga, who was drinking at a bar in Ndogbong, went to outside relieve himself. 
Found urinating on his wall, home owner Muoaha requested Njonga to wipe up his urine or 
face death, where after he stabbed and killed Njonga. 
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was recognised that Mouaha committed a wrongful act, as there is no right to kill in 
such circumstances. 
Although no recorded Cameroonian court case could be found where the home 
owner or resident of a dwelling killed a robber specifically in defence of property, it 
is submitted that Cameroonian courts will probably agree with sentiments 
expressed in decided cases of such kind in other jurisdictions.151 Most courts 
consider a counter-attack reasonable in the circumstances and thus lawful. Where 
persons “react on the spur of the moment to prevent the invasion of their property 
or persons, the courts will not be astute to criminalise their conduct, unless clear 
excesses are present”.152 
 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, killing in defence of property in Cameroonian criminal law was 
considered. Criminal law in Cameroon is a mixture of English common law and 
French civil law; but in certain regions such as West Cameroon, the customary 
courts, due to the principle of indirect rule, still play a major role. This is important 
as many cases of self-defence are conducted in customary courts. The 
Constitution of Cameroon enshrines rights which protect especially one’s life, but 
also one’s family, home and property. The Preamble of the Constitution states that 
ownership entails the right guaranteed to every person by law to use, enjoy and 
dispose of property, and that no person shall be deprived of such a right. However, 
this does not guarantee one the right to kill anyone who attempts to deprive one or 
others of such right.  
Although the Cameroonian Criminal Procedure Code provides rules for the 
investigation of offences; the search and identification of offenders and other 
                                                          
151 S v Dimmere (n130 supra); S v Tatedi (n130 supra); S v Johane 2008 (2) BLR 159 (HC); S v 
Van Wyk 1968 (1) SA 488 (A). 
152 Kirby J in S v Tatedi (n130 supra) 65. 
87 
 
criminal procedural issues; these procedures are rarely followed in cases of killing 
in defence of property. This is because such incidents never actually reach the 
court, as they are dealt with in flagrante delicto by the community. It was 
established that although customary courts do not have the jurisdiction to deal with 
cases of self-defence, people tend to prefer these courts to official proceedings. 
Even cases of aggravated theft are tried in customary courts. One of the reasons 
provided for this preference is that on a guilty-finding, compensation is paid by the 
accused to the aggrieved person. However, certain crimes are punishable by 
stoning the criminal to death or by hanging, which is seen as justifiable by the 
community, especially for crimes which presumably involve witchcraft. 
It was established that Cameroonian criminal law is harsh on criminals who break 
into another’s property bearing weapons, amongst others. In contradistinction to 
the constitutional guarantee to life, the death sentence is mandated to anyone 
convicted of aggravated theft. Furthermore, a right to kill in defence of property is 
provided in law so long as it was immediately necessary to kill in the 
circumstances. When a property or home owner is being attacked by robbers, it is 
obvious that his life is threatened also. Therefore, the threat to life and property is 
related and coalescing. This makes the use of deadly force a lawful defence as the 
threat is to his life and property, if there is no other reasonable response to the 
threat of violence. As noted earlier, lawful defence of self and of property is of 
general application under the Penal Code, which is broader in scope than the law 
of self-defence in other jurisdictions. Everyone has the right to defend his person 
and all other rights including the rights of others. It is stipulated that no criminal 
liability may arise from an act dictated by an immediate necessity of defence of the 
person acting or of any other person, or of any right of himself or of any other, 
against an unlawful infringement. However, the means of defence must be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement threatened.  
Cameroonian Penal law provides that no penalties may be inflicted for an offence 
for which no provision was made at the time it was committed; that everyone 
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charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; and that no bodily or psychological harm will be caused to the alleged 
offender. These provisions have been blatantly ignored by the Cameroonian 
society especially in cases where a thief is being chased by a crowd. It is 
considered that in such a case, the criminal has relinquished any rights, such as 
the right to life, when he chose to embark on his criminal acts. As such, it was seen 
that a person can be killed in Cameroon for stealing a trivial item. Although any 
individual may in case of a felony or misdemeanour committed in flagrante delicto 
arrest the author of such an offence, it is unlawful to cause any bodily harm to the 
person arrested. 
It is submitted that Cameroonian law, in allowing private defence of property, 
should balance the prohibition on private use of force and the protection of the right 
to life and physical security. Of necessity, this requires the law to set priorities and 
reinforce social security even though the harsh realities of life will not neatly fit into 
fixed boxes. 
In the following chapter, the situation as regards private defence of property in 
South Africa will be investigated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRIVATE DEFENCE OF PROPERTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Robbery - an extremely broad and serious crime - occupies a central place in 
South African criminal law, and holds a high profile both in the jurisdiction’s criminal 
statistics1 and the consciousness of a public for whom being a victim of crime is of 
a daily concern. It is a vexed problem for the general South African public. A 
common response from South African citizens to violent crime such as robbery is 
community justice or self-help. These types of acts are not supported by the South 
African justice system which requires that citizens resort to the law. Nevertheless, it 
has been accepted that the state cannot always protect all people in all places.  
In certain circumstances individuals under immediate attack cannot wait for the law 
to intervene.2 In such situations, it may be considered that persons acting in private 
defence act in place of the police or authorities. In this regard, one further has to 
consider the very close relationship between the right to act in private defence and 
the extent of the right, on the one hand, and the availability and efficiency of the 
police force to protect people against unlawful attacks, on the other.3 It is submitted 
that the higher the level of police inefficiency in a particular area; the greater the 
possibility for private defence to be prevalent. 
                                                          
1 See the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Crime Statistic Overview RSA 2013-2014 
http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2014/crime_stats.php 
(accessed 23/09/2015).  
2 Singh “Self-defence as a Ground of Justification in Cases of Battered Women who kill their 
Abusive Partners” (Unpublished LLD thesis UNISA Pretoria 2009) 86. 
3 Snyman “The Two Reasons for the Existence of Private Defence and their Effect on the Rules 
relating to the Defence in South Africa” 2004 17 SACJ 179. 
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South African criminal courts evaluate criminal conduct (which may include private 
defence) with reference to; amongst other things, the concept of unlawfulness. One 
acts lawfully in private defence if one uses force to repel an unlawful attack 
provided that the attack has commenced or is imminently threatening upon one’s 
or someone’s else’s life, bodily integrity, property or other legally-protectable 
interest. This is only possible if the defensive act is necessary to protect the 
interest threatened, is directed against the attacker and is reasonably proportionate 
to the attack.4 These requirements will be fully discussed in this chapter. 
Individuals under unlawful attack have the right to protect themselves against such 
attack.5 There need not even be an absolute precise proportion between the legal 
interest that is protected by the defender and the interest that is infringed by him. In 
the absence of protection by the state, the defender also acts as the upholder of 
justice.6 The relevant rules relating to the upholding-of-justice theory are as follows:  
...although the attack must be unlawful, it need not necessarily amount to the 
commission of a crime; that is, that attack need not necessarily comply with the 
definitional elements of a crime. This means that the defendant need not wait for the 
first blow to be struck or the first shot to be fired by the attacker before commencing 
with the defensive action. Therefore, the defender has no duty to flee, even if it is 
possible for the defender to flee from the attacker.7 
According to this theory, the defending party must consciously defend himself in 
private defence. There must be a conscious desire or will to defend.8 It is argued 
that under the current law individuals may employ force and even deadly force in 
order to protect life, property and all other rights therein.9 
                                                          
4 Le Roux “Private defence: Strict conditions to be Satisfied Govender v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2009 2 SACR 87 (N)” 2010 73 THRHR 328. 
5 This is according to the protection theory. See Snyman (n3 supra) 181. 
6 According to the upholding-of-justice theory; see Snyman (n3 supra) 183. 
7 Snyman (n3 supra) 185 states that South African law “expects the attacked party to flee, in order 
to avoid the attack”.  
8 Snyman (n3 supra) 187. 
9 Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed (2010) 246.  
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This chapter will examine the origin of private defence as a ground of justification in 
South Africa; the requirements and most important characteristics of and test for 
the defence; exceeding the limits of private defence and putative private defence. 
Special regard will be given to cases where lethal force is utilised to protect 
property in the jurisdiction. 
 
4.2 Private defence in South African law 
Similar to other cultures, private defence as a ground of justification is an ancient 
defence in South Africa.10 The right to private defence played a very important role 
in past indigenous South African cultures where there was no organised police 
force to uphold the law. As the transgression of taboos, especially religious taboos, 
meant disaster for the entire community, members of the community would punish 
the offender to appease the deity, and sometimes even sacrifice the life of the 
offender as the only adequate way of atoning for the offence.11 In this manner the 
moral order of society was restored, the victims of the transgressions appeased, 
and hopefully the temptation for potential transgressors to violate the laws 
removed.12 On the emergence of an organised state authority the field of operation 
of private defence became more restricted, so that today it can only be applied in 
certain defined circumstances, which will be elaborated on in the paragraphs to 
follow.13 
South African criminal law developed over the years resulting in a truly mixed 
system, blending Roman-Dutch, English and unique South African legal elements. 
                                                          
10 Snyman (n3 supra) 178 states that as “...early as classical times, the right to defend oneself 
against an unlawful attack was considered to be an ancient right, expressed in the maxims 
naturalis ratio permittit se defendere (natural reason allows a person to defend himself or herself 
against danger) and vim vi repellere licet (force may be repelled by force)”. It has been stated 
that because the defence forms part of the generally-acceptable natural law to maintain order 
and justice, it could be accepted that the defence of private defence is untraceable. 
11 Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers, Leslie & Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa (2013) 
7. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 102. 
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The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199614 
necessitates that all statutes or common law be constitutionally compliant.15 The 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution enshrines the rights of all people and affirms the 
value of human dignity16 and freedom.17 These rights are further enhanced by 
section 12(1)(c) which guarantees freedom and security of the person,18 and that 
no one may be deprived of property, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property.19 This right is especially applicable to the issue of private defence. 
The right to dignity must be interpreted to also afford protection to the institution of 
marriage and family life.20 Therefore, the home is regarded as an important place 
where a person is expected to enjoy and experience that particular freedom. There 
is a distinct probability that the greater percentage of criminal acts such as robbery 
happen within homes where peace and freedom are expected to reign, as 
witnessed in daily periodicals.21 In order to protect basic human interests and 
public morality in these types of incidents, South African criminal law permits the 
individual a right to resort to private defence in certain circumstances. However, 
there are requirements stipulated for situations wherein persons have to defend 
themselves against danger. These requirements will be subsequently discussed.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Hereinafter the SA Constitution. 
15 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 12. 
16 S 10 of the SA Constitution states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected”. 
17 The SA Constitution s 7(1). 
18 S 12(1)(c) states: 1) “Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources”. 
19 S 25 of the SA Constitution. 
20 Heerden J in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) SA 997 (CC) 998 para F. 
21 House robberies are a prominent feature in daily South African periodicals; eg, three men stole 
cash and goods worth about one million Rand from a family’s home. See Lekgau “Robbery at 
the Guptas” Sowetan (12/09/20) 138. A house robbery also occurred in Brandwag when the 
victims were robbed of their four cell phones, two laptops and a car. See Becker “Five Armed 
Men robbed Bank Employees at Home” The New Age 2013 10. 
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4.3 Requirements for private defence 
For the purpose of classification, it is convenient to divide the requirements of 
private defence into two groups. The first comprises the requirements with which 
the attack against which a person acts in private defence must comply; the second, 
the requirement with which the defence must comply. An attack presumes a 
voluntary human act;22 not necessarily committed culpably; nor need it be directed 
at the defender. An attack may consist of a positive act of commission or an 
omission.23 The defender against the unlawful attack must satisfy the court 
regarding the appropriateness of the private defence, and thus also the justifiability 
and lawfulness of his conduct. 
 
4.3.1 The requirements for the attack 
In this section, the three requirements for the attack in a private-defence scenario 
will be discussed. 
 
4.3.1.1 The attack must be unlawful 
The first requirement necessitates an unlawful threat or danger to a person (not 
necessarily the defender), but also to property. The unlawful threat must result 
from some illegal conduct performed by a human aggressor.24 Any person with a 
legal interest in property or in possession of property belonging to another may 
lawfully defend the property. A person can act in private defence against an 
unlawful attack even if the attacker lacks criminal capacity or acts without intention 
because of a mistake.25 In the case of a threat to property, the property could be of 
any kind. However, it must be mentioned here that the property should not be of 
                                                          
22 Singh (n2 supra) 87. 
23 Singh (n2 supra) 119. 
24 A person is not entitled to use force to prevent a lawful seizure or sale of his property. 
25 Snyman (n13 supra) 103. 
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negligible value. In this regard, it is the function of the court to determine the 
property’s worth in accordance with the owner’s circumstances.26 
 
4.3.1.2 The attack must be against an interest deserving protection 
It must further also be established that the defender directed his defensive act 
against a legitimate interest which deserves legal protection. The courts regard 
these deserving interests which ought to be protected usually as the attacked 
individual’s life or person, but property can also be defended. The danger or threat 
to the property must be a serious one, that is, the risk of losing the property or the 
threat of damage, destruction or other substantial interference with the right 
involved has to be of a serious nature.27 
 
4.3.1.3 The attack must be threatening but not completed 
Where the question of private defence arises, the conventional requirements 
initially raised are namely the imminence of the danger and the necessity28 of the 
attack to protect the legal interest. The threat must be either currently present, 
which means that the unlawful danger must have existed at the time the defence 
was taking place, or impending. If there was no imminent or commenced illegal 
attack, it is the end of the enquiry into the actual private defence, as this is a 
triggering requirement.  
                                                          
26 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 83. 
27 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 83; Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 248. 
28 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 257 state that “one finds an element of necessity present in private 
defence, and considering the fact that acts done in both private defence and in a situation of 
necessity seek to prevent a greater harm. However, the requirements of the two defences are 
different. Eg, private defence requires an unlawful attack by the complainant, while the defence 
of necessity does not. Again, while private defence is directed against the wrongdoer, acts of 
necessity usually results in the infliction of harm to an innocent person. Private defence involves 
acts of a person defending himself against an unlawful imminent threat. Necessity involves an 
escape from an emergency situation or from an immediate threat thereof.” 
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To meet the requirement of imminence, two possibilities should be considered. The 
attack must have already begun but is not yet complete; or the danger or threat is 
immediate. To differentiate between the two possibilities, the test consists of “the 
temporal proximity between the anticipated fear and the defensive action”.29 
However, it is debatable, on a balance of probabilities, whether an unlawful attack 
is in fact imminent. This is because the defender is not required to wait until he is in 
fact in danger of death or serious injury, or his property is indeed being taken away 
from him to lodge a defensive act. Instead, it is required that the defender 
reasonably believes that he or his property is in danger, even if this was in fact not 
so.30 
As previously stated, if there is an attack or immediate threat of attack, it is, of 
course, not necessary for the defender to wait for the first blow. In the case of the 
defence of property, the threat or danger must have materialised or be imminent, 
as long as it is present. There only needs to be evidence that the property is 
subject to pending danger of damage or destruction that was unlawful.31 For 
example, when automatic defence mechanisms are set up to protect property 
(such as a gun which automatically activates if a thief tampers with the property); 
no imminent threat or attack exists at the stage when the mechanisms are rigged.  
South African law recognises that in certain narrowly-defined circumstances the 
setting up and triggering of such automatic defence mechanisms may constitute a 
valid and thus lawful private defence. It is further permissible in South Africa to use 
electric fences, even traps, in anticipation of future danger or any potential risk to 
property. However, as indicated above, the danger or threat should be impending 
or ongoing and sufficiently serious to warrant the measures taken. Also; the devise 
                                                          
29 Singh (n2 supra) 119. 
30 Botha “Private Defence in the South African Law of Delict” 2013 SALJ 154 163. This is putative 
private defence, which is discussed infra at 4.8. 
31 Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume I: General Principles of Criminal 
Law 4thed (2011) 136. 
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should be designed to prevent or deter would-be thieves or intruders; and the 
public must be given sufficient warning about the rigged traps.32 
A question that arises is whether a person is justified in using force after the event 
(when the attack is no longer threatening) in order to recover stolen property that is 
still in possession of the thief. According to Burchell and Milton, this would be 
permissible in view of the fact that theft is a continuing crime:33 
If theft is a continuing crime, it would then follow that an owner would be permitted to 
justifiably use force to recover stolen property even though the procuring was 
complete and the private defence had taken place at some later stage when the 
owner discovered the thief with the property.34 
However, once the attack is completed and the threat or danger over, the defender 
may not use force, for example, to assault a thief who has already abandoned the 
stolen property.   
 
4.3.2 Requirements for the defence 
In this section, the four requirements for the defensive act in a valid private-
defence contention will be elaborated on. 
 
4.3.2.1 The defence must be directed against the attacker(s) 
It is logical that an individual can only act in private defence if his protective act is 
directed against the person attacking him. If the defender defends himself or some 
other person against anybody else than the attacker, no lawful ground of 
justification in the form of private defence exists. 
                                                          
32 S v Van Wyk 1968 (1) SA 488 (A) 509 (hereinafter Van Wyk). 
33 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 248. 
34 Ibid. 
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4.3.2.2 The defensive act must be necessary 
In order to protect the interest threatened, the defensive act must be necessary. 
The act of defence must be the only manner in which the defender can ward off 
danger or obviate the threat to his interests.35 As such, when utilising force to 
defend person or property, it should have been the only possible way of repelling 
the threat or danger. It is submitted that a defensive act will be necessary as long 
as it is the only way existing at that particular time for averting the attack on the 
defender’s rights or interests. However, even if other means of relief were available 
but the defender had no means of obtaining the relief at the time of the attack, the 
defensive act will still be considered necessary.36 
 
4.3.2.3 The defensive act must be reasonably proportional to the attack 
The force used to defend the deserving interest should not only be necessary, but 
also reasonably proportional. This means that the manner of defence should not be 
out of proportion to that of the attack. A person cannot claim private defence in a 
situation where deadly force is utilised whereas less harmful defensive methods 
were available, obtainable and preferable to ward off the attack. A proportionality 
test is employed to determine the balance between the attack and the defence. In 
S v Steyn 2010 1 SACR 411 (SCA) 417, the Supreme Court of Appeal listed some 
factors to be taken into consideration when determining a reasonable proportion 
between the attack and the defence. These factors are, amongst others, the 
parties’ relationship, gender, age differences, physical abilities, where the incident 
took place; the type of weapon used; the nature, gravity and perseverance of the 
attack and the nature and extent of any injuries the attack would cause; the types 
                                                          
35 Snyman (n13 supra) 107.  
36 Singh (n2 supra) 96. 
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of means available to ward off the attack as well as the actual means used by the 
defender; and the nature and extent of any injuries the defence would cause. The 
Court however emphasised that this list in not exhaustive and that the 
circumstances of each particular case should determine the applicable 
proportionality factors to be considered. 
Even if force was necessary in a situation of private defence, the question has to 
be asked whether the force used was reasonable in the particular circumstances.37 
The issue here is the degree of force that could be considered reasonable and 
necessary, because if the force that was used is not regarded as necessary then it 
would be considered as unreasonable. The reasonableness of the force used in 
private defence cases is a question of fact to be determined by the judiciary.  
For the use of force to be necessary, it is required that the danger or threat which 
the accused apprehends must be sufficiently specific and imminent and must be 
such that it could not be reasonably be made without resorting to force. If the 
conclusion is that the use of force was necessary, than the harm caused by the 
accused will be compared with the harm prevented by his action in order to 
determine whether the force used was reasonable. If the harm caused was grossly 
disproportionate to the harm prevented, the court may hold that the defender’s use 
of force exceeded the degree of force required to avert the attack.38 Therefore, 
despite the fact that the defender was defending his property as a result of the 
unlawful threat, his defence will be unsuccessful; his act will be regarded as 
unlawful and he will be culpable.39 
                                                          
37 See S v Motleleni 1976 (1) SA 403 (A); S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) 436; S v Goliath 1972 (3) 
SA (A) 26; S v Ngomane 1979 (3) SA 859 (A) 863; S v Dougherty 2003 (2) SACR 36 (W) 50 
(hereinafter Dougherty); Matlou v Makhubedu 1978 (1) SA 946 (A) 956. 
38 Mousourakis “Excessive Self-defence and Criminal Liability” 1999 12 SAJC 145-147. In the US, 
the law requires the defender to first request the aggressor to desist from his unlawful acts or 
attempts. 
39 Mousourakis (n38 supra) 147-148; Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 255. 
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No precise measurement exists to determine what should be regarded as 
reasonable force or excessive force in any particular case.40 The South African 
courts require that “there should be a reasonable relationship between the attack 
and the defensive act, in the light of the particular circumstances in which the event 
takes place”.41 When considering the light of the circumstances in which the 
accused decided to use force, it should be taken into account that, under the stress 
of the situation, the accused might not have been able to reflect on the exact 
degree of force needed to avert the attack. It is highly likely for the defender to 
overestimate the amount of force that was required in the particular circumstances. 
If the accused was unable to correctly calculate the amount of force actually 
needed, a plea of private defence may be successful even if the accused used 
more force than was in fact necessary.42 The accused may then not be criminally 
liable because of a lack of dolus, in the form of the necessary intent to act 
unlawfully.43 In such cases, the accused should likely be convicted of culpable 
homicide and not murder if at the time of the act he honestly believed that the force 
he used was reasonable in the circumstances.44 
 
4.3.2.4 The defender must be aware of acting in private defence 
The defender must have the knowledge that he is acting in private defence, as 
there is “no such thing as unconscious or accidental private defence”.45 This further 
means that the person claiming to act in private defence cannot first provoke the 
other person, who then merely reacts to the provocation. In this situation, the 
private defender is actually the aggressor. Also, private defence cannot occur on 
pure chance – if the supposed defender kills a person he dislikes only finding out 
                                                          
40 Walker “Determining Reasonable Force in Cases of Private Defence” 2012 1 SAJC 84. 
41 See S v Trainor 2003 (1) SACR 35 (SCA) para 13. 
42 Mousourakis (n38 supra) 148. 
43 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 85. 
44 Mousourakis (n38 supra)152. 
45 Snyman (n13 supra) 111. 
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later that this person posed some type of lethal risk to him or other individuals, he 
cannot claim private defence as the original act is still considered to be murder.46 
 
4.4 The duty to flee 
An issue which has always been of great concern is whether a person being 
attacked must flee or withdraw from the scene if this act would prevent any 
possible lethal confrontation. This is a question which has as yet not been fully 
answered by the South African courts. However, judged against the new 
constitutional dispensation, it can be accepted that the law would require an 
attacked person to flee, if possible, rather than kill the aggressor.  
There are however several instances where it can be established, with reasonable 
certainty, that there is no duty on the attacked party to flee.47 South African courts 
recognise the principle that if it is dangerous for the defender to flee in the sense 
that he would then expose him to, for example, a stab or a shot in the back; he 
need not flee, but may act pro-actively and put his attacker out of action:48 
The law does not expect a person to gamble with his life by turning his back on his 
attacker and merely hoping that he would not be hit by a bullet or be stabbed in the 
back with a knife by the attacker, who unlawfully and intentionally launched the 
attack. It is the attacker who has to carry the risk of injury or death and not the 
attacked party. Thus the duty to retreat is not a condition led down by law, but only a 
factor to be considered by the judiciary when deciding whether it was necessary for 
the accused to use force and if the force used was reasonable.49 
 
 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Snyman (n13 supra) 107. 
48 Snyman (n13 supra) 108. 
49 Mousourakis (n38 supra) 143-154, 146. 
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In private defence of property, the duty to retreat is not necessary despite the fact 
that the attacked party can possibly flee from the attack.50  Therefore, the owner of 
a property, when faced by a robber in his own dwelling, is not expected to abandon 
his property nor submit to the attempt to take it from him51 or to flee his home. This 
is because by law, his dwelling house is regarded as “his last refuge - his castle - 
where he may protect himself”52 and his family from any unlawful entry. However, 
there is some submission that the owner might first avoid the intrusion by closing or 
locking the door.53 When determining the reasonableness and hence lawfulness of 
any act of private defence in terms of property, an appropriate inquiry would be 
whether the act of the defender was reasonable in defending himself or his 
property.54 In such cases, the value of the property to the defender is also an 
important consideration in assessing whether the use of force and the means used 
were reasonable in the circumstances.55 
In certain circumstances, the court may conclude that even though the defender 
assumed that he was permitted to use force in order to defend his rights, 
objectively viewed the situation was not one that necessitated the use of deadly 
force. Alternatively, if he was justified in using force to defend his property, the 
courts could hold that the force he used was excessive to that necessary to deflect 
the attack.56 
 
 
                                                          
50 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 249. 
51 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 249. 
52 Snyman (n13 supra) 108. In terms of the CPA s 42(3), a property owner may furthermore 
attempt to capture without a warrant anyone committing any unlawful act to his property.  
53 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 249. In the United States, the law requires the defender to first ask 
the aggressor to cease his unlawful acts or attempts. 
54 Walker (n40 supra) 84-92. 
55 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 83. 
56 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 255. 
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4.5 The test for private defence in South African law 
It is generally accepted that the test for private defence in South African criminal 
law is objective. In other words, the reasonableness of the defensive act must be 
judged objectively. However, in order to determine whether there has been a 
situation of private defence, the defender’s subjective beliefs relating to the person 
present and circumstances prevailing are also considered. In this regard, judicial 
weight may be given to both the objective and subjective tests; taking into 
consideration the exigencies of the specific situation.57 These tests will 
consequently be elaborated on. 
 
4.5.1 Objective test for private defence 
In deciding cases of private defence, courts first have to establish whether there 
was in fact an unlawful threat or attack. If this question has been confirmed, the 
question of the use of force or excessive force by the accused is considered.58 For 
the use of excessive force to be justified, it has to be ascertained that the defender 
had reasonable grounds for considering a particular threat as imminent.59 As 
previously pointed out, when deciding on the question of the reasonableness of the 
defence, courts need to imagine themselves acting under the circumstances in 
which the accused had to act when he decided to use force. This test is called the 
objective test as facts are regarded from an external point of view. It is also termed 
the reasonable-person test as the question is asked whether a reasonable person 
acting in a similar situation that the accused found him in would also have acted in 
the same way.60 Although it may seem that the objective test for private defence is 
similar to that of the test for negligence, Snyman reveals that South African courts 
“apply the reasonable person test here merely in order to determine whether X’s 
                                                          
57 S v Nyokong 1975 (3) SA 792 (O) 794; S v Motleleni (n37 supra) para 406.  
58 Botha (n30 supra) 160.  
59 Botha (n30 supra) 161. 
60 Snyman (n13 supra) 112. 
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conduct was reasonable in the sense that it accorded with what is usually 
acceptable in society”.61 The objective test is thus utilised in this sense only as “aid 
to determine whether X’s conduct was lawful or unlawful”.62 
As confirmed by Snyman, South African courts do employ the reasonable-person 
test to determine the judiciousness of the force used in private defence as well as 
the particular circumstances in which the accused found him when the defensive 
act was applied.63 However, one should assess whether the use of this test is 
merely a harmless expedient, or is indeed justified. The problem with following this 
prescription (the reasonable-person test) is that: 
[w]hilst capacity for knowledge has a direct bearing on capacity for foresight and 
hence on the question of negligence, it can have little or no bearing on the question 
of whether a particular defensive act was a reasonable response to a particular act 
of aggression. By adopting the reasonable-person test for this latter purpose, 
therefore, the court runs the risk of introducing considerations that have no logical 
bearings on such an enquiry.64 
A further objection to the reasonable-person test lies in the frequency with which 
the question ‘would a reasonable person have acted in the same way as the 
accused?’ is converted into the open-ended question ‘what would the reasonable 
person have done?’ In this way, the focus of the enquiry is made to shift from an 
examination of the accused’s conduct, to an examination of what other options 
were available to him. Whilst a court should consider the various defensive 
measures that were available to the accused at the critical time, the main point of 
the enquiry should not be whether other defensive options were possible but 
whether the defensive act implemented was reasonable and thus justifiable.65 
                                                          
61 Snyman (n13 supra) 112-113. See also Dougherty (n37 supra) 44h-46i where the court 
confirmed that the test in respect of both unlawfulness and negligence is objective. 
62 Snyman (n13 supra) 113. 
63 Singh (n2 supra) 110. 
64 Walker (n40 supra) 90. 
65 Ibid. 
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In light of the above, it may be concluded that, although there is indeed precedent 
for the use of the reasonable-person test, it is not as harmless as it might appear at 
first sight. In addition, the precedent for the use of the reasonable-person test does 
not appear to have been based in its own turn on any particularly compelling or 
persuasive authority. After all, it might be asked if one is required to explain what is 
meant by ‘reasonable force’ in any given case. The most serious objection lies in 
the fact that the reasonable-person test is no longer a wholly-objective enquiry in 
South African law, but has been partly ‘subjectivised’ to the extent of incorporating 
certain personal characteristics of the accused.66 
The danger of courts expanding the objective test is suitably illustrated in the case 
of Dougherty.67 In this case, the conduct of an attacked person who feared for his 
life, and who endeavoured to protect his life or property and claimed private 
defence was questioned as to its objective reasonableness. In this particular case, 
the court rejected the accused’s claim as, according to the court, his actions went 
further than were necessary.68 The facts of the case are as follows: The accused 
person, who lived on a plot in Honeydew just outside Randburg, held a party for 
about twenty of his friends at his house to celebrate his 63rd birthday. When two of 
Dougherty’s guests left the party, they were held up by two people (a certain 
Dlomo and the deceased) in an attempted robbery outside his house, assaulted 
and seriously wounded. Shaken by the incident, Dougherty grabbed hold of his 
firearm and went outside to see what had happened. He found the deceased and 
Dlomo sitting on a wall and questioned them as to their knowledge of the incident. 
They denied knowing anything; however, the deceased approached the accused, 
pointing at the firearm and challenging him that he will not use it. In order to warn 
the deceased not to further advance, the accused fired a downward shot. When 
the deceased (who was unarmed) continued coming closer, the accused panicked 
                                                          
66 Walker (n40 supra) 89. 
67 Dougherty (n37 supra). See also Snyman “Private Defence in Criminal Law - An Unwarranted 
Raising of the Test of Reasonableness” 2004 67 THRHR 326. 
68 Snyman (n67 supra) 325. 
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that the deceased would overpower him, take his weapon where after he feared 
there would be no escape for him. He blindly fired a shot at the deceased, who was 
already very close to him, killing him instantly. The deceased’s companion, Dlomo, 
was grazed by the bullet, but survived. 
Dougherty was convicted of murder and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment 
and six years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder in respect of Dlomo. Both 
sentences were to run concurrently. On appeal, the court by judgment of Willis J 
agreed with the trial court’s findings that his reliance on private defence could not 
succeed.69 However, it was held that because of Dougherty’s belief that his acts 
were lawful that he lacked intention, and he could thus not be found guilty of 
murder or attempted murder which necessitates the presence of dolus as to the 
consciousness of the unlawfulness of the act. The court held that, although 
Dougherty honestly but erroneously believed that his conduct in killing another was 
justified,70 he acted unreasonably and thus negligently when killing the deceased.71  
He was convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to three years’ correctional 
supervision.72 
Snyman is of the opinion that the Dougherty-case represents a classic case of 
private defence as the accused’s actions complied with the prerequisites for the 
defence.73 However, he warns that, in the light of the provision of section 11 of the 
Constitution,74 the judgment may be interpreted as introducing more stringent 
standards as to the rules of private defence. This is because it seems to suggest 
that the objective test which determines whether an accused’s actions were 
                                                          
69 Snyman (n67 supra) 326.  
70 Dougherty (n37 supra) 47a-b. 
71 This principle has been acknowledged in a number of authoritative decisions. See, eg, S v 
Motleleni (n37 supra) 406 C-H; S v Sam 1980 (4) SA 289 (T); S v De Oliveira 1993 (2) SA CR 
59 (a) 63g-64a (hereinafter De Oliveira). 
72 This was in accordance with s 276(1)(h) of the CPA. 
73 Snyman (n67 supra) 326. 
74 S 11 provides for a right to life. 
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reasonable and responsible must be measured against constitutional provisions, 
and must therefore be “a high one”,75 that is, higher than what it used to be. 
Snyman questions the court’s application of the objective test, and the reasons for 
the court’s finding that the appellant’s actions were unreasonable and thus 
unlawful.76 According to the facts of the case, the appellant’s acts of leaving the 
house to investigate the cause of the attempted robbery and possibly to apprehend 
the robbers were entirely reasonable. According to Snyman, he might even have 
thought it his duty to do so, and even such a belief would have been reasonable.77 
It was furthermore an objective fact that the accused and Dlomo were the attackers 
of the two guests.78 Dougherty also legitimately feared that the two men would 
attack or overpower him, grab hold of the weapon and shoot him. 
According to Dougherty’s evidence, which was accepted by the court,79 he “fired 
downward in the direction of the deceased”80 only when approached by the 
deceased which means that he wanted to fire a warning shot and avoid harming 
the deceased. Curiously, in determining the reasonableness of the accused’s 
conduct, the court in the Dougherty-case did not consider the fact that the 
aggressors outnumbered the accused two to one. The court also does not mention 
the significant age difference between the accused and the aggressors. Dougherty 
was already 63 years old, while the assailants were aged about 31 and 25 years. 
Even if Dougherty had attempted to run away (exposing his back to his attackers, 
abandoning his other guests in the house), the younger men would have easily 
overpowered him. Surely he acted reasonably in proactively shooting in the 
direction of the two persons approaching him in the dark?81 He had fired a warning 
shot but the two attackers continued to approach him, which shows that they were 
                                                          
75 Dougherty (n37 supra) 49h-l; Snyman (n67 supra) 326. 
76 Dougherty (n37 supra) 50a-d. 
77 Snyman (n67 supra) 327.  
78 Dougherty (n37 supra) 38j, 42c-d. 
79 Dougherty (n37 supra) 39h-i; 44f. This evidence was supported by an independent witness. 
80 Dougherty (n37 supra) 39d. 
81 Snyman (n67 supra) 328. 
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intent on attacking him.82 Dougherty only fired at the aggressors in order to protect 
himself and his visitors still in the dwelling.83 Snyman confirms that  
…there is no duty on the attacked party of having to risk his life or physical integrity 
by taking insufficient precaution, thereby exposing him to the danger of being 
seriously injured or even killed. It is the attacking party, who intentionally initiated the 
unlawful course of conduct, who bears the risk of injury or death.84 
It is not expected from a person to risk his own life if, by killing his attacker, he can 
secure his own safety.85 This viewpoint is supported by earlier case law, such as 
by Van Den Heever JA in R v Zikalala: 
But the observation places a risk upon the appellant that he was not obliged to bear. 
He was not called upon to stake his life upon ‘a reasonable chance to get away’. If 
he had done so he may well have figured as the deceased at the trial, instead of the 
accused person.86 
The court in Dougherty found that the accused’s conduct of shooting was 
unreasonable as “the deceased was unarmed and clad only in a pair of shorts”.87 
As confirmed by Snyman, the dress of the attacker is immaterial to the 
reasonableness of an accused’s actions.88 As regards the deceased’s lack of 
weapon, there is no such principle in private defence that the assailants select the 
weapons.89 The court failed to appreciate the significance of these very important 
facts as factors bearing on the reasonableness of the accused’s defensive actions. 
This flaw, as well as the “court’s attitude […] of an armchair critic who failed to put 
itself in the position at which the accused found himself at the crucial moment”90 
and the ‘higher’ test for determining the reasonableness of the defender’s conduct, 
                                                          
82 Dougherty (n37 supra) 39d. 
83 Dougherty (n37 supra) 50c-d. 
84 Snyman (n67 supra) 329. 
85 See S v Teixeira 1980 (3) SA 755 (A) 76C; S v Mokgiba 1999 (1) SA CR 534 (O) 550 d-e. 
86 R v Zikalala 1953 (2) SA 568 (A) 573 A-B. 
87 R v Zikalala (n86 supra) 50b. 
88 Snyman (n67 supra) 329. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Snyman (n67 supra) 330. 
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may impact seriously on the objective test for private defence. A wait-and-see 
attitude will have to be adopted in this regard. 
 
4.5.2 Subjective test 
Before accepting private defence as a defence, some subjective features have to 
be taken into consideration. These aspects are based on the assumption that the 
question of whether the use of force was necessary and reasonable must be 
viewed taking into consideration what the defender believed them to be at the 
particular moment of the defensive act. It is thus customary in private defence that 
the conduct of a person who alleges to have acted in private defence must be 
judged according to the defender’s subjective (personal) beliefs91 about the attack. 
This belief requirement does not replace the requirements for an unlawful attack, 
but rather acts as a qualification, extension or addition in cases where homicide in 
defence arises.  
If a person believes that he is under attack whereas he is not, or that the attack is 
unlawful, however it is legitimate, and the person defends himself against this 
supposed unlawful attack, such a person may not claim private defence as his 
defensive act is not lawful. This does not necessarily mean that the person will be 
guilty of murder or assault, as the case may be. If the accused acted under an 
honest although mistaken belief that the use of force was necessary for his 
protection or the protection of other interests, he is no more criminally responsible 
than if that force was in fact necessary for self-defence.92 This is known as putative 
private defence, which will be fully discussed infra at 4.7. 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Kemp et al (n11 supra) 85. 
92 Mousourakis (n38 supra) 146. 
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4.6 Is there a right to kill in defence of property in South African law? 
Killing in defence of property is a question that has been considered by South 
African courts when weighing the nature of interests threatened with that of the 
interests impaired. In the era predating the introduction of a justifiable Bill of Rights 
as supreme law, judicial development of private defence took place on the basis of 
public policy. The duty to develop the common law fell to the courts. It is clear from 
case law that common law prescribes that if the risk to property overlaps with the 
endangering of life, the proprietor or any other person a propos the property may 
use violence to protect himself and his property. In such instances, the use of 
‘necessary force’ is approved of. The question is however whether necessary force 
may amount to lethal force. 
As a general rule, South African criminal law does not expect individuals to tolerate 
trespasses upon their properties, or to retreat from their homes in a situation of an 
unlawful interference. The interests of the home owner or resident are so strongly 
protected that jurisdictions that do not allow for the use of deadly force in defence 
of property admit an exception in the case of the defence of one’s own dwelling 
house.93 
This attitude is already perceived in the case law of the pre-constitutional era. For 
instance, in 1832, in an unreported case, a young farmer who had killed a cattle 
thief who was driving away with his cattle, was acquitted by Kakewich J.94 Sir 
Benjamin D’Urban, the then Governor of the Cape Colony questioned the Cape 
Supreme Court as to whether present laws in the Cape Colony allowed the frontier 
districts’ populaces to “do which is necessary to prevent housebreaking and 
theft”.95 The court held the view that these residents were justifiably entitled to kill 
any person in defence of property. The court based its finding on a reading of 
Grotius’ De Iure Belli ac Pacis which provides that “…the thief flying with his 
                                                          
93 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 246. 
94 The case is discussed in Ally & Viljoen “Homicide in Defence of Property in an Age of 
Constitutionalism” 2003 16 SACJ 121-136 122. 
95 Ibid. 
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plunder may, if the goods cannot otherwise be recovered, be slain with a missile.”96 
This right was however, according to the court, restricted to situations where the 
theft or damage to the property could not have been prevented in any other 
possible way. Furthermore, the use of deadly force was only permitted where the 
aggressor (the thief) responded in a forceful manner, which also may risk the life of 
the defender. The court expounded on this right to use lethal force by not limiting it 
to the proprietor of property only, but also entitling third parties present, any 
occupants of property and also slaves to use lethal force to preserve the 
property.97 
A case in the following century further confirmed the common-law right of a home 
dweller to use lethal force in protecting life and property. In the case of R v 
Stephen,98 private defence was recognised as justifying the use of force against 
unlawful entry onto premises. In this case, the accused awoke in his home at night 
after being startled by a noise. Upon spying an intruder climbing through a window, 
he feared that he was to be robbed; a threat not only to his person but also to his 
property. In distress, he rushed to his kitchen, grabbed a knife and stabbed the 
intruder, whereupon the intruder died. Although the court expressly stated that 
killing in defence of property alone may never be justified, the facts of this case 
clearly indicates the interconnectivity between the threat to personal violence and 
to property in cases of private defence where lethal force is used.99 
Exactly 40 years after the Stephen-case, the Appellate Division also had to 
consider the use of force to protect private property. In one of the most 
authoritative pre-constitutional cases on this topic, that is, the Van Wyk-case,100 
the court, after considering precedents and various authorities, again reached the 
conclusion that using any type of force whatsoever to defend property is justifiable. 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 R v Stephen 1928 WLD 170 (hereinafter Stephen). See also Ally & Viljoen (n94 supra) 122-123. 
99 Stephen (n98 supra) para 172.   
100 S v Van Wyk (n32 supra). 
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However, certain stipulations for the use of such force are provided. Lethal force 
may only be used if absolutely necessary, and as a last resort. Before reverting to 
deadly force, the defender must give fair warning to the aggressor, if it is 
reasonably feasible to do so. The defensive conduct must also be limited to the 
least dangerous - yet still effective - response possible.  
In this case, Van Wyk, a shopkeeper whose business was burgled repeatedly, 
made numerous endeavours to protect his property and livelihood. These included 
employing night watchmen, keeping dogs on the property, installing different types 
of burglar-proofing, and even having the police patrol the area on certain 
occasions. However, none of these efforts were fruitful. Almost ruined by the 
break-ins, Van Wyk, out of desperation, set up a loaded shotgun in his shop to go 
off and injure prospective burglars. The shotgun was rigged in such a way that it 
would be triggered by anyone entering the premises at a certain window or 
removing the goods behind a counter, and would only wound the lower body of the 
offender. Furthermore, Van Wyk informed the police about the rigged gun, and also 
placed notices in English and Afrikaans on the shop door and windows, cautioning 
prospective burglars about the loaded gun set up in the shop. The deceased still 
broke into and entered the premises, and triggered the gun to go off. He was fatally 
wounded as he was crawling on the floor. Although the deceased did not pose any 
danger to the person of the shopkeeper, the accused successfully relied on private 
defence.   
On appeal lodged by the Minister of Justice, two questions were reserved for the 
Appellate Division: if a person kills another in order to protect property, may he rely 
on the ground of justification of private defence? If the answer is in the affirmative, 
in the particular case of Van Wyk, were the bounds of private defence not 
exceeded? The court unanimously confirmed that a person may rely on private 
defence in defence of property.101 Even if the actual intended threat by the 
                                                          
101 Van Wyk (n32 supra) 501H, 504B, 509A. 
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deceased may have been merely to property, it is highly likely that the startled 
occupant may perceive the threat to also be a threat to life or bodily integrity. Some 
jurisdictions102 specifically mention even the use of devices to protect property. The 
occupant of a house can legitimately resort to the use of deadly weapons to defend 
his property even though the value of property will never be proportionate to that of 
a life. The court held that when an aggressor unlawfully invades another’s property, 
disregarding the occupant’s rights and any trespassing admonitions, the invader 
must suffer the consequences of his actions if dangerous measures are used 
against him.103 
In the Van Wyk-case, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it is not probable that 
an accurate test to determine lawfulness can be formulated in cases where fatal 
force is applied in response to a property offence, and that regard must be had to 
the circumstances of each particular case.104 Nevertheless, the court stated that 
the starting point should be whether there was “a reasonable balance between the 
attack and the defensive act”,105 or whether, “taking all the factors into account, the 
defender acted reasonably in the manner in which he defended himself or his 
property”.106 The court concluded that Van Wyk did act reasonably in the particular 
circumstances, and that he could rely on private defence in the protection of his 
property. 
                                                          
102 In Texas “[t]he justification afforded by sections 9.41 and 9.43 applies to the use of a device to 
protect land or tangible, movable poverty if (1) the device is not design to cause, or known by the 
actor to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury; and (2) use of the 
device is reasonable under all the circumstances as that actor reasonably believes them to be 
when he installs the device”. See Texas Penal Code s 9.44. This section seems contradictory 
because of the motive of the device; which is intended to cause bodily injury. Again, the actor 
may reasonably believe the device would cause minor injury but it causes death instead. 
103 See Kemp et al (n11 supra) 84. 
104 Van Wyk (n32 supra) para 19.  
105 Walker (n40 supra) 87. This enquiry includes the so-called objective test (see 4.5.1 above) 
which determines the necessity of the defensive act of the accused by measuring the accused’s 
conduct against that of the hypothetical reasonable person. The court in this instance stated: 
“We have to consider whether what you did in this circumstance was a reasonable thing which a 
reasonable man might have done”, explaining that courts “often do measure the conduct of the 
alleged offender against that of a reasonable person on the basis that reasonable conduct is 
usually acceptable in the eyes of the society”. See Van Wyk (n32 supra) para 18; Walker (n40 
supra) 88. 
106 Walker (n40 supra) 85. 
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The principles expressed in Van Wyk were similarly utilised in S v Mogohlwane,107 
some twenty years later. Mogohlwane, a very poor and old man, was robbed of his 
only valuables by the deceased, a much younger man bearing a tomahawk axe. 
Fearing that he would lose his only possessions forever, Mogohlwane fetched a 
knife and attempted to reclaim the bag by using the weapon. Upon noticing the old 
man, the deceased again produced the axe and swung it in the accused’s 
direction. The accused thereupon stabbed the deceased, fatally injuring him. The 
judge concluded that the accused only used his knife because “his life or body 
(limb) was threatened… because he could have hurt the accused with the axe”.108 
Although it seemed that the protected possessions were of a trifling value, the 
contents of the paper bag were the only possessions the old man had. In this case, 
the court similarly concluded that killing in defence of property would be justifiable if 
the defender, at the same time as defending his property, also protected his life or 
bodily integrity. 
A question to consider here is whether, taking into consideration the present 
democratic disposition in South Africa, a person is still allowed to kill a thief who is 
stealing his property or even to kill the thief in order to recover stolen property. This 
question seems all the more pertinent against the background of continuous 
reports of people using lethal force to protect life and property.109 It is quite 
possible that the common-law rule that a person may kill in defence of property will 
be challenged on the grounds that it amounts to an infringement of the 
constitutional rights of a person to life, and to freedom and security. An enquiry as 
                                                          
107 S v Mogohlwane 1982 (2) SA 587 (T) (hereinafter Mogohlwane) a post-Van Wyk case. 
108 Mogohlwane (n107 supra) 594B-C (own translation). It could thus be accepted that killing in 
defence of property may be justified in certain circumstances. Also see Snyman Strafreg 6th ed 
(2012) 108; Van der Merwe in Van Wyk (n32 supra); Stuart “Killing in Defence of Property” 1967 
84 SALJ 123-131. 
109 Eg, see the correspondence by Bright “Defence Files for Dismissal in Blanchard Murder Burglary 
Case” The Star http://chickashanews.com/topnews/x18080452/ (accessed 31/07/2015); Stander 
“Man Gunned Down after House Robbery” Port Elizabeth Herald http://www. 
peherald.com/news/article/15711 (accessed 30/08/2015). One of the recurring themes of these 
articles is introduced in that the defence of property is closely linked to the defence of bodily 
integrity.  
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to the constitutionality of this rule will involve a balancing of the rights of the 
attacker to his life against the rights of the defender to his property.110 
It is however clear that in situations where no danger to bodily harm exists, to kill a 
robber only to defend property from being stolen may not be justifiable. South 
African courts have consistently emphasised that force applied must be 
“reasonable in the circumstances as they existed or as the accused believed them 
to be”,111 and the force must be commensurate with the danger.  
 
4.7 Putative private defence in South African law 
As previously explained, an accused’s plea of private defence is determined on the 
facts that existed or that the accused believed to exist, whether they actually 
existed or not. In certain cases, private defence is claimed by the accused person 
as a ground of justification where he genuinely and reasonably believed that he 
was being attacked,112 but on the facts it later transpired that he was not being 
                                                          
110 This rule will probably be subjected to similar tests as in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security 
and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another (CCT28/01) [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4) SA 613; 2002 
(7) BCLR 663 (hereinafter Walters), where the constitutionality of CPA s 42 was challenged. In 
this case, the owner of a bakery and his son shot and killed a robber who, after breaking into the 
bakery was fleeing the crime scene. They were accused of murder. They justified their act by 
citing CPA s 49(2) in that they had the rights of an arrestor attempting to carry out arrest to kill a 
suspect in self-defence or in defence of any other person. The trial court found s 49(2) 
unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violated the suspect’s right to life, dignity, security of person 
and bodily integrity. The Constitutional Court regarded the approach taken by Olivier JA in 
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) as to s 49(1) to be applied 
correspondingly to s 49(2). This approach advocated that the narrow test of proportionality 
between the gravity of the crime allegedly committed by the suspect, and the nature and extent 
of the force used by the arrestor be expanded to also consider the threat posed by the suspect 
to the safety and security of the arrestor, members of the public, and society in general. The 
recent decision of April v Minister of Safety and Security [2009] 2 SACR 1 (SE) 2, 8-9 confirmed 
this view. Although a proportionality test is used to determine whether the force or even deadly 
force employed to protect persons and property in situations where arrests of the suspects by 
the arrestor are attempted, it is not yet settled whether a possessor of property is justified in 
killing an aggressor. See Botha & Visser “Forceful Arrest: An Overview of Section 49 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and its Recent Amendments” 2012 (15) 2 Pennsylvania LJ 
366 367. 
111 Mousourakis (n38 supra) 144; Ally & Viljoen (n94 supra) 121-122. 
112 English law recognizes that the accused’s beliefs need not be reasonable, just honest. Thus, if 
the accused was totally mistaken in thinking that he was about to be attacked he will be judged 
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attacked. Similarly, the accused may honestly believe that he was being attacked 
unlawfully, yet the attack was lawful. If an accused honestly believed his life or 
property to be in danger, although objectively viewed they were not, the defensive 
steps he took against a putative aggressor cannot constitute private defence.113 If 
the accused assaulted or killed somebody in these circumstances, his conduct will 
be unlawful. Such instances constitute mistaken or putative private defence. In 
putative private defence, it is not lawfulness that is in issue but culpability.114  In 
such cases the accused’s defence should be regarded as a mistake rather than as 
justification-based. The accused’s action remains wrongful, as there is no real 
attack justifying the use of force in defence, thus, the accused may be excused on 
the grounds of the mistaken belief.115 
An accused who bona fide but mistakenly believed that he acted in private defence 
cannot be held liable for murder as he lacked the requisite dolus to commit a 
murder. This aspect is illustrated well in the case of De Oliveira.116In this case, the 
accused was awoken on a Sunday afternoon by a noise in his backyard. Under the 
impression that it was a group of robbers trying to break in, De Oliviera shot a 
number of shots through a window intending to scare them off. One of the men 
was fatally shot. It later transpired that it was his long-standing employee and his 
friends trying to get into the employee’s room in the backyard. De Oliviera pleaded 
putative self-defence which was rejected by the trial court. On appeal, the court 
had to decide whether the appellant had the necessary culpability when he 
committed the crime. The Appeal Court concurred with the trial court’s finding, and 
explained that De Oliveira’s refusal to testify at his own trial as to his state of mind 
at the time of the shooting had impacted on this decision. Only appeal against 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
on the basis of that mistaken belief. However, the United States has adopted a different test 
which requires the accused’s belief to be founded on reasonable grounds. The accused may be 
entitled to a complete defence only if his mistake was reasonable. See Mousourakis (n38 supra) 
147; 151. 
113 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 225. 
114 Botha (n30 supra) 179. 
115 See Mousourakis (n38 supra) 148; Wright “Self-defence and the Classification of Defences” 
1992 7 Auck Univ LR 127 133. 
116 De Oliveira (n71 supra) 59(A). 
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sentence was allowed. It is clear though that if a person labours under the 
misimpression that his life and property are in danger, depending on the precise 
circumstances, his unlawful defensive act may exclude intention. At most, the 
accused could then be convicted of culpable homicide.117 
In another putative private defence case involving alleged threats to person and 
property, S v Joshua,118the appellant believed his life to be in danger, although 
objectively viewed, the facts did not indicate that he had been in danger of an 
imminent attack. The facts of this case are as follows: the appellant’s wife had 
been robbed during the afternoon of the day in question. The appellant’s neighbour 
had agreed to accompany the appellant in search of his wife’s robber. The 
appellant had been armed with a shotgun. During their search, they encountered a 
group of youths, one of who fitted the description given to the appellant by his wife 
of her robber.119 Both the appellant and the neighbour testified that when the 
appellant had demanded his wife’s purse from the youth, they had felt threatened 
by the aggressive response of the group. The appellant then drew his firearm and 
fired four shots with the result that three of the youths were fatally wounded.120 
When the appellant attempted to approach a further member of the group at a 
house to which the youth had fled, another youth had approach him with a knife in 
his hand and had tried to set his dog upon the appellant. Fearing for his life, the 
appellant fired a number of shots that resulted in the death of these last two young 
men. The court held that the appellant erroneously believed that he was in danger 
of being attacked by the men, and that it was thus lawful for him to retaliate.121  
This mistake excluded intention. As such, the appellant should have been 
convicted of culpable homicide instead of murder.122 
                                                          
117 Reddi “Mens Rea and Putative Private Defence” 2003 16 SACJ 74. 
118 S v Joshua 2003 (1) SACR 1 (SCA). 
119 Joshua (n118 supra) paras 2-11. 
120 Joshua (n118 supra) para 21. 
121 Joshua (n118 supra) para 21. 
122 Joshua (n118 supra) para 32. See also De Oliveira (n71 supra) 63i-64a.  
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Putative private defence has recently been propelled into the South African public 
eye particularly due to the trial of the para-athlete Oscar Pistorius. In S v 
Pistorius,123 the accused was on trial for the murder of his 29-year-old girlfriend 
(Reeva Steenkamp), whom he shot four times at close distance while she was 
locked inside his bedroom’s toilet in his home in Pretoria East, on Valentine’s Day. 
Pistorius said he fired in self-defence because he believed his home was being 
invaded.124 This was confirmed in pre-trial testimony, where the accused's lawyers 
informed the court that the shooting had been a tragic “mistake”125 and the athlete 
was acting in self-defence against what he thought was a robber:126  
The discharging of my firearm was precipitated by a noise in the toilet which I, in my 
fearful state, knowing that I was on my stumps, unable to run away or properly 
defend myself physically, believed to be the intruder or intruders coming out of the 
toilet to attack Reeva and me.127 
Pistorius admitted that he did not fire a warning shot as he was petrified it would 
ricochet and strike him. He also did not verbally warn the supposed intruders 
before he opened fire on the lavatory door in his bathroom. According to the 
accused’s testimony, he thought he was rightfully defending himself, his 
girlfriend and his property against an imminent threat. After hearing someone 
behind the door, he armed himself with a firearm: 
He had heard the window slide open. He had heard the toilet door slam shut. 
He had heard a noise coming from the inside of the toilet. It would have been 
different if he had just heard a noise and assumed that something, maybe a 
stray animal, was in the toilet. In this instance the evidence shows that he 
                                                          
123 S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 924 (hereinafter Pistorius). 
124 Bateman “Pistorius Indictment Readied” http://news.iafrica.com/sa/874977.html (accessed 
12/08/2015). 
125 Ibid. 
126 Herskovitz “South African Police Complete Probe in Pistorius Murder Case” http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2013/08/13/us-safrica-pistorius-idUSBRE97C0LM20130813 (accessed 14/08/2015).  
127 Plea statement of OLC Pistorius on Count 1, s 4.5, Pretoria, 4 March 2014. 
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thought an intruder was behind the door. Using a lethal weapon, a loaded 
firearm, the accused fired not one but four shots into the toilet door.128 
The accused’s claim of private defence, which was the initial defence strategy 
adopted by his legal team, was quite correctly rejected by the court. It soon 
became apparent that the plea is one of putative private defence. In this regard, 
the accused may not be held accountable as there was no intention present to 
perform an unlawful act. His mistake or ignorance serves to deprive him of the 
mens rea for the crime charged.129 
The accused also claimed that he did not have any intention to murder as “he 
would have fired higher if his intention was to kill”.130 Curiously, this 
submission was accepted by the court. The accused must have foreseen as a 
distinct possibility that whoever was on the other side of the toilet door would 
be killed by his shots. This means that the accused had sufficient intention to 
kill in the form of dolus eventualis to sustain a conviction for murder. The 
accused even admitted to the fact that “there was no room for escape for the 
person behind the door”.131 However, in order to sustain a murder conviction 
the state had to prove that there was a perception on the part of the accused 
that he acted unlawfully at the time. This is extremely difficult to prove. One 
can only examine the precise circumstances and facts as provided by the 
accused and other witnesses. Masipa J found the accused guilty of culpable 
homicide, and also guilty of contravention of section 120(3)(b) of the Firearms 
Control Act 60 of 2000.132 
                                                          
128 S v Pistorius (n123 supra) para 20. 
129 Burchell & Milton (n9 supra) 255. 
130 S v Pistorius (n123 supra) para 10. 
131 S v Pistorius (n123 supra) para 10. 
132 In terms of the culpable homicide charge, Pistorius was sentenced to a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment, and on the firearms charge to three years’ imprisonment. The last charge was 
conditionally wholly suspended for five years. Both sentences were to run concurrently. In an 
appeal by the prosecution to this decision, the SCA in Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng 
v Pistorius (96/2015) [2015] ZASCA 204 (3 December 2015) found Pistorius guilty of murder. 
Pistorius has applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court and, if that fails, he may 
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The court in the Pistorius-case emphasised that the Constitution “applies to 
everyone and ... protects everyone, including those who transgress the 
laws”.133 Still, lawbreakers should face the consequences of their illegal 
conduct. In this regard, if an accused commits a defensive act unlawfully and 
succeeds with a putative private defence because he had at the relevant time 
no knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct and lacked the required 
intention or dolus, he must still face the consequences of his wrongdoing.  
 
4.8 Summary  
In South Africa, as in many other jurisdictions, persons threatened by criminal acts 
may not take the law into their own hands but have to revert to ordinary legal 
remedies for effective protection. Still, in certain circumstances individuals face 
immediate danger or threats upon their person or rights without any intervention by 
the law directly available. In such situations, it is lawful for threatened individuals to 
resort to private defence. 
According to the requirements of private defence in South Africa, one acts lawfully 
if force is employed to avert a prohibited attack by another person on the life, 
property or any other legally-protectable interest of the person himself or that of 
somebody else. The unlawful attack must have already commenced or be 
impending. However, the act of defence has to be necessary to defend the interest 
that is being threatened, the act of defence must be directed against the aggressor 
and the defensive act must be reasonably proportionate to the attack. These rules 
relating to both the use of force and lethal force in a defensive act are known as 
the proportionality test. This test has also established that where there is an 
impending or imminent threat of attack, the attacked party need not wait for the 
aggressor to first carry out his unlawful act.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
petition the Chief Justice. It is submitted that this judgment is just, as one cannot justify anyone 
killing a person without any proof that he poses a real threat to the self-defender or others. 
133 S v Pistorius (n123 supra) 3812 paras 10-20. 
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In South Africa, case law has determined that where automatic defensive 
apparatuses are set up, even if there is no direct threat of an attack when these 
protective measures were constructed, these protection mechanisms may 
represent a lawful and thus valid private defence. However, narrowly-defined 
circumstances are prescribed for private defence claims where such mechanisms 
are used.  
Regarding the question whether the attacked party is compelled to retreat when 
being attacked, it seems as if the Constitution will advocate this conduct in order to 
protect the sanctity of life. The general idea is that if any other less harmful means 
of avoiding any violence are accessible at the time of the attack, such as leaving 
the scene of aggression, this would be a sounder choice. Still, it is accepted that 
the defender should not endanger his life, rights or interests by attempting to run 
away from the impending danger. It is submitted that the assailant who initiated the 
conflict must risk any potential perilous response to his unlawful conduct. If an 
innocent person is denied the right to act in private defence when that person is 
under unlawful attack, that individual’s right to life is similarly being denied.  
The rule that private defence is not required if the attack can be avoided by 
retreating is not relevant in the private defence of property. Therefore, the duty to 
retreat is not a legal condition, but merely a factor to be taken into consideration by 
the judiciary when deciding whether it was necessary for the defender to apply 
force, and whether the force that was applied by the defender was reasonable. 
Thus, a person in possession of property, when attacked by a robber is not 
expected to retreat or to abandon his property nor is he expected to succumb to 
the attempt to unlawfully destroy or to take the property from him. 
Although the act of defence has to be judged objectively, the subjective elements 
relating to the defender’s present and prevailing circumstances also form part of 
any conclusion as to the necessity and reasonability of the defensive act. This is a 
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purely factual question determined by the particular circumstances of every private 
defence case. 
South African courts have also settled the question as to the amount of force that is 
needed to defend or prevent an unlawful attack. In cases of private defence where 
excessive force is used to ward off the attack, it is likely that the defence may fail 
and the conduct of the defender would be held to be unlawful. However, in cases 
of putative private defence, the accused may still not be held accountable for his 
actions as he lacked dolus; that is, lack of the necessary intention to act unlawfully. 
This is so because even though the defender honestly but mistakenly believed that 
his defensive act is justified, the intention to commit murder is absent on the basis 
that the defender lacked culpability. In such instances, the defender may be held to 
have negligently killed the deceased. Where this is the case the defender may be 
found guilty of culpable homicide.  
It is important to note here that the concept of private defence is deeply rooted in 
natural law, as the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution. It has been accepted 
that with regards to self-defence, defence of others and of property, the common 
law endures but only to the extent that it is not incompatible with the Constitution. 
In this respect, the attacker’s rights to life, bodily integrity, and freedom and 
security, amongst others, must be weighed against the defender’s right to life, 
bodily integrity and property. Killing in defence of property would be justifiable if the 
defender, at the same time as defending his property, also protected his life or 
bodily integrity, a situation common in the crime of robbery. As perceived in the 
Dougherty-case, the court found that the test for justification of private defence had 
to be a high one, when constitutional imperatives are taken into account.  
South Africa is one of the countries currently overwhelmed by a very high crime 
rate. This calls for stringent measures to combat crime if the safety and sanctity of 
human beings and property are to be guaranteed. Borchers J in S v Sehlako 1999 
(1) SACR (W) 67 71 affirms that “this country is suffering from an epidemic of 
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violence which cannot be tolerated”. In such circumstances, it is reasonably 
plausible that society’s conception about justice would tilt towards this basic need - 
safety, in the form of private defence. Still, it has to be taken into consideration that 
although the defence of private defence fundamentally exists so that justice should 
not give way to injustice, one should not become the judge, jury and executioner in 
such cases. One has a moral responsibility to obey the law as far as possible. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, the findings and conclusions of each jurisdiction will be 
summarised. Thereafter recommendations will be made for each legal system.  
 
5.2 Conclusions 
It has been seen in all the jurisdictions that the right to private defence has been 
based on two distinct basic ideas: (a) the principle of defending legitimate 
individual interests against wrongful violation, and (b) the principle of safeguarding 
public law and order. The rationale behind the second principle has traditionally 
been found in the principle that right need not yield to wrong. However, from the 
evidence ascertained in this research, it seems that every jurisdiction interprets 
these principles differently. This explains the aggressiveness in the application of 
force in private defence in certain countries, in particular in the absence of a 
general requirement of proportionality. Even if the attacked legal interest is not 
worth as much as compared to the impaired interest, private defence should be 
justifiable, since it protects the legal order. Conclusions will consequently be drawn 
on the various jurisdictions discussed in the research. 
 
5.2.1 United States 
At common law an individual is permitted to apply “reasonable force” to protect 
himself, another or his property in the United States. The United States Penal 
Code restricts the use of defensive force to occasions when it is immediately 
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necessary. However, it is not yet settled when force is necessary and whether 
deadly force could be regarded as reasonable force. A scenario raised earlier 
asked the question as to whether the accused could be exonerated from criminal 
liability if the only available means to protect his life-saving item was to kill the 
aggressor. This is a constitutional right expressly stated in about 21 states’ 
constitutions in the United States to protect property. Generally, this means that 
this right is inalienable since it is inherent in some constitutions. In this vein, the 
Nebraska Self-Defence Act of 1969, section 29-114, states that:  
No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for 
protecting, by any means necessary, himself, his family, or his real or personal 
property, or when coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the 
victim of aggravated assault, armed robbery, holdup, rape, murder, or any other 
heinous crime. 
The idea that unlawful conduct may be justified arises from the recognition that 
there may be grounds of justification that deprive the unlawful conduct of its 
blameworthiness. However, the common-law requirement that a self-defender has 
the responsibility to prove that he never acted with malice in homicide has recently 
experienced a shift in the United States. A majority of the states now hold the view 
that the burden is upon the prosecutors to prove that the defendant pleading self-
defence acted with malice. In this regard, one envisages how the law is shifting 
from the observation that killing in defence of property must be justified.  
If the plea of private defence may fail on the basis that the defender in defence of 
property used excessive force, the result would be manslaughter and not murder. 
In the strictest sense of the law in the United States, if killing occurred, though the 
defender never intended to inflict more bodily harm than was necessary, the law is 
ready to vindicate the defender for the killing. This is so if, during the act or 
omission, the defender honestly thought the force he applied was reasonable in the 
particular circumstance.  
125 
 
It was ascertained that any person who uses lethal force against an individual while 
he reasonably and in good conscience believed that deadly force is necessary to 
avoid impending danger to himself or another, or even to his or someone else’s 
property, is in most United States’ jurisdictions excused.  
From the selected states’ constitutions examined, it became clear that they all 
guarantee a definite constitutional right to defend property as they hold a dwelling 
house to be worthy of protection. Although the right to protect property is regulated, 
the constitutions do not elaborate on whether it is allowable to use lethal force in 
the course of protecting property. When examining case law, it seems that the 
jurisdictions are divided as to whether a person has the right to use lethal force 
against the aggressor in protecting life, limb and property. In some cases this is 
allowed but in others not. Similarly, setting upon one’s premises a deadly 
mechanical device in order to kill or injure another was found to be legitimate in 
some cases, while in others this was found not to be permissible. A reason for 
these variances could be the distinctive facts of each particular case; however it 
seems from the jurisprudence examined that it is more the specific court’s 
interpretation of private defence and applicable legislation. The differences in 
interpretation leads to legal uncertainty, as one does not exactly know whether a 
particular court will interpret certain conduct as lawful or not.  
 
5.2.2 Cameroon 
According to Article 2 of the United Nations’ Convention against Torture, states that 
are signatories to this treaty are required to take effective administrative, 
legislative, judicial and other methods to avoid acts of torture in their respective 
states. Subsection 2 and 3 of this Article rejects any reason whatsoever that may 
be advanced as a justification for torture. It has been found that in Cameroon, 
although a signatory to the Convention, torture and even killing for petty crimes 
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such as stealing or pickpocketing is more prevalent than any other form of 
punishment. 
In Cameroon, fitting the modern law of private defence neatly into one or other 
category has proved difficult. This is partly as a result of the fact that most cases 
do not end up in court because there is no one, not even the state, to represent the 
deceased (housebreaker or thief). Morality also plays a great role as the defender 
is regarded as having a superior interest by virtue of being the innocent party, while 
the aggressor’s interest is discounted by the act of aggression. Similarly to the 
United States, the duty to retreat is not applicable in Cameroon. This is because 
the issue of the sanctity of the home is historically emphasised. As such, there is 
no obligation placed on a defender to flee the attack.  
The Cameroon Penal Code states that no criminal responsibility may arise as a 
result of threats that could not be avoided by the defender. Apart from dwelling-
houses, the law does not hold a very clear view on killing to defend property. 
Although the legislative provisions state that the application of defensive force must 
be reasonably necessary to avoid escape, and that intentional killing must be 
proportionate to the attack which has caused the defender a reasonable 
apprehension of death, it is witnessed that mob justice instead dominates private-
defence procedures.  
According to the Cameroon Constitution, all persons have a right to life and to 
humane treatment in all state of affairs. The Constitution also specifies that no 
person shall be subjected to pain, or any form of inhumane treatment in 
whatsoever circumstances. It has been found that a constitutional challenge exists 
in this domain since the Penal Code still allows for the death penalty. This 
notwithstanding, Cameroon criminal law does not permit killing to protect property if 
there is no real risk of death or serious injury. Furthermore, mob- or social justice is 
considered unlawful. However, there are currently no consequences for these 
transgressors who kill presumed robbers or thieves. 
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No Cameroonian authorities could be found in order to provide an unambiguous 
answer to the question as to whether there is a right to kill in order to protect 
property. As mentioned earlier, once a thief is caught by a mob it is very likely that 
he will be killed and even burnt with tyres before the police arrive on the scene. 
Whether the victim was indeed the guilty party or whether the item stolen was high 
in value or not, is not important to the mob. It is also not of the essence whether 
the thief is still in possession of the property or poses any threat of death to the 
owner or to any other person as in the United States. The Cameroonian society 
applies excessive force (such as killing a thief) even in cases where only an empty 
wallet was stolen. According to a material section of the Rome Statute no one shall 
be held criminally liable if, during the act or omission, it was reasonable to defend 
property which is indispensable for that person’s continued existence. Whether the 
actions by the mob may be seen as reasonable, is highly questionable.  
It was furthermore seen that although the countries under study constantly develop 
legal rules relating to killing in defence of property, Cameroon is not following this 
trend. Efforts should be made to develop private defence of property more 
specifically in Cameroon. In this regard, the approach followed in the United States 
could serve as an example to this jurisdiction, as self-defence includes both 
defences of property and of the person. Cameroon criminal law should then 
cautiously outline justifications, limiting the kind of example to those which are 
regarded as unquestionably legally and morally suitable. 
 
5.2.3 South Africa 
Despite the ratification of international treaties such as the UDHR, South Africa and 
the other jurisdictions researched still primarily adhere to national laws with little or 
no allegiance to international laws. Although the right to own and protect property 
is recognised by the country, no specific legislation exists that specifically guides 
the subject matter of this study in South Africa (and similarly in Cameroon). The 
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power to decide any case in this regard is bestowed on the courts. Thus the courts 
apply judicial discretion and adjudicate cases of private defence based on the 
circumstances of each particular case. 
The South African legal system requires that the application of the defensive force 
be necessary; reasonably proportional to the attack; and the defender must be 
aware that he is acting in private defence. Similarly as in some states in the United 
States, the right to install devices to protect property, such as land and even 
movable properties is afforded so long as such apparatuses, if triggered would not 
result to death or serious injury to the body.  In South Africa, the pre-constitutional 
position on killing to protect property is linked to the Van Wyk case. In answering 
the question whether the common-law rule in Van Wyk will withstand constitutional 
scrutiny in so far as it allows the defender to kill merely to defend his property; it 
has been found that the application of deadly force to secure property where life is 
not in peril does not align with the South African Constitution.  
The South African courts are thus directed by the Constitution regarding the 
approach to be followed when a common-law rule conflicts with the Constitution. 
Thus, according to the Constitution, it must be the intent of every court when 
developing the common law, to promote the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
By implication, the common-law rules may be developed by the courts where it is 
appropriate to mirror constitutional goals. This may require that a limitation of a 
right must comply with section 36 the Constitution; which means weighing the 
nature, the importance and scope of the limitation of the right against the nature 
and the importance of the objective of the limitation. Apart from case law, it has 
been found that the South African Constitution remains ambiguous on the issue of 
private defence.  
It is very difficult to balance a killing with the right to secure property according to 
the proportionality requirement. Some authors insist that it will always be unlawful 
to use deadly force to defend property, because property cannot be measured 
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against the life of the thief. Still, as an attack on property may imply an 
endangerment to the life of the property’s owner, these concepts seem to be 
intertwined and should, in certain cases, be considered together. The courts have 
also in certain cases ruled that if a property is a life-saving item to the owner, it is 
worth defending even if the attacker’s life is lost in the process.  
It has also been pointed out that even though the law expects the attacked party to 
flee, no such obligation to do so exists in South African law. If one was expected to 
flee in such unlawful encounters, the implication is that the life of a criminal is 
valued more than the life of law-abiding citizens. Fleeing may also expose the 
attacked person to strikes from the rear. Counter-arguments to this assertion state 
that the loss of property may always be recovered through an eventual civil action 
or insurance claim. While such possibilities may be convincing in certain 
circumstances, it could be largely theoretical to, for example, an indigent rural 
house owner. One could therefore state that since the rights provided in the Bill of 
Rights are all of equal importance, the same protection afforded to life may 
correspondingly apply to property. 
Where a dwelling house is intruded on by unknown and uninvited persons, and the 
home owner reasonably believes the intruder to be armed and dangerous, as such, 
he has the right to use whatever means of defence he may have at his disposal, 
whether the danger was real or not. It would be outrageous to expect a person in 
such situations to remain entirely calm or to retreat.   
In South Africa, after considering the requirements for the unlawful attack as well 
as the kind of danger which the defender faced, the court’s decision is based on 
the actual state of affairs and not the reasonably believed state of affairs. Thus, the 
issue whether the defender can successfully allege private defence is determined 
by objectively examining both the nature of the attack and the defensive force used 
in order to establish whether there is conformity to the legal principles. However, it 
has been found that the decisions of judges in cases of private defence in South 
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Africa and the United States are not based on ideological reflections but on 
objective and subjective considerations. Therefore one could state that in South 
Africa a defender is required to use force which is (objectively) reasonable, as he 
(subjectively) considered it to be necessary. This approach is also followed by the 
United States. 
If the application of necessary force is justified in private defence, then it is unclear 
why lethal force must be disqualified from the principle; since lethal force may in 
certain circumstances be necessary force. A person, who is undeniably expected 
to defend his property, should not be regarded as a person acting unlawfully. 
Despite this view, the South African courts have cautioned that fatal force in 
defence of property should only be reserved for exceptional circumstances when it 
is considered reasonable and necessary to do so.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The following modifications are recommended for the various jurisdictions. 
5.3.1 United States 
The rules governing modern society must make sense. Law is the formal 
recognition thereof. Thus, the law needs to be adjusted to fit the changing needs of 
society where necessary. This can only be done by either amending the law or 
creating new laws and abandoning impractical precedents or laws in statute books.  
In the United States, the private defence of property is commonly referred to as 
self-defence. Killing in defence of property is an aspect of private defence or self-
defence. Apart from the United States, South Africa and Cameroon do not have 
appropriate and effective legislation in place for specifically addressing the private 
defence of property.  
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Owing to the present-day society being overwhelmed with violence and an ever-
increasing crime wave, it is apparent that the courts encounter an influx of cases of 
private defence. Moreover, a lack of an explicit definition can lead to poor 
prosecution, especially as the courts rely on imaginary circumstances to decide on 
a particular case. For example, the common law principle which allows a person to 
use reasonable force places the defender’s conduct wholly at the mercy of the 
court.  
Criminals may be intimidated and the rate of home invasion and other forms of 
robbery reduced if society is given clear legal rules as to when deadly force may be 
applied to defend property. The legislature could lay down a yardstick which, if not 
attained, the application of fatal force in the protection of property would be 
regarded as unlawful. If rules are to be set which permits the application of fatal 
force, they would need to be systematically definite because they intend to lay out 
restrictions in terms of what the society may or may not do. In this regard, it is also 
required that the jurisdiction impose stricter conditions for firearm licences and 
severe sanctions for possessing illegal firearms.  
Although the United States and the countries under study still have divergent 
considerations as to killing in defence of property, it is important to mention that 
these countries have ratified international treaties such as the UDHR. Thus, the 
fact that the right of private defence is a natural right founded not in the law of 
society, but in the law of nature; and the fact that the extent of the right of private 
defence is undefined by the law of nature, necessitates universally-acceptable 
legislation and definitions in this regard. This will encourage a clear understanding 
of the ground of justification, not only in the United States - where in majority of the 
states a person has no right to retreat whether he is inside or out of the home, but 
in other jurisdictions as well. Thus, if South Africa has to enact new legislations on 
private defence, the United States jurisdiction should be the measuring rod in this 
regard. 
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5.3.2 Cameroon 
The concept of private defence of property does not exist in Cameroonian criminal 
law or the Constitution.  Before the colonial era, robbery was a crime punishable by 
death. The complexity here is the fact that Cameroonians live in a constitutional 
era where such degrading punishment must be regarded as repugnant. Despite 
the ratification of the African Charter and the UDHR, legislation on private defence 
of property still differs in the various selected jurisdictions, Cameroon in particular. 
The concept of private defence of property has taken a different dimension in this 
jurisdiction which calls for firm and specific legal intervention. It is recommended 
that Cameroon enacts appropriate legislation as regards private defence of 
property and enforces its implementation. It will also be beneficial if the police force 
recruited more constables to be deployed for surveillance. This will probably 
reduce if not eliminate jungle justice in Cameroon. 
Although according to Cameroonian legislation, it is expected of the High Court to 
observe and enforce laws and customs which are not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience. However, there is no statutory or legal definition of 
what criminal punishment would be regarded as repugnant to natural justice. This 
area of the law needs redefinition. Moreover, Cameroon criminal law is very 
inexact. The Penal Code of Cameroon, for example, only make mention of 
“grievous harm” but it fails to state to what extent bodily injury would be regarded 
as grievous harm. It is noted that there has been no significant efforts to revise the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code of Cameroon either in accordance 
with English criminal-law reforms or other common-law jurisdictions such as 
Nigeria, or even in harmony with the customary law concept of criminality.  
It would be plausible for Cameroon, considering the jurisdiction’s legal history, to 
institute new national criminal laws on private defence of property; given that the 
parliament will have to approach two different contemporary legal systems (English 
and French) blended with traditional laws, and also taking into consideration the 
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United States’ laws on self-defence, to assess and compare the laws before the 
new enactments. The principles of criminal responsibility and the definitions of 
these offences need to be amended to mirror the needs of contemporary 
Cameroonian society.  
 
5.3.3 South Africa 
Since the state no longer permits the taking of life as punishment, one is left to 
ponder how the same law permits the killing of a criminal, instead of apprehending 
the culprit. If the law, with reservations, allows society to apply fatal defensive force 
to protect their property, then probable aggressors would be placed in a less 
favourable situation. This situation could perhaps fulfil one of the purposes of 
criminal law; that of deterrence, but it seems that the jurisdiction needs to put in 
place more defined private defence laws.  
Although the concept of private defence of property does not exist in any South 
African legislative text, the guarantee to security of person is found in section 12 of 
the Constitution. However, the phrase ‘private defence’ captures a broader scope 
of legally-recognised interests. This phrase includes not only the defence of person 
but also the defence of property. In this jurisdiction, certain conditions are assigned 
to the defender regarding both the attack and his defensive action. As regards the 
current requirements for private defence, if it is accepted that a defender may apply 
force to obstruct an attack where the attack is imminent, applying the 
proportionality rule would be contradictory in such circumstances. The defender 
need not wait until the robber is running away with the property or has broken in 
and is approaching him with a weapon. In such situations, it is impossible for the 
defender to estimate the exact force to be used.  
Taking into consideration the imminence of the threat, for example, it becomes 
apparent that the law still remains ambiguous and rigid; especially for an owner of 
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property who seeks to protect his property and his life. It is therefore recommended 
that parliament enacts new laws on private defence that are clear, certain and 
accessible. Societal awareness of these new laws will also go a long way to deter 
criminal actions. 
The requirement that the force used must be proportionate fail to state whether the 
prevention of a particular harm could itself be proportionate to killing someone. 
Such instances should be viewed as forming part of the necessity requirement 
because a person, having reacted to a terrifying situation, should not be judged as 
if he had the time and the chance to consider the repercussions of his actions. The 
focus should be on the kind of danger faced and not on the act of the defender. 
Again, requiring proportionality in a defensive act implies giving preferentiality to 
criminal conduct which the law claims to deter.  
Private defence in fact does not require strict or any proportionality. Despite the 
fact that Kriegler J emphasised the necessity for the law to apply the proportionality 
test; that is, weighing the interest protected against the interest of the wrongdoer, 
proportionality was not as such given preference in the case of Van Wyk. If killing 
to defend property is justified, then the proportionality requirement should not apply 
for the reason that the aggressor is considered to have waved his rights by 
persisting with the unlawful act. This judgment was confirmed in Mogohlwane. 
Even though these judgments were handed down more than 20 years before the 
introduction of the Constitution, it is submitted that if a court is approached with a 
similar private-defence situation, it is likely that it would arrive at the same verdict. 
The dilemma South Africa faces is that the constitutional right to life is of general 
application. This makes the concept of killing in defence of property foreign in 
South African legal system. As such, it could be stated that the laws relating to 
private defence do not comply with constitutional directives. Considering the South 
African crime statistics, one is concerned about the ever-increasing rate of 
incidences of burglaries and robberies. There is certainly a need for citizens to 
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protect themselves and their property in cases where law-enforcement interception 
is minimal. One cannot therefore deny the fact that the application of lethal force in 
defence of property is inevitable under these circumstances. For the South African 
criminal law to meet its objectives, it is recommended that new legislation be 
promulgated explicating the exact requirements for the private defence of property. 
In this vein, it is recommended that South Africa should consider or adopt the 
United States’ laws on self-defence, particularly the self-defence statute of Florida 
if the law on private defence has to be revisited. 
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